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Building Information Modelling (BIM) enables the creation, exchange and storage of digital 
information which represents digital and physical assets within a facility. The data within the 
in-use phase of a BIM project life cycle incorporates the highest level of details, where the as-
built data of the facilities are managed and maintained by the facilities management (FM) 
organisations. The connection of BIM with the FM systems facilitates access to as-built and 
as-maintained data of all components within a facility, which may enable control of the devices 
and systems within the facility. Hence, facilities and their occupants become ever more 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks with malicious intentions of harming the occupants or disrupting 
and destructing the facilities. Thus, effective cybersecurity management is required to protect 
data.  
Findings from the review of literature were summarised in a cybersecurity risk matrix, to bridge 
the concepts of cybersecurity and BIM in FM by unveiling the impact of a cybersecurity attack, 
resulting in a compromise of the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data in various 
task areas of a BIM-enabled FM (BIM-FM) organisation. Hence, emphasising the significance 
of effective and efficient management of cybersecurity in preserving the benefits associated 
with the implementation of BIM in FM.  Review of the literature showed that both academia 
and industry are more focused on the technical aspects of using BIM in FM, which is often 
coupled with an overdependency on technical cybersecurity measures. Thus, investing in a 
mature implementation of BIM, that includes cybersecurity considerations from a people and 
process perspective, is often overlooked in FM organisations. This has resulted in an increased 
vulnerability to a cybersecurity attack that may compromise the potential BIM benefits in FM. 
Therefore, this study sought to shift focus to the people and process aspects of the issue of 
cybersecurity in BIM-enabled FM, by exploring the people and process related BIM and 
cybersecurity determinants that contribute to a more cybersecure BIM-FM. 
An inductive approach to the research facilitated a multi-disciplinary exploration of the 
concepts of BIM and cybersecurity, which resulted in the demarcation of the research focus to 
the BIM enabled facilities management organisations. This was followed by a literature review 
and qualitative analysis of secondary data from BIM maturity models and cybersecurity best 
practice guidelines to investigate the requirements of a cybersecure implementation of BIM in 
FM. Findings were structured to form the primary research framework, that was further 
enhanced and improved using the empirical findings collected via 25 semi-structured 
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interviews with facilities management professionals. Findings from the thematic analysis of 
the interviews were coalesced with the literature review findings to develop the BIMCS-FM 
framework upon the primary research framework. The BIMCS-FM framework presents the 
determinants of a cybersecure BIM in FM and their interconnections, to assist BIM-FM 
organisations in their approach to cybersecurity management. The framework was validated 
using expert opinion that was carried out using semi-structured questionnaire, that was 
qualitatively analysed to make final revisions on the framework.   
The BIMCS-FM framework acts as a prompting mechanism for BIM-FM organisations to 
integrate cybersecurity within all aspects of BIM in FM. This framework expands the scope of 
BIM maturity, by incorporating cybersecurity considerations as part of the management of BIM 
in FM. Hence, creating a unified approach towards the management of both BIM and 
cybersecurity in FM.  The application of this framework to BIM-FM can benefit from the future 
development of process models to enable the build-up of knowledge, skill sets, awareness and 
culture that is required for a cybersecure implementation of BIM. This study also provides a 
foundation for future research into the complexities of cybersecurity in protecting the digital 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction      
 Introduction  
This chapter introduces this research study, by presenting an overview of the research scope 
and providing a background of the key domains including building information modelling 
(BIM), BIM-enabled facilities management (BIM-FM) and cybersecurity management within 
the built environment. The chapter proceeds by discussing the research rationale and 
illustrating the research aim, research question and objectives. Finally, the chapter will 
conclude by discussing the outline of the thesis. 
 Research Background 
The Architectural Engineering Construction and Operations (AECO) industry has opted for the 
adoption of technology and digital tools across all its sectors (Azhar, 2008). Many studies have 
emphasised the need for the employment of digital technologies, such as Building Information 
Modelling (BIM), for optimising processes and increasing efficiency across the whole life 
cycle of a construction project (Bughin et al., 2017). BIM facilitates a collaborative approach 
towards the generation, utilisation and management of digital information and BIM models of 
a physical asset, and its attributed operational characteristics (Ghaffarianhoseini et al., 2017a).  
Although the benefits of BIM are well demonstrated within all phases of a project lifecycle, it 
is particularly beneficial in optimising efficiency during the in-use phase of the project 
(Edirisinghe et al., 2017). The operations and maintenance work in this phase are collaborative 
in nature. Facilities management (FM) organisations liaise with contractors, sub-contractors, 
suppliers and clients/owners for various projects (Abdullah et al., 2013). All stakeholders 
commonly communicate through a digital common data environment (CDE) for an enhanced 
collaboration which encapsulates voluminous virtual information linked with the physical 
attributes of a building/facility (Louis and Dunston, 2018).  
Maglaras et al., (2018), also state that the rapid growth of connectivity between the facilities 
management systems and the real-time monitoring capabilities enabled by BIM, have increased 
the risk of a cybersecurity attack. However, this is overlooked in favour of the numerous 
advantages that technologies bring to the industry (Boyes, 2015a). Cybersecurity threats that 
can potentially disrupt the functionality of facilities, compromise the physical security of the 
occupants and incur financial losses for businesses (Boyes, 2015b). A cyber-security breach 
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within a BIM-enabled facilities management allows unauthorised access to the building 
management systems and real-time information for all aspects of the built facility (Mutis and 
Paramashivam, 2019). This results in significant risks to the health and safety of the occupants 
and the functionality of the facility/building, as well as the financial and reputational aptitudes 
of the stakeholders (Nazir et al., 2017; Purpura, 2019). Therefore, it can be concluded that 
although a cybersecurity attack can have adverse effects on all phases of a BIM project 
lifecycle, its implications within the in-use phase, managed and maintained by facilities 
management is most critical. 
Traditionally, IT or technical experts were seldom held responsible for the management and 
monitoring of information security (Tuptuk and Hailes, 2018). However, an isolated approach 
as such is criticised in the literature for its inefficiency and ineffectiveness in managing cyber 
security within digital organisations, such as BIM-FM organisations (Von Solms and Van 
Niekerk, 2013). The transition of the FM organisations from traditional to BIM-enabled ways 
of working, challenges the  achievement of a mature implementation of BIM (Pärn et al., 2017), 
which can act as a cybersecurity vulnerability with the accompanying cybersecurity threats to 
FM organisations. Therefore, cybersecurity should also be considered within both the people 
and the process aspects of BIM-FM implementations.  
For a holistic approach to the management of cybersecurity, a number of studies have proposed 
organisational cyber-security management within the context of the enterprise risk-
management domain (ERM), where risk is assessed through a multi-perspective lens (Min et 
al., 2015). Researchers have historically identified the need for strategic planning to embrace 
enterprise risk management which takes into account cybersecurity risks within digitalised 
organisations (Siponen and Willison, 2009). This is applicable to BIM- enabled facilities 
management organisations seeking to enhance their cybersecurity management capabilities, by 
a seamless integration of cybersecurity considerations within all aspects of implementing BIM 
in FM. Through the assimilation of BIM and cybersecurity capabilities, this integration will 
result in an improved state of cybersecurity within BIM-FM organisations (Boyes, 2015a; 
Mantha and de Soto, 2019). 
 Research Problem  
A multi-disciplinary exploration of the concepts of BIM and cybersecurity demonstrated the 
adverse implications of a cybersecurity attack within the in-use phase of a BIM project lifecycle 
(Boyes, 2015a; Maglaras et al., 2018). The literature illustrated that the impact of a 
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cybersecurity attack in this phase can extend to loss of life and injury for the facilities’ 
residents, as well as significant financial and reputational losses for the organisations involved 
in the management and maintenance of these facilities (Boyes, 2015c; Pärn et al., 2017). 
Further review of literature in BIM enabled facilities management shed the light on the benefits 
of implementing BIM in FM. These benefits were mainly dependent on the availability of 
accuracy of the right information at the right time. As the facilities management organisations 
are still transitioning from the traditional ways of working to BIM enabled facilities 
management, they face a number of challenges and shortfalls in the adoption of BIM, that limit 
the accomplishment of the full potentials of BIM in FM.  
Incorporating knowledge from the review of literature in cybersecurity, it was identified that 
challenges of BIM in FM act as a cybersecurity vulnerability, that may be exploited by 
malicious cybersecurity threats (Figure 1). Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may 
compromise the BIM benefits in FM, through manipulation of the availability, integrity, and 
confidentiality of information.  
Research Focus: 
CS in BIM-FM 
organisations 
BIM-FM 
Benefits of BIM 
in FM 
Challenges of 
BIM in FM 
Availability of 
accurate information 





data in organisations 
is defined by their 
availability, 
confidentiality and 















Figure 1- Identification of the research problem 
 
Hence, having an effective approach to the management of cybersecurity within BIM-FM 
organisations is essential. However, the acknowledgement of  the cybersecurity risk and the 
poor cybersecurity status in BIM-FM is limited (Mantha & Karri, 2020; Mayo and Snider, 
2016). With reference to this and recognising that cybersecurity-related research for BIM 
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within the built environment is still developing, the focus leans towards improving the technical 
and modelling capabilities of BIM. Although this support overcoming the technological 
challenges encountered in the implementation of BIM, it lacks acknowledging the people and 
process sides, which contribute towards an increased  risk of a cybersecurity attack via the 
exploitation of the resulting vulnerabilities. Therefore, there is a need to acknowledge the 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risks associated with the implementation of BIM in FM, and 
plan for a robust management of cybersecurity, that includes people, process, and technology. 
This will enable a unified management of BIM and cybersecurity, which supports an informed 
consideration of cybersecurity related issues and complexities in BIM-FM organisations. 
 Research Aims and Objectives 
The research aim is to develop a framework that assists the incorporation of cybersecurity 
considerations BIM-enabled facilities management organisations. To support the 
accomplishment of the aim, and identify how can the management of cybersecurity improve in 
BIM-FM organisations, the following objectives were defined and fulfilled: 
I. To critically explore the risks of cybersecurity across all phases of a BIM 
project lifecycle.  
II. To identify the risk factors affecting cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations. 
III. To determine the requirements of a cybersecure implementation of BIM in 
BIM-enabled facilities management organisations.  
IV. To develop and validate a framework that supports an improved integration of 
cybersecurity considerations in BIM-enabled facilities management 
organisations. 
 Research Question 
Following the preliminary explorations of the research scope, the research question was 
developed as: 
-What are the key factors that contribute to the integration of cybersecurity considerations 
within BIM enabled facilities management organisations? 
 
 Thesis Outline  
This thesis aims to articulate the exploration and investigation of the ways in which facilities 
management organisations can improve their cybersecurity in the implementation of BIM. In 
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doing so, this chapter provides an introduction to the research (See Figure 1). The second 
chapter is an in-depth exploration of BIM, BIM-enabled FM, and cybersecurity in the built 
environment, which highlights the criticality of cybersecurity in facilities management 
organisations, as part of the overall BIM life cycle. This is followed by further investigation 
into the issue of cybersecurity associated with the challenges of BIM implementation in FM. 
Exploring the theory and practice of cybersecurity management in BIM-FM organisations 
directs the focus of the research to the people and process aspects of BIM. Therefore, a thematic 
exploration of the people and process determinants of a cybersecure BIM in FM is conducted, 
upon which the initial research framework was developed (Chapter 2). The third chapter is a 
road map of the research which presents a detailed explanation of the research approach, 
philosophical positioning, methodology and most importantly, research quality and ethical 
considerations.  
Chapter four reports on findings from the semi-structured interviews conducted to further 
expand and validate the initial research framework. Hence, Chapter five discusses the empirical 
findings in relation to the theoretical findings, to restructure and expand the primary research 
framework. Chapter six describes the validation of the framework using expert review. Finally, 
chapter seven presents the attribution of findings with the research aim, research question and 
objectives and discusses the limitations of the work, along with the contributions to the industry 















Figure 2- Thesis Outline 
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 Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 Introduction  
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the three domains of Building Information 
Modelling (BIM), facilities management and cybersecurity within the built environment, to 
highlight the criticality of the issue of cybersecurity in the in-use phase, and in particular, BIM-
FM organisations, as part of the overall BIM lifecycle. The review of BIM and cybersecurity 
directs the focus of the research to the cybersecurity of BIM-enabled facilities management 
organisations (BIM-FM), following which the cybersecurity implications, and the 
underpinnings of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and challenges within the BIM-enabled FM 
organisations is reviewed. The chapter also provides a conceptual risk matrix that brings the 
three concepts of cybersecurity, BIM, and FM together. This chapter will look further into the 
requirements of a cybersecure BIM in FM. In doing so, an analysis of secondary data within 
the literature is conducted to identify the determinants of a cybersecure BIM-FM. The chapter 
concludes with a diagram of the theoretical framework of the research that portrays the 
integration of cybersecurity considerations in strategic, implementation and performance 
aspects of a BIM-enabled FM organisation.  
 BIM: A Critical Review 
The architecture, engineering, construction and operations (AECO) industry has always sought 
optimisation of processes and procedures for increasing efficiency within projects (Azhar et 
al., 2008). In 2011, the UK government mandated the use of Building Information Modelling 
(BIM) in all public sector construction projects to enable digitisation of processes, resulting in 
optimised project management and execution as well as an enhanced efficiency throughout all 
stages of a project lifecycle (Ghaffarianhoseini et al., 2017a).  
 Definitions of BIM  
The literature shows that there are multiple definitions for the term Building Information 
Modelling (BIM). Some research studies have claimed that BIM stands for building 
information management or building information modelling and management (RIBA, 2012). 
BIM could be defined differently based on the background and experience of experts working 
within a BIM-enabled project (Khosrowshahi and Arayici, 2012; Sacks et al., 2018; and 
Hardin, 2009). The definition of BIM was presented in some research studies as a tool that can 
be used for simulating the construction and/or operational processes of a facility, from which 
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the resulting model would be an accurate representation for the physical components and their 
interactions with one another (Morlhon et al., 2015). In defining BIM, some research studies 
considered BIM as a three-dimensional computational tool (Ellis, 2006). However, others 
considered it as an interactive tool for information modelling and management, rather than 
object-oriented software (Tang et al., 2020). In another definition by Schade,  (2011), BIM is 
defined as a process that supports communication, collaboration, simulation and optimisation. 
The definition of Gu et al., (2008), suggested that BIM is a digital representation of the 
information of a facility throughout the different phases of the project lifecycle using a 
structured-data repository. This is in agreement with the definition of Smith and Figp, (2010) 
definition in which BIM was assumed as a structured set of data that can easily be shared 
amongst all stakeholders. BIM can also be defined in the context of information management 
in which the information is managed throughout the lifecycle of the project, starting with the 
design process, through the construction and finally into the in-use phase of the  facility 
(Ghaffarianhoseini et al., 2017a). Smith and Figp (2010) also suggested that BIM is an image 
digitisation technology from which users can determine service costs inside buildings. A 
comprehensive definition of BIM is provided by Ahmad et al., (2012), stating that BIM is a 
powerful tool that enables information sharing, modelling, design evaluation, stakeholders 
collaboration and management of models throughout the lifecycle of a project. As highlighted 
by NBIMS Committee (2007), Ahmad (2012) and State of Ohio (2010), there are three main 
aspects to BIM:  
• A product which is considered as a structured database used in representing, simulating and 
automation of buildings. 
• An activity of developing a building information model in which processes are being created, 
scheduled, and organised. 
• A system for increasing the quality and efficiency of communication inside organisations by 
maintaining and sharing real time information. 
 Levels of BIM Adoption 
The transformation of the AECO industry from the traditional ways of working to a BIM-
enabled modus operandi has led to the introduction of four levels of BIM adoption (Levels 
0,1,2,3,4) throughout the lifecycle of a BIM project (BIM United, 2020). As shown in figure 
4, each level entails pre-set milestones that can be achieved through technological excellence 
and improving upon the collaborative methods used amongst the stakeholders. Prior to the first 
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level, level 0 indicates that there is no collaboration, and the project is based on 2D CAD 
drawings. In this level, paper and print outs of documents are the main data that are used in the 
project. Because level 0 is obsolete nowadays, in Level 1, BIM project commences by drafting 
3D drawings. 3D drawings are used during the concept phase, whereas 2D is usually used in 
acquiring approvals for design and documents. The communication and data exchange for 
stakeholders takes place using a Common Data Environment (CDE). A CDE is considered as 
a platform used for gathering, managing, and exchanging graphical and non-graphical 
information, to enable all project stakeholders to access the project related information (RICS, 
2017). Using common data environments such as SharePoint, Viewpoint, One Drive, Autodesk 
360 (Radl and Kaiser, 2019) in BIM projects enable easier access to the required information 
which saves time and effort for finding relevant information for a component, structure or asset 
(Boxall, 2015). Although collaboration is limited at this level, British Standards (e.g. BS 
1192:2007) are used to regulate data-sharing processes within collaborative projects (BIM 
United, 2020). There are several requirements in order to achieve level 1. For instance, roles 
should be clearly defined as mentioned in the CIC BIM Protocol (CIC, 2013). In this regards, 
Delany (2019) points out that compliance to standards relevant to BIM-enabled projects is also 
another consideration for BIM level 1 projects.  
Level 2 allows better coordination and easier access to the project BIM model and digital 
information for all team members and stakeholders (BIM United, 2020).  Employing digital 
information sharing processes is a fundamental requirement for deploying level 2 BIM. In a 
BIM-enabled project, team members would often be working on different files; and data would 
be shared automatically using data-exchange file format. In this way, organisations would be 
able to merge data from external sources with their local models and create the BIM model. 
This requires facilitation and installation of software that support common file formats (Leite 
et al., 2011; Richard, 2018).  
The UK government has mandated the use of BIM level 2 for all public projects, however level 
3 BIM is proposed to bring new horizons to the industry. At this level, all stakeholders 
collaborate on a centralised model that contains all information of a facility in real time (Gu 
and London, 2010; Richard, 2018). In this level, international ‘Open Data’ standards are 
required to enable data sharing across the industry and promote consistency of work processes 
and result in optimum collaboration (Gu and London, 2010). Additionally, the requirements of 
a level 3 BIM encompasses training and upskilling considerations for the public-sector 
organisations to achieve the full benefits of BIM within their projects (Richard, 2018). 
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Most organisations are still working to improve their digital collaboration processes to fulfil 
all requirements of level 2 and level 3 BIM in their organisations. This requires excelling in 
both the information modelling and information management capabilities of BIM, to enable 
optimum collaboration between stakeholders involved (Sacks et al., 2016a).  
 Digital Collaboration in BIM 
BIM enables better information management by enhancing collaboration and communications 
between teams (Ghaffarianhoseini et al., 2017b). With the adoption of BIM, all information is 
updated on a single data base which can be accessed by all stakeholders involved (Dawood et 
al., 2009; Hu, 2008; Liu, 2009). This will benefit all phases of a project lifecycle, such as 
information management in construction sites, which commonly faces issues with managing 
the exchange of information, (e.g. daily safety reports), generated from various sources, that 
might contain overlapping information (Chen and Kamara, 2011; Cho, 2002; Lee et al., 2018).  
Traditionally, the development of process models was carried out based on ISO standards for 
the exchange of data between different disciplines (Pratt, 2001).  BIM models have a schema 
(i.e. data structure) that users follow to organise and structure data (Abdelmohsen et al., 2011). 
In a BIM-enabled project, there are several schema for different products and hence, different 
information can be exported from various applications for the same object, leading to potential 
misinterpretations and loss of information within the data exchange processes between 
stakeholders (Honti and Erdélyi, 2018a). For a successful exchange of information through 
CDEs, all stakeholders should seek compliance with the regulations and best-practice 
Figure 3- BIM Levels, Source: bimportal.scottishfuturetrust.org.uk 
11 
 
guidelines and standards (BSI, 2013a). As best practice guidelines and standards are 
continuously evolving, The UK BIM framework is developed to assist the industry 
professionals in transitioning from the previous BS1192 suite to the ISO19650 series which 
have recently been published. By providing useful resources and guidance documents, UK 
BIM Framework promotes compliance to the most up to date standards for all industry 
stakeholders (“UK BIM Framework”, 2019).  
Collaboration in BIM-enabled projects entail the ability of different systems to exchange and 
share data in several formats, such as the Drawing Exchange Format and Initial Graphic 
Exchange Specification (Demian and Walters, 2014). Although there are different data 
exchange file formats, the Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) is the one that is commonly used 
in data exchange between different stakeholders (Abdelmohsen et al., 2011; Edmondson et al., 
2018; Patacas et al., 2016). A research study carried out by Van Berlo and Hendriks (2012) 
concluded that IFC contributes to the improvement of workflows especially in integrated 
project delivery systems, which inherently improves on the consistency and quality of data. 
Thus, Autodesk and Bentley systems made an agreement to facilitate exchanging files to ease 
the process of switching between the two products (Interview: Bentley Systems’ Greg Bentley, 
2016). This enables enhanced coordination and collaboration for the stakeholders involved in 
working on an integrated model (Theiler and Smarsly, 2018). For example, a project might 
include engineers from different departments such as: civil engineering, mechanical 
engineering, planning, and architectural engineering and many more. Each department’s input 
in the model is different and therefore, different end products would be generated, such as 
master-plan drawings, structural and architectural drawings, building permits, survey 
drawings, specifications, schedules, cost estimates, and models for visualising the building. All 
these products and team members interact during the lifecycle of the project creating 
information of various level of details (LODs) (Karlshøj et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2016). To 
enable such interactions, a complex digital environment with a large volume of data exchange 
between different stakeholders is created, where IFC data-exchange files play a crucial role for 
team collaboration in the AECO sector (Pishdad-Bozorgi et al., 2018). Software companies are 
continually improving the limitations of IFC data-exchange files in order to make the 
collaboration easier and more efficient (Bazjanac, 2008; Van Berlo et al., 2012; Theiler and 
Smarsly, 2018). 
All stakeholders (i.e. designers, vendors or contractors) should be transparent as to whether 
their processes abide with the regulations as set out in the BIM Execution Plan (BEP) (Lin et 
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al., 2016). Similarly, clients should clearly define the requirements for the exchange and flow 
of data and their strategy for managing information throughout the lifecycle of the project. This 
strategy should address information management during project execution and operational 
stages (Radl and Kaiser, 2019; Portal, 2020). Additionally, there might be more than one CDE 
in a project and each with differing user groups and varying functions. A project might entail 
a CDE for the exchange of information between a contractor and a designer and another CDE 
for the client to receive or publish information (BIM portal, 2020b). A CDE strategy related to 
the operational stage would be called the Asset Information Model (AIM), in which, if applied 
on an enterprise level would enable clients to access information across different projects while 
abiding with the regulations of information management as defined by BS 1192-3 (BIM Portal, 
2020; Shillcock, 2019). Organisations usually have several projects with indefinite number of 
team members; therefore, the AIM is a significant investment that would require organisations 
to understand the requirements of integrating this strategy with the internal processes of the 
organisation (BIM Portal, 2020b).  
Prior to the commencement of a BIM project, clients must investigate their infrastructure 
capabilities to ensure that data exchange is done efficiently, and the process would be 
maintained over time (BIM portal, 2020b). As stated in the BS1192-3, the Organisation 
Information Requirements (OIR) are client information models that include the information 
required to make strategic decisions (BIM portal 2020c). In OIRs, information requirements 
are categorised in a way that assists the organisation in managing physical and digital assets 
(Ashworth et al., 2016). There are several organisational aspects taken into account for the 
development of the OIR documentation (O’Neil and Saleeb, 2019). The available time and 
budget required to gather, extract and store data in addition to the tools that are available in 
order to undertake these processes are all aspects that would be addressed in a business case 
(O’Neil and Saleeb, 2019). Asset Information Requirements (AIRs) are the building blocks for 
OIR as stated in BS1192-3. They include detailed information in response to the requirements 
set out in the OIRs (The BIM Hub, 2018). In order to regulate the flow of data and make it 
more structured when defining the requirements of OIR, the Asset Information Model (AIM) 
is created to incorporate the different AIRs in which they are classified and structured to get 
stored (Amatsari et al., 2017). In order to be able to use AIRs in defining the requirements for 
OIRs, it is important that they are sufficiently granular from which answers can be derived for 
different questions regarding the asset’s lifecycle (Patacas et al., 2016; The BIM Hub, 2018). 
Plain Language Questions (PLQs) are defined as per the British Standards Institute as the 
13 
 
questions that are asked by clients through the supply chain of an asset from which decisions 
can be made. These questions assist organisations in identifying the requirements at various 
stages of a BIM project life cycle, through the identification of current stance and its 
comparison to the organisational/project goals (BIM Portal, 2020).  
 BIM Lifecycle  
BIM facilitates informed decision making at early stages rather than late in the process, which 
inherently reduces wastage of time and resources (Lorimer, 2011). As per the Omni Class 
Construction Classification System, lifecycle of construction projects is divided into 9 stages 
which include: idea, concept, design criteria, design, coordination, construction, 
commissioning, operations and closing (OCCS, 2013). Other resources such as The Royal 
Institute of British Architects (RIBA) have suggested other phases, in which there are 7 phases 
including ideation, concept, design, detailed design, construction, commissioning, closing, and 
using the facility (Sinclair, 2019). Alternatively, some studies recommended a more abstract 
categorisation using only three phases which are design, construction, and operations (Succar, 
2009). 
 
Figure 4- BIM Phases, Resource: Succar, (2009) 
 
As stated by the Construction Industry Council (2013), adopted from PAS 1192, the project 
lifecycle can be broken down into 7 phases. These include brief, concept, developed design, 
production, installation, as conducted, and in use (figure 3). These phases can be linked to the 
delivery of projects. The different stages for project delivery systems were: strategy, brief, 
concept, definition, design, build and commission, handover and closeout, operation, and end 
of life (CIC, 2013).   
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As pointed out in figure 4, BIM models have the ability to combine graphical, non-graphical 
information and documentation in one file from which a user can define and visualise the 
components of buildings (Kensek, 2015; Morlhon et al., 2015). BIM models also offer 
information on how different objects and parameters interact with each other and how they are 
interrelated (Honti and Erdélyi, 2018b). Hence, this entails data exchange files to contain more 
information than just simple geometrical information that are usually shown on CAD files 
(Bandi, 2019).  
Research studies have addressed the features of BIM that can be used over the lifecycle of the 
project. As stated by Baldwin and Bordoli (2014), application of BIM in the design phase 
enables spatial visualisation and interdisciplinary coordination. BIM can also be used in design 
analysis for structural elements, energy modelling and simulation, and viability check of the 
design against the code (Czmoch and Pękala, 2014). During the construction phase, BIM 
enables informed decision making regarding site mobilisation and utilisation, activity 
sequencing, scheduling and cost estimation (Eadie et al., 2013). It can also be used in asset and 
facility management by monitoring, managing and reporting issues that would be linked to the 
building environment and components (Kelly et al., 2013a).   
 BIM Data Across Project Phases 
In a BIM-enabled project, the project information is visualised in a digital environment to 
provide useful information for decision making in various activities within a construction 
project, such as  procurement, fabrication, construction and operations, and maintenance 
(Zhang, et al., 2015). The digital representation of the project is in the form of a model which 
contains information regarding the geometry, spatial environment, characteristics of building 
components, cost estimations and many more characteristics of the project (Bazjanac, 2008). 
The real time update of this model with the progress and advancement of the project allows for 
the exchange and communication of the scope of the quantities, scope of the work and the 
potential changes and amendments with all stakeholders (McArthur, 2015).  
The information used within every stage of a BIM project is of a different level of detail (LoD). 
The Level of details (LOD) is defined as the extent of information that can be provided to the 
user. The term information refers to the geometric and non-geometric information required to 
complete a certain task in a BIM project (Kim et al., 2013). The LOD has been addressed in 
several research studies (Calvin Kam et al., 2013; Jeong et al., 2009; Leite et al., 2011). The 
American Institute of Architects (AIA, 2013) published the E202 LOD standard which can be 
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used in different lifecycle phases from which the user can determine the LOD level on a five-
level scale starting with 100 and ending with 500. This scale indicates the level of details and 
the richness of the information attached to an object in the model. Information such as 
geometrical and geographical location can be determined at level 100, whereas level 500 
indicates accurate size, orientation and quantity in addition to some detailed information such 
as time and cost (Ikerd et al., 2013).  
Several studies have addressed various classification of LOD. These studies were mostly based 
on AIA standards. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the BIM Forum adopted the same five 
levels of AIA standards in developing the LOD specification. An additional level, namely level 
350 was added to the five-point scale. Leite et al. (2011), suggested another LOD to be used 
by software developers in which information such as shape and location geometry and 
fabrication can be identified. The LOD developed by AIA which has also been presented in 
different studies, described the different levels and corresponding level of details in each level. 
In LOD 100, the elements in a model are graphically represented by symbols and generic 
elements, in a way that does not classify to level 200. In LOD 200, model elements are 
represented graphically in an approximate way with some information such as quantities, 
heights, lengths, and widths in addition to geographic orientation. LOD 300 models contain 
graphical representation for specifics, either a system or object, and information such as 
quantities, sizes and geographical location are shown. Similarly, LOD 400 contains the same 
information as the ones in LOD 300, however the user would be able to attach non-graphic 
information to the elements of the model. LOD 500, would have the model elements size, 
quantities and location in addition to non-graphic information (Ikerd et al., 2013; Latiffi et al., 
2015). 
A higher LOD would help in more accurate analysis of performance inside buildings 
(Autodesk, 2017), which is known as Building Performance Analysis (BPA). If a model is at a 
LOD 100, this would prevent a user from modelling energy which would be required for LEED 
certification, however LOD 100 can determine how sunlight would affect energy consumption 
inside the building. Therefore, LOD and BPA share certain inputs and outputs as the project 
progresses (Liu et al., 2017). In order to assess a model using BPA, LODs can be determined 
based on the evolution of the project lifecycle.  
In the ideation (planning) phase, project requirements are identified, and aspects related to 
existing buildings and services are collected (Autodesk, 2020a).  There are assumptions related 
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to LOD at the idea phase during the project lifecycle.  For example, if it is an existing project 
there could be a pre-existing BIM model at level 300, while if it was a new project, the 
possibility of having a BIM model would be low. In this phase, decisions related to data and 
geographic location should be made in addition to project site-visitations and investigations. 
Information related to the climate such as wind speed, daylight duration, precipitation and 
existing utilities shall be gathered. Following the collection of data, analysis shall be made in 
order to determine the feasibility of having a building in this location from which sustainability 
issues can be resolved and analysed (Autodesk, 2020; Grytting et al., 2017; Ikerd et al., 2013; 
Leite et al., 2011).  In the concept design phase, the general idea and direction of how design 
will progress is set. At this phase, most models are at LOD 100 in which elements are modelled 
at an abstract level.  During this phase conceptual runs are made to predict energy consumption. 
Studies related to building orientation and facades would also be carried out at that stage 
(Autodesk, 2020b).  
After proposing concept designs, design development is instantiated in which proposed design 
is refined and materials are selected in addition to the structural elements design (Autodesk, 
2020c).  In the design and development phase LOD is usually LOD200 or LOD300 in which 
materials for cladding are identified and wall thicknesses and materials are modelled.  At this 
phase, the structural model should be at LOD200 with structural elements selected and 
designed (i.e., beams, columns, or frames). MEP models are usually at LOD200 in which pipes 
and ducts sizing would be the next task (Leite et al., 2011). A complete building analysis and 
simulation is carried out at this phase in which the geometric features and building components 
are analysed (Autodesk, 2020c). Also, energy modelling is performed to understand the 
building reaction to solar radiation based on the selected materials. Additionally, structural 
analysis is carried out to size structural elements and finalise the design (Autodesk, 2020c). 
During the final design, detailed design and documentation for the various project components 
are produced (Grytting et al., 2017). All models should be completed at LOD 300, with sizes 
and materials finalised on all elements in the building. At this stage, documents for the final 
design are produced which would include the findings for the final building analysis (Nilsen 
and Bohne, 2019). During construction phases, the as-built elements would be modelled which 
would be at LOD 400.  
After the construction phase, operations and maintenance for the building requires LOD 500 
in which actual operating conditions are accurately represented on the BIM model (Cassano 
and Trani, 2017). During this phase, commissioning and testing are performed by facility 
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management in which the comfort for occupants can be determined. The difference between 
design and actual building performance can be verified and the costs resulting from these 
differences can be calculated (Alavi and Forcada, 2019). In this phase, facilities- management 
organisations undertake the operations and maintenance of the facilities, by exchanging high 
volumes of data with maximum level of detail (Becerik-Gerber et al., 2012a).  
 Security of BIM Data  
Explorations of BIM data across various phases of a BIM lifecycle illustrated that high volumes 
of digital information are managed and maintained in all phases of a BIM lifecycle. The 
information can be in various formats, with different level of details in the various phases 
(Dawood et al., 2015). However, the common thread across all phases of a BIM project is the 
digital collaboration between all stakeholders involved in the project (Ashcraft, 2008). This 
requires an increased interaction of people (stakeholders) with technology (BIM tools, digital 
devices and systems), where each stakeholder may be at a different level of BIM adoption, with 
different information management capabilities and facilities (Succar, 2010). This raises 
concerns regarding the secure management of BIM data at rest (archived) or in transit (during 
exchange) (Giel and Issa, 2013). Thus, the following section presents a holistic overview of 
the issue of cybersecurity in the digital built environment, to explore the cybersecurity risks 
and threats, and in particular, across various phases of a BIM project.   
 Cybersecurity across BIM Lifecycle  
As stated by Mutis and Paramashivam (2019), many factors contribute to the cybersecurity 
vulnerability of a BIM-enabled project, which include: BIM level, level of data and how it is 
exchanged. Therefore, throughout the lifecycle of a BIM-enabled project, risk impact and 
vulnerability differ, based on the phase that the project is in. 
In the early phases of a project planning, the aim is to determine the feasibility and objectives 
of the project (Mantha and de Soto, 2019; Zhang, Seet, et al., 2015). A feasibility study is 
carried out after identifying the project requirements, for which the technical requirements are 
analysed, and preliminary cost estimations are produced. During this phase, the number of 
stakeholders is at a minimum, with the majority of information being in 2D formats (Akcamete 
et al., 2019). The LOD in such phases is commonly LOD 100 which entails a relatively lower 
data-sensitivity in most projects.  However, there are still critical assets that deal with data, that 
could be subject to threats, such as data theft (Kure et al., 2018). Competing parties might be 
interested in getting their hands on the sensitive financial and commercial information, for 
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achieving leverage over other parties (Brackney and Anderson, 2004; Sommer and Brown, 
2011).  
During the design phase, project objectives are implemented in the form of a preliminary 
design. In this phase, collaboration entails the exchange of information in 2D and 3D formats 
with a relatively higher LOD (e.g. 200 or 300), because the data is representative of more 
components, structure and details of the project (Leite et al., 2011). Thus, the level of 
vulnerability slightly increases in comparison to the start of the project. Also in this phase, 
critical asset-information, including cost estimations, proprietary data on materials, or design 
of building components, is subject to theft through unauthorised access, leading to financial 
losses and reputational damage for the organisation (Baker, 2014; Björck et al., 2015).  
A cybersecurity attack in this phase might also result in theft of intellectual properties (Loza 
de Siles, 2015). Innovative ideas in the design phase of a model, or a certain construction-
method statement is considered as intellectual property, and, if an engineer or architect wants 
to prevent an idea from being exposed or stolen, appropriate security measures should be 
implemented. As BIM models provide a centralised data base, accessible to all stakeholders, 
the risk of a compromise of intellectual properties is rather high (Boyes, 2015a; NIBS, 2017).  
During the construction and procurement phases, the data is a higher LOD (i.e. LoD 400 or 
500) and provides a more accurate representation of the project components and environment 
(Aram et al., 2013; Lin and Su, 2013). Therefore, a breach of cybersecurity could allow 
malicious tampering with data regarding the equipment and machinery, resulting in disruption 
of operations, or health and safety implications for the workers on site (Boyes, 2015c). Remote 
access to data using mobile devices connected to the internet, is also associated with risk of 
cybersecurity compromise. The connection to the public-internet networks would increase the 
vulnerability of devices to attacks using malware (Vishwakarma, 2016). Hence, the use of 
mobile devices to access a BIM model on site are accompanied by cybersecurity risks (Lin and 
Su, 2013). 
Following the delivery of the project and during its in-use phase, facilities are maintained and 
operated in order to avoid degradation over time and to maintain a certain level of functionality 
(Apostolopoulos et al., 2016; Marmo et al., 2019). During this phase, the data for the facility, 
including all devices and components installed, are stored and exchanged with a large number 
of stakeholders (Mayo and Snider, 2016; Tang et al., 2020). This data is of the highest LOD, 
as it represents both the as-built, and as-maintained information for the facility (Alavi and 
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Forcada, 2019).The connectivity of BIM with building management systems that control the 
IoT devices installed within a facility,  may enable malicious cyber actors to perform cyber-
attacks, with the aim of causing physical damage to the facility or a threat to the health and 
safety of the occupant (Cui et al., 2018; Yaqoob et al., 2017).  The damage can take the form 
of financial loss, reputational loss, operational disruption, security breach, injury or loss of life 
of the occupants (Amin, 2019). Hence, the impact of a cyber-attack during the in-use phase of 
a BIM project is deemed as critical.  
The BIM life-cycle cyber-risk model (Figure 5) portrays various phases of a BIM lifecycle and 
their attributed LOD, information content and potential cyber-risk impacts at each phase. It 
also demonstrates a holistic view of the issue of cybersecurity, by presenting the risk impacts 
at each stage and highlights the life span of each phase to enable comparison.  




Figure 5 illustrates that cybersecurity risks impact all phases of a BIM lifecycle. Although the 
impact of a cybersecurity risk in earlier phases is not as critical as the final phases, they may 
still have disastrous effects on the facility and those involved in the project. However, as the 
in-use phase is found to be the most critical, in terms of the impact of cyber-attacks, the focus 
of this research is narrowed down to the BIM-FM organisations. This enables the research to 
conduct a more focused investigation into the problem and collect concise knowledge on the 
cybersecurity management of BIM-FM. 
A summary of the findings that support the decision made above are listed below (Alavi and 
Forcada, 2019; Amin, 2019; Apostolopoulos et al., 2016; Cui et al., 2018; Marmo et al., 2019; 
Mayo and Snider, 2016; Tang et al., 2020; Yaqoob et al., 2017) : 
• A very high volume of data is exchanged and stored in the facilities management 
organisations 
• A long-term (more than 10 years) of data life cycle is estimated for the in-use phase.  
• The facilities management working processes entail collaboration with various 
contractors, suppliers and providers of products and services. Hence, data is digitally 
exposed to various stakeholders involved in a BIM project.  
• An increase in the physical security risk due to smart devices and sensors installed in 
the buildings, which can cause danger to the health and safety of personnel and residents 
of the facility. 
Considering the findings, the secure management of information at the in-use phase of a BIM 
project would be critical. Therefore, robust information management processes and procedures 
are required to ensure the availability of information to achieve the BIM benefits in FM. To 
further understand the issue of cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations, the following section 
presents an overview of the application of BIM in FM, to implementing BIM in FM, and to 
understand the challenges associated with the implementation of BIM in FM organisations.   
 Role of BIM in Facilities Management 
 Overview of Facilities Management 
Facilities management organisations are involved in multidisciplinary tasks to deliver 
functional working-environments that accommodate people, processes and technology (British 
Institue of Facilities Management, 2012). Existing studies propose varying definitions of 
facilities management. While some studies consider more tasks areas, others only focus on a 
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limited number of activities associated with FM. In the light of this, Shiem Shin Then (1999) 
describes facilities management as a practice that seeks to provide a functional environment 
for the support of businesses and their resources. The author further elaborates on the role of 
facilities managers, which is to balance all assets inside a facility by delivering the needs and 
overcoming the challenges. Many resources such as the Omni Class Construction 
Classification System (OCCS) distinguish between the management of facilities, and their 
operations and maintenance tasks (Services, 2018). In the light of this, facilities management 
is defined as the management of safety and functionality of facilities, which differs from the 
operations and maintenance tasks that are solely focused on maintaining the operations within 
the facility (Succar et al., 2013). Alternatively, several resources present a more comprehensive 
definition of FM, which includes maintenance and operations as part of the FM’s activities to 
ensure the functionality and usability of buildings (Barrett and Baldry, 2003; Becker and Steele, 
1990). Some authors have even proposed that facilities management can also include all the 
stages of a construction project (Ebinger and Madritsch, 2012).  
 BIM-Enabled Facilities Management (BIM-FM) 
In traditional facilities management, information, including equipment inventory, data sheets, 
spare parts and schedules used in maintenance activities, are usually paper based documents 
that are handled and exchanged manually (Abdullah et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2013). Such 
information is sometimes incomplete and inaccurate as a result of human error. Hence, huge 
efforts are required to recreate these paper-based documents if they are lost or damaged (House 
et al., 2007; Keady, 2013). Carbonari et al., (2018) highlights that BIM resolves this issue by 
providing access to all the required information through a digital platform which enhances 
communication and collaboration  amongst all stakeholders (Lin et al., 2016; Matarneh et al., 
2019).  However, this depends on FMs understanding of the information requirements of each 
task (Volk et al., 2014). Patacas et al., (2015) point out that the early engagement of FM in a 
BIM-enabled project facilitates the coordination of all phases of the construction project by 
coordinating workflows, tools, and regulations to fulfil the information requirements of the FM 
tasks (Eastman et al., 2011). This will ensure the right data is shared with the right stakeholders, 
to save time and effort in finding the right data for a specific task (Lin et al., 2016).  
The visualisation capabilities brought by BIM enables an improved understanding of the 
building components compared to the conventional 2D drawings (Leite et al., 2011). A BIM 
model visualises the updated as-built and as-maintained information of a facility, including the 
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Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing (MEP) data required to perform operations and 
maintenance tasks (Hu et al., 2018). Also, BIM models provide parametric description of the 
interrelationship between the components, enabling the management of the building 
performance and monitoring the functionality of the components (Abdullah et al., 2015; Atkin, 
B., & Brooks, 2015; Gao and Pishdad-Bozorgi, 2019). These features in BIM provide enhanced 
accuracy on the predictions and estimations of the resources required for undertaking all FM 
tasks (Marmo et al., 2019) 
The review of the literature demonstrated that the implementation of BIM, benefits the FM 
organisations in various task areas (Pishdad-Bozorgi et al., 2018). As per the definitions in 
section 2.3.2, activities in task areas differ across FM organisations. They might focus solely 
on management and maintenance of the operations and functionalities of the facility, or might 
also carry out renovations and construction projects (Barrett and Baldry, 2003; Ebinger and 
Madritsch, 2012). However, despite the high variety of activities carried out within various FM 
organisations, the literature is commonly focused on the benefits of BIM in financial 
management, space management, and the operations and maintenance of facilities. According 
to Barrett and Baldry, (2003) and Becker and Steele, (1990), the FM task areas include the 
operations and maintenance, as well as the management of the physical and digital assets. 
However, as per Ilter and Ergen (2015), the sustainability projects in the built facilities and 
those projects involving refurbishment and renovation, can neither be fitted in operations or 
management. Hence, space management is considered as an individual category which includes 
management of space and optimising the utilisation of environments within a facility. 
Therefore, the following sections will provide an overview of the implementation of BIM in 
three main task areas of FM:  
 Financial Asset Management 
Facilities management is not only limited to managing and maintaining the physical assets of 
a built environment, such as the heating system, it covers the management of all assets related 
to a built facility, including cost estimations, structural data and data related to occupants and 
operations (Guillen et al., 2016). In this regards Eastman et al. (2011) and BIFM (2012), 
suggested that the implementation of BIM in FM could be used to support real-time decision 
making, regarding resource allocation, scheduling, and financial management.  
The asset-management task area in a BIM project involves managing the finances as well as 
the contractual documentation and legal matters for the facility (Kassem et al., 2015a). Costs 
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for preventive and corrective maintenance must be identified right at the outset. The BIM 
model sets up cost control for facility managers and establishes an effective monitoring system 
for the management and control of the budget (Naghshbandi, 2016a).  
For the optimum management of assets, data should be collected and maintained for all systems 
and services, that need to be continuously running to keep the building functional. Asset 
management entails documenting and storing as-built drawings, lists of equipment and their 
spare parts, warranty certificates, defect liability periods of contractors and suppliers, contact 
details of suppliers, operation and maintenance manuals, product data-sheets, a preventive 
maintenance schedule and other asset-specific information that assists with the effective 
management of the physical (tangible) and digital (intangible) assets related to a facility 
(Becerik-Gerber et al., 2012b). The availability of accurate information in BIM-FM would 
enhance the asset value by enabling effective FM (Guillen et al., 2020). This is achieved 
through the effective management of budget and human resources and the timely maintenance 
of the facility, which improves the life-span of the built asset (Alkasisbeh and Abudayyeh, 
2018).This requires concise information about material quantities, and the labour costs required 
for undertaking a specific task, which can be facilitated by BIM (Tang et al., 2020).  
 Space management  
Space management involves the optimisation of the way space is used in a facility. In the light 
of this, Steiner, (2006) states that the management of space and the physical assets within, can 
have a positive or negative impact on the productivity of workers within a business 
environment, or the comfort of residents in any type of facility.  
One of the most desirable features of BIM is its capability for visualising space and its 
components, enabling optimised planning of the requirements of space utilisation (Becerik-
Gerber et al., 2012b). In this regards, ARCHIBUS (2013) elaborates on the need to have an 
accurate inventory of all assets associated with certain spaces of a facility, including the asset 
description along with the status of the space being used, or left unused. This information is 
often in the form of a CAD file, along with specific indexes that are used to collect, or display 
data related to a specific space within a facility. BIM assists by accommodating elevation 
creation, section modelling, layout views and visual rendering of the proposed changes; and 
hence, results in time saving and cost-efficient decision making (Love et al., 2014). One of the 
identified challenges in this regard is inconsistent labelling and updating of information, which 
can be resolved by the effective application of BIM in FM (Becerik-Gerber et al., 2012b). An 
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additional benefit of BIM in FM is the potential to monitor asset utilisation over the period of 
use. This would show that the space is both sufficient and meets the user requirement 
(Ashworth, Tucker and Druhmann, 2016).  Furthermore, BIM provides access to information 
about the building structure and shell, entailing the load calculation for structural elements 
(column, beam, slabs, core wall and shear wall) and assisting facility managers in decisions on 
major renovations (McGraw Hill Construction, 2012). It is also possible to verify the material 
selections against the specific building code and regulations (AEC (UK) Committee, 2012).  
 Operations and maintenance 
According to Barbarosoglu and Arditi, (2019), operations and maintenance of a facility is either  
corrective or preventive. Preventive maintenance encompasses services that prevent failure of 
machinery or components in the future; while corrective maintenance corresponds to actions 
that are taken to maintain the operations of a facility (Kassem et al., 2015b; Sullivan et al., 
2010; Yam et al., 2001).  
BIM enables the real-time exchange of facility information for all the stakeholders involved 
(Matarneh et al., 2019). The real-time information is captured from various digital tools used 
in FM to optimise working-processes (Pishdad-Bozorgi et al., 2018). For instance, CMMS and 
CAFM, as two of the most commonly used software in FM, are capable of storing built-asset 
information for reactive and preventive maintenance as well as tracking and monitoring events 
(Mohanta and Das, 2016). This information will be updated on the BIM model to enable 
improved decision making, leading to the optimisation of processes and work plans within the 
operations and maintenance tasks (Carreira et al., 2018).  
Furthermore, operational management requires continuous and real time monitoring of the 
facilities, which is where BIM plays a critical role (Davtalab, 2017). The real-time sensing of 
the smart devices integrated with BIM 6D-models can save time by up to 80% (Davtalab, 
2017), enabling the optimisation of processes in operations and maintenance tasks. The 
accurate assessment of the asset, including the resource limitations, and the accurate evaluation 
of the conditions of the asset, assists the facility management-team to model and predict the 
deterioration and depreciation of the assets. Furthermore, the repair and maintenance strategies 
can be selected by also taking into account the requirements and risks involved in the processes 
(Naghshbandi, 2016a). In this regards, Lavy and Jawadekar (2014) point out the capability of 
a BIM 3D database in providing useful information that could assist in the prediction of 
building behaviour and facility deterioration more accurately.  
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BIM simulation capabilities enable the creation of multiple replications for different energy-
use scenarios, and the reaction of facility-systems to each scenario to enable the enhancement 
of the system configuration. For instance, using such an approach would facilitate corrective 
measures when a certain space is unoccupied, such as switching off the lights, which would 
eventually reduce energy consumption and result in energy savings. This could also be used to 
predict energy consumption over time, based on previous trends of consumption and usage 
(Gourlis and Kovacic, 2017; Wu and Issa, 2015). In addition, the building-performance data 
collected through BIM ensures that the building is operating as per a specific standard. The 
areas to be modified or upgraded could be identified by the FM team to improve the overall 
building-performance (Carnero and Gómez, 2017).  
In maintenance management, BIM assists FM to implement a proactive-maintenance plan. The 
facility managers can develop efficient maintenance plans as well as keeping a record of 
maintenance, which will ultimately reduce any corrective and emergency maintenance 
(Carnero and Gómez, 2017). In complex building structures where several systems are working 
simultaneously, essential services cannot be halted for maintenance, due to the risks involved 
with health and safety and security. Analysis of BIM models enables FM to undertake a risk 
assessment for operation and maintenance processes, leading to improved coordination 
amongst the contractors, suppliers and inter-organisational teams (Becerik-Gerber et al., 
2012b).  
Emergency management is another important task area which benefits from the implementation 
of BIM in FM (Arslan et al., 2014; Gao and Pishdad-Bozorgi, 2019; Wang et al., 2014) 
Emergency events, both human or natural, such as: failure of services, fires, earthquakes, and 
force majeure need to be managed, in order to avoid business disruptions, health and safety 
compromise or financial losses (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003; Lee et al., 
2013). Emergency management relies on up to date data from different sources which would 
need to be well organised and maintained to enable an informed and appropriate decision in 
the event of an emergency (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003; Kennett et al., 
2005).  
Being able to access the data from BIM quickly can give insights which enable prompt 
decisions. Through the visual capabilities of BIM models, users can identify the location of 
events and pinpoint the hazards or identify the interrelationships between hazardous locations 
and emergency-evacuation routes, to aid decision-making during emergency events (Wang et 
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al., 2014) . Additionally, BIM can contribute to the development of better training for 
emergency management (Becerik-Gerber et al., 2012). The simulation capabilities of BIM can 
be used to simulate the expected impact of an event and testing the anticipated responses for 
the proposed emergency plans (Arslan et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2020). 
Table 1 summarises the benefits associated with the implementation of BIM, in the three main 




Table 1-BIM benefits in FM 
 








1. Enhancing productivity 
2. Improving forecasting and cost estimations  
3. Informed decision making 
4. Process optimisation 
5. Availability of real-time data for cost estimation 
6. Visualisation for project elements that must be estimated  
Space 
Management 
1. Increasing efficiency of allocated spaces in a facility  
2. Process optimization for building uses  
3. Efficient planning of spaces, components, and events   
4. Monitoring space use to make improvements  
5. Effective management of safety and security of facilities   
Operational 
Management 
1. Developing and visualizing various scenarios to improve 
building performance and functionality 
2. Effective disaster management enabled by the availability 
of reliable real-time information  
3. Availability of updated information regarding facilities’ 
components and equipment 
4. Ease of access to the required information for operations 
and maintenance  
5. Availability of accurate quantity take offs  
6. Real-time update of the model to include changes  
7. Optimisation of maintenance scheduling, monitoring and 




 BIM Challenges in FM  
Despite the benefits associated with the implementation of BIM in FM, as with any new digital 
solution, there are strategic, implementational and performance related complexities and 
challenges which need to be discussed. These include: 
• Lack of data availability: It was reported by Becerik-Gerber et al. (2012) and Kassem 
et al., (2015) that the full potential of BIM in FM bloom with the involvement of FM 
organisations in the earlier phases of the project. However, current practice 
demonstrates a lack of engagement by the facilities in the planning, design, and 
construction phases, in which the information required for the FM operations and 
maintenance are defined (Gao and Pishdad-Bozorgi, 2019). Furthermore, FM depends 
on using meaningful data from BIM data models, but sometimes this data is not 
structured for use within FM working-tasks (Carreira et al., 2018).In many UK public 
projects, common practice entails changing the FM contractor every 3-5 years (FBIFM, 
2010), which could increase the likelihood of poor data transfer from one organisation 
to the other, resulting in the loss of data or compatibility issues. Hence, additional 
surveys would be required incurring additional costs (Kelly et al., 2013a). In some 
instances, contractors are required to conduct a survey of the facility after the 
completion of construction works, or when a new contract for performing maintenance 
activities is awarded and the contractor is changed, both of which might result in data 
duplication (Barbosa et al., 2016). As such, with information not being available at the 
right time, a BIM-FM organisation will face restrictions in carrying out everyday tasks 
(Kassem et al., 2015a).  
• Lack of organisational BIM-readiness: The cultural aspect of adopting a new 
technology is also considered a challenge, as FM is considered by many practitioners 
as a rigid industry with a fragmented nature (Daniotti et al., 2020; Newswire, 2020). 
This has led to a degree of scepticism and reluctance towards the adoption of BIM, 
which weakens the cultural readiness of the FM organisation for a digital renovation of 
working practices (Abbasnejad et al., 2020; Edirisinghe et al., 2017). As stated by Kelly 
et al., (2013), there is insufficient demand for using BIM in FM, as a result of the costs 
incurred for facilitating the resources for BIM implementation. 
• Lack of knowledge and Skills: To achieve the full potential of BIM 
implementation, FM organisations are required to provide continuous training 
programs to upskill employees and ensure they have sufficient knowledge, skills and 
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awareness in handling, manipulating, interpreting, analysing and managing BIM data 
and models in FM (Becerik-Gerber et al., 2012b; BIM Task Group, 2012). Considering 
that BIM in FM has only recently been introduced, there is a gap of knowledge and 
awareness amongst those in FM industry, which affects compliance to good practice 
and creates process inconsistencies amongst the stakeholders (Puolitaival and Forsythe, 
2016). 
• Lack of standardisation: A number of guidelines are available that address the 
application of BIM in FM organisations (Ashworth et al., 2016; BuildingSMART, 
2010). Examples include the Government’s Soft landings (GSL) FM guidance, that 
demonstrates how BIM could be used to support FM throughout the lifecycle of the 
facility  (BIM Task Group, 2012). Also there is the RICS strategic plan of work for 
BIM in FM, which provides facility managers with the steps to follow for the operations 
and maintenance of the buildings (RICS, 2017, 2018). However, a number of studies 
have shown that the existing BIM standards are still developing and need upgrading to 
address all aspects that need to be taken into account (Alreshidi et al., 2017; Binesmael 
et al., 2018). To exemplify further, the only guideline addressing the cybersecurity of 
BIM-FM organisations are the PAS1192-5, later superseded by ISO19650 (New BIM 
Standards - ISO19650, 2020), which does not specifically address FM practices, and 
are rather focused on the design and construction phases, and the hand-over of the 
project data in between the phases (Shillcock, 2019). Furthermore, Sacks et al., (2016) 
point out that the available standards are evolving and advancing as more FM 
organisations with various characteristics are seeking to adopt BIM for various FM task 
areas. This has resulted in difficulties for the FM organisations to standardise their 
processes and procedures. Particularly in the area of information management in BIM, 
ISO19650 has been developed in two parts to supersede all previous standards (New 
BIM Standards - ISO19650, 2020). However, the regulating bodies are still in the 
process of developing guidelines to assist organisations in complying with the new 
standards (UK BIM Framework, 2020). As stated by the Centre for Digital Built 
Britain, (2018), transition to the new ISO standards will require trained resources, as 
well as financial resources to support the new changes.  
• Issue of interoperability and incompatibility : The issue of interoperability and 
incompatibility of digital project data exchanged between project stakeholders, is one 
of the challenges of using BIM in FM (Pärn et al., 2017). The British Institute of 
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Facilities Management, (2012) reported that there is a need to standardise libraries that 
can be used in data exchange and transfer of data for facilities. The inconsistency and 
incompatibility of data format and system configuration is one of the challenges that 
FM organisations face in converting to a BIM-enabled FM organisation (Hoang et al., 
2020). For instance, the COBie specifications for exchanging information was 
developed to capture and exchange information required by FM teams (Kensek, 2015). 
It was concluded by Patacas et al., (2016) that COBie is used in data structuring to help 
in overcoming the issue of  interoperability, however the lack of knowledge or process 
for collecting the right data impedes the potential advantages of complying with the 
standard (Lavy and Jawadekar, 2014).  
• Lack of formal documentations and contracts : There are several legal risks that 
could arise from using BIM in FM such as BIM data ownership and how to protect the 
data copyrights (Eadie et al., 2015). This is identified as a gap in contractual 
documentation, that creates complexities in managing access to information for all 
stakeholders involved (BIFM, 2012). Considering the collaborative nature of the BIM 
projects, over-restricting access to information may limit real-time collaboration, and 
create difficulties in managing the security of the embedded data that requires various 
parties to access the models for validation purposes (AIA, 2013).  
 Invoking the Risks of Cybersecurity in BIM-FM 
Challenges in the implementation of BIM are also the contributing factors for a weak 
information security. For instance, a lack of defined information requirements for FM tasks 
would lead to the exchange of a large volume of facility-related data amongst the stakeholders, 
without considering the relevance of that information to the task. Hence, effective authorisation 
of access to data would be difficult to achieve (Gao and Pishdad-Bozorgi, 2019; Mell and 
Grance, 2011). The literature further sheds light on the issues associated with transfer of data 
when the FM body is transferred to a new contractor. The interoperability issues as well as the 
probability of information loss resulting from the poor handling and management of digital 
information, heightens the risk of unauthorised access to the data and the compromise of 
information confidentiality (Mantha, 2020). Also, reluctance to adopt the digital ways of 
working brought by BIM, further affects the organisational approach for developing the 
required knowledge, skills and awareness for working with digital tools in a BIM-FM 
organisation (Akbarieh et al., 2020). This shows that poor interaction between people and 
technology creates opportunities for malicious cyber-intrusions which compromise the security 
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of digital data in  BIM projects (Doneda and Almeida, 2015). To further exemplify the effect 
of these challenges on the information security of FM organisations, the literature highlights 
the issue of interoperability and incompatibility. This results from process inconsistencies and 
poor compliance to standards and best-practice guidelines such as COBIE, which instruct on 
how to follow a more homogenous approach to the structuring and layering of data, to avoid 
complications during the exchange of data and models (Lee et al., 2018; Patacas et al., 2015). 
A lack of formal documentation stating the process requirements and contractual agreements 
solidifying the stakeholder responsibilities and authority over the project, also results in 
complexities with data-ownership. This can further complicate the effective management of 
data-access authorisation. Data-ownership complexities mean that the responsibility for 
ensuring the security of the data is lost and hence, the vulnerability of data to security breach 
increases (AIA, 2013). As stated by von Solms and von Solms (2018) information security 
should encompass cybersecurity, when the information is presented in a digital environment, 
but the existing literature has often viewed cybersecurity through an information-security lens 
(Calder, Alan ; Watkins, 2019; Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011). In a BIM-FM organisation where 
information is digitally produced, handled, and managed in a CDE, using various digital tools 
and technologies, a lack of robust information-security management can lead to a heightened 
risk of cybersecurity breach. The cybersecurity risks and their impact on BIM-FM 
organisations are further explored in section 2.4.3. 
 Cybersecurity Concept in Digital Built Environment 
The existing literature fails to provide a unified definition for cybersecurity (Bayuk, 2012), 
which presents a variety of viewpoints, ranging from technical measures to managerial 
functions which protect information from unauthorised access (Bailey et al., 2015; Bayuk, 
2012). The Task Force Transformation Initiative (2015) presents a more comprehensive 
definition of cybersecurity as a “computing-based discipline involving technology, people 
information, and processes to enable assured operations. It involves the creation, operation, 
analysis, and testing of secure computer systems. It is an interdisciplinary course of study, 
including aspects of law, policy, human factors, ethics, and risk management in the context of 
adversaries” (p.1).Accordingly, some researchers have also pointed to the continuous 
prevention, detection and recovery required to maintain the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information, which may be compromised as a result of a breach of cybersecurity 
(Gerber et al., 2001; Humphreys, 2008; Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004)  
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A breach of cybersecurity resulted from a cyber-attack is known to adversely affect the 
functionality of digital systems and devices (Nye, 2018). Gandhi et al., (2011) defined cyber-
attacks as any outside attacks that could compromise the security of an organisation or a system 
inside an organisation. Malicious cyber-attacks are acts carried out with the intent of destroying 
the user data and documentation (Mayo and Snider, 2016; Wood, 2000). A cyber-attack, if 
successful, allows unwanted access to data or systems by unauthorised actors, resulting in 
potential loss of information integrity and availability (Boyes, 2015a; Mantha et al., 2020).  
In managing cybersecurity, both cybersecurity threats and risks should be identified. A 
cybersecurity risk is conceptually defined as the likelihood of an adversarial event and its 
consequence, resulting from a successful cyber-security attack. For instance, loss of 
information integrity and its effect on a system or organisation. A cybersecurity-threat is an 
agent which exploits the vulnerabilities and weaknesses and results in accidental or intentional 
damage to a system or organisation. Accidental or unintentional threats such as human error in 
handling digital information can lead to a risk of information leakage or risk of financial 
damage to an organisation. The following sections will provide further insight into the 
cybersecurity threats, the risk they pose to systems and organisations and the consequences 
associated with the risks.  
 Cybersecurity Threats  
Cybersecurity threats are commonly categorised by the techniques used by their initiating 
agents (Griffin, 2019). Threat agents include people or entities who exploit one or more 
vulnerabilities in a system or organisations, using various techniques (Bowen et al., 2011). 
Threat agents which intentionally initiate an exploitation may have various financial, 
commercial, political, personal, or national motivations. Unintentional threat agents are people 
who accidentally exploit a vulnerability as a result of a human error or carelessness  (Borky 
and Bradley, 2018). Unintentional threat agents are often an insider threat and a 
vulnerability/weakness (incompetent and/or careless employees) used by intentional threat 
agents to compromise the cybersecurity of a system (Brackney and Anderson, 2004).  
Intentional- threat agents are malicious insiders (disgruntled employees), hackers, organised 
crimes, terrorists, and advanced persistent threat (APT). Malicious insiders are commonly 
disgruntled employees who seek revenge or other financial gains from incurring damage to the 
information or systems, or to steal data (Scully, 2011). These are often undetected as they have 
been granted access to system. Hackers and organised crime organisations seek to compromise 
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security of digital data with the purpose of financial gain and/or blackmailing purposes 
(Brackney and Anderson, 2004).  The advanced persistent threat agent (APT) attackers execute 
their attack over a long period time, to thoroughly intrude and gain full access and control over 
the systems and data of the victims. APT attackers have a wide range of intentions including 
commercial, political, military, and financial. Finally, terrorists are the attackers whose 
intentions are to inflict harm on the targeted system/organisation/asset, as part of a political 
campaign, or specific belief, etc. (Hussain et al., 2020).  
Threat agents use a variety of techniques to attack organisations through the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities related to technology, processes or people. (Kopp et al., 2017). These include: 
• Social engineering: This is executed by deceiving employees to expose sensitive 
information or avoid a cybersecurity measure (Griffin, 2019). Insider threats (people) 
inadvertently allow an attack to take place as a result of their naivety, lack of 
knowledge, or carelessness (Stanton et al., 2004). As an example of social engineering, 
phishing attacks have previously compromised passwords and user identification 
details to compromise security of data and systems (Srinivas et al., 2019). There is an 
alarming increase in identity theft and systems breaches as a result of exposing 
passwords. Breaches as such commonly occur, using various phishing tricks by the 
attacker to collect the victim password by creating fake password fields (Nokhbeh 
Zaeem et al., 2017).  
• Ransomware: Similar to crimes that involve kidnapping and demanding ransoms, 
ransomware attacks are cyberattacks in which data is held for ransom (Song et al., 
2016). In these attacks, the digital information of the victim is encrypted by the 
attackers and a ransom is demanded and when the ransom is paid, the information is 
decrypted so it can be used again (Brewer, 2016). This type of cyber threat can be aimed 
at any digital platform or system, including local drives or cloud-based data storage 
systems (Al-rimy et al., 2018). Another implication of such an intrusion is that attackers 
could move between files and computer systems on a network without requesting 
access, which would result in  higher numbers of encrypted data and files (Richardson, 
R., and North, 2017). In extreme cases, victims are denied access and unless the user 
has a backup for the affected BIM data and models, there is no other choice except to 
pay the attacker the ransom which does not guarantee the retrieval of the data in a format 
that would be fit for use (Al-rimy et al., 2018; Sophos, 2014; Yaqoob et al., 2017). 
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• Viruses and malware: A computer virus is a computer code that is stored on a computer 
that becomes the host for the virus (Stallings and Bauer, 2011). Viruses are designed to 
damage the host computer, or collect and send information from the host computer to 
other computers (Srinivas et al., 2019). Malware is a type of virus that affects the 
performance of computers and can be transmitted  from one computer to another by 
downloads of software or files from the internet, email attachments in which malwares 
are embedded, media files that could be transferred from removable devices, or 
propagation from within the malware itself (Cisco, 2018). Outdated software and 
hardware which is unable to detect or protect against newly advanced threats, as well 
as untrained users who bypass security regulations, are enablers of a successful virus 
and malware attack.  
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: With the increase of organisations who adopt cloud 
systems as the base of their operations, attackers target vulnerable systems with ‘bugs’ 
by sending inputs to crash or disrupt the system. In such attacks, organisations will not 
be able to use or access information or systems until they are recovered from backup 
storage. 
Considering the increased sophistication of cyber-threats today and the rapid empowerment of 
the malicious cyber-intruders, current data management techniques and security measures are 
insufficient to protect systems against malicious cyber-attacks (Mantha et al., 2020) 
Technological cybersecurity measures such as firewalls and other software and hardware 
technical measures often struggle to protect the systems and networks from inter-organisational 
threats (Rivera, 2017). The insecurities within the infrastructure of organisations has led to 
billions of dollars of investments on technological cybersecurity solutions, whilst the insider 
threat is yet the most common reason for cyber incidents (Huber et al., 2009; Lesk, 2011). 
Recent studies indicate that most cyber incidents, including cyber-attacks and fraudulent 
behaviours have human error at their core as the initiative of the incident (Huang and Pearlson, 
2019). Neglecting the effects of the interactions of people with digital technology, on the cyber 
security of digital space, has left the doors open to threats and potential risks to organisations 
and their assets (Rowe and Garfinkel, 2012).   
 Cybersecurity Risks  
Cybersecurity risks and the potential threat they represent are often associated with loss, 
damage, interruption, or destruction of a data/asset/ system. A cybersecurity threat poses risk 
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to the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of information, which is accompanied by 
adverse implications for the affected organisation (Cabric, 2015). This is known as the 
cybersecurity triad or CIA, which is a classic model that is widely used as the foundation of 
managing digital information (Henderson, 2019). The three aspects of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability (CIA) of data are essential to the value of the information and digital assets 
(Sherman et al., 2017) and contribute towards the operation of the assets within or related to 
an organisation (Salminen, 2019). Thus, compromising any one of the components of the triad 
may incur adverse implications, such as the degradation, malfunction, abuse and unavailability 
of the targeted asset (Couce-Vieira et al., 2020).  
• Risks to data confidentiality: Confidentiality refers to the authority of people who are 
allowed to access and view the data. Confidentiality of data may be compromised by 
an unauthorised access to the information, whilst sitting in the archive, or whilst being 
transferred and/or used by the users. This can be facilitated by various attack methods, 
such as a successful phishing attack that exploits user credentials to gain access to 
information/ systems. It can also result from an infected tool such as a USB, physically 
inserted in a device to capture input data (e.g., keyboard sniffer). An infringement of 
information confidentiality regarding the intellectual property or sensitive commercial-
data can result in financial and reputational losses for the organisation (Winzar et al., 
2018). A leak of sensitive organisational information can also result in financial 
blackmail for the organisation (Couce-Vieira et al., 2020). Furthermore, organisational 
information also includes personally identifiable data which, if obtained by criminals, 
could result in harm to clients, employees, and communities and in some instances, 
could result in fines and/or regulatory complications for the business.  
• Risks to data integrity: Integrity is concerned with unauthorised changes to data, 
infringing its validity while it is transmitted, processed, or archived. This infringement 
may be carried out by unauthorised modification, addition, corruption, and 
manipulation of data, which results in the malfunction or disruption of operations in an 
asset or system. As stated by  De Sá et al., (2017), malfunction or degradation of an 
asset results in a reduction in productivity, or disruption to its functions, with the aim 
of incurring financial losses and/or negative commercial implications for the targeted 
organisation. Infringing the integrity of data also refers to the manipulation of an asset 
(e.g., systems, devices) to produce undesired outcomes. An example of this is an 
unauthorised access to a greenhouse smart temperature-control to dramatically increase 
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or decrease the temperature, with the aim of causing harm to the plants and resulting 
financial loss (Axelrod, 2013; Kure et al., 2018). The adverse implications of a breach 
in an environment such as a smart building, occupied with people could also have health 
and safety implications (Minoli et al., 2017).  
• Risks to data availability: The availability of data is to ensure the required data is 
accessible to authorised people, in the right format and at the right time (Kumar et al., 
2016; Olivier, 2002). A compromise of availability refers to the disruption or 
obstruction of systems or processes, which could pose a range of unwanted effects on 
the organisations and their clients (Couce-Vieira et al., 2020). Depending on the 
targeted asset and its purpose, the implications can vary from financial losses, to injury 
and death. If the targeted asset is a production machine, the implications are limited to 
financial and reputational loss for the organisation. However, when a disaster, such as 
a fire, occurs in a facility, not having up to date information available, could have health 
and safety implications for the occupants (Ahmad Zawawi et al., 2014). 
Cybersecurity risk management plans are often based on CIA, which is used as a reference 
point (Aminzade, 2018), however, managing a balanced approach towards the three aspects is 
proven to be challenging for many organisations (Aminzade, 2018). Excessive measures to 
protect the confidentiality and availability of data would negatively affect the availability of 
data required for undertaking authorised tasks (Tagarev, 2020). Therefore, in managing the 
balance between the three aspects, awareness of the potential implications of the cybersecurity 
threats is essential (Aminzade, 2018). This will enable the organisations to determine their 
preparedness to accept risks to a certain extent, when considering the business goals and 
objectives (Kosseff, 2018; Olivier, 2002) 
 Risk Matrix: Cybersecurity Risks for BIM-enabled FM 
The review of the benefits associated with the implementation of BIM in various task areas of 
FM, highlighted the importance of data availability and accuracy (Section 2.3.2). The as-built 
info-graphic BIM model of the facility includes data for the devices, installations, and fittings 
as well as detailed 3D models of various elements incorporated into the building (Matarneh et 
al., 2019). The availability of real-time data for the facility as it is maintained, and the integrity 
of that information is key to achieving the potential benefits of BIM (Kelly et al., 2013b). 
Therefore, a breach of cybersecurity, infringing the integrity and availability of data would 
compromise the potential benefits of BIM in FM. For instance, the availability and accessibility 
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of accurate and up to date information for the facility in a BIM model, optimises 
emergency/disaster management in FM (Arslan et al., 2014). However, a cyber-attack might 
infringe the integrity and availability of BIM data (Henderson, 2019), leading to a failed 
management of emergency situations and incurring loss of life and injury for the occupants 
(Kennett et al., 2005). Furthermore, section 2.3 highlights the importance of data 
confidentiality, by discussing the impact of a breach in data confidentiality on the organisation 
and its employees.  
The review of BIM benefits in section 2.3.2 also highlights the benefits associated with 
the process optimisation that is brought to the FM organisations. For instance, accessibility of 
the updated information of a facility, improves decision making regarding cost estimations and 
resource allocation, which potentially brings financial gain for the FM organisation (Guillen et 
al., 2016). However, a malicious unauthorised-access to the FM bidding-documents or 
contractual agreements might result in legal and reputational implications for the organisation, 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 summarises the findings from sections 2.3 and 2.4 to show the impact of a cybersecurity 
breach in various task areas of FM. It highlights the threats associated with the infringement of 
data integrity, availability, and confidentiality across the three main FM task areas of financial 
asset management, space management, and operations & maintenance. By showcasing the 
criticality of the impact of cybersecurity risks in FM, it contributes to raising awareness 
amongst the FM professionals; and justifies the need for a proactive approach towards the 
development of a strategy for tackling the issue of cybersecurity.  
The challenges of BIM in FM, highlighted in section 2.3.3 identified that implementing BIM 
in FM  heightens the cybersecurity risk by creating different vulnerabilities which are people-
related (lack of knowledge), process-related (lack of compliance, lack of formal 
documentation) or technology-related (issue of interoperability, lack of security protection). 
However, section 2.3 also highlighted that in managing cybersecurity, over-reliance on 
technical cybersecurity measures overlooks the management of people and process aspects of 
cybersecurity. Such an approach is regarded as ineffective for the management of cybersecurity 
in organisations. Therefore, the next section explores how the BIM-FM organisations can 
minimise their cybersecurity vulnerabilities, taking into consideration the role of people and 
process.   
 Cybersecurity of BIM-enabled Facilities Management 
Facilities management organisations are responsible for managing and maintaining facilities 
safely and securely (Glantz et al., 2016). The adoption of BIM in FM and its incorporation with 
other systems and networks within facilities management forms a bridge between the physical 
building and its intangible assets. Traditional facilities management focuses on managing the 
physical aspects of buildings such as fire safety, equipment safety and physical security 
(Enoma et al., 2009; Leung et al., 2005). However, the security of BIM data and the CDEs 
supporting digital collaboration in BIM projects are often disregarded and overlooked (Mutis 
and Paramashivam, 2019). The built environment is not exempt from the eminent threat of 
cyber-actors and hence, the FM organisations, in particular, the BIM-FM organisations, 
capable of real time managing of facilities, must incorporate cybersecurity considerations in 
their work plans (IET, 2013).  
Section 2.4 illustrated that a malicious cyber-intrusion is often associated with a physical target 
and leads to physical harm. The combined physical impacts and cyber-impacts of such attacks 
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have caused uncertainties regarding the accountability of risks and how they should be 
managed in FM organisations (Mayo and Snider, 2016). The lack of knowledge and skills in 
handling and managing digital BIM information amongst the FM professionals, results in poor 
cybersecurity practices when exchanging and storing digital BIM data, leading to an increased 
vulnerability of their systems to such attacks. This is mainly due to the lack of cybersecure 
interaction with BIM infrastructure and tools (Boyes, 2015a).  
Cybersecurity threat to BIM-enabled facilities management is heightened by the digital 
collaborations brought by BIM, where the impact of a cybersecurity attack is heightened due 
to the existing connection with building management systems (BMS) (Mayo and Snider, 2016; 
Minoli et al., 2017). An attack to the CDE can act as a vector of attack to the FM control-
systems and enable unauthorised access to systems leading to disastrous outcomes for the 
facility and occupants. This may cause disruption to services, or result in a loss of control, 
leading to serious health and safety harm to the occupants, such as the disabling of fire alarms 
which could pose life threatening implications in a fire incident. (Boyes, 2015a; Purpura, 2019). 
The scenario is exacerbated in the case of highly-intelligent buildings with multiple 
interconnected IoT devices that are operating through digital networks (Mantha and de Soto, 
2019). 
An attack to the BIM  can act as a vector of attack to the FM control systems; to exemplify, 
access to BIM data can expose details of CCTV specifications and locations, easing the way 
for potential threats, such as theft, terrorism, and unauthorised access to the building (Boyes, 
2015b). Furthermore, a vector attack to a CDE may lead to access to control systems. In the 
example of CCTVs, a malicious cyber-intrusion could lead to the loss of data availability by 
deleting the CCTV footage, or compromising information confidentiality by allowing the 
unauthorised viewing of images, or tampering and altering images to compromise the 
information integrity (Abie, 2019; Boyes, 2015c).  
Thus, the implications of cyber-attacks and their impact on the tangible and intangible assets 
of a facility need to be understood by the FM team. However, the multi-faceted nature of the 
problem does not match the existing competencies of the FM organisations (De Soto and Karri, 
2020) . Hence, it is important to investigate the impact of cyber threats on buildings, to provide 
an insight into the cost of a cybersecurity attack in various FM task areas, and the way it 
compromises the benefits associated with the adoption of BIM in FM. This will  establish the 
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importance of understanding, managing and preventing cybersecurity risks in BIM-FM 
(Mantha et al., 2020).   
 Cybersecure management of BIM in FM 
The review of literature highlighted that the challenges and shortfalls associated with the 
implementation of BIM in FM contribute to more cybersecurity vulnerabilities, therefore it is 
concluded that cybersecurity considerations should be integrated within the implementation 
and management of BIM. To overcome the challenges associated with the implementation of 
BIM, maturity models are developed to assist organisations in assessing and evaluating their 
capabilities with respect to the competencies set out in the model (Mom and Hsieh, 2012). 
Hence, this study explores the BIM-maturity models to identify the determinants that contribute 
towards a cybersecure BIM-FM organisation, to help overcome the vulnerabilities discussed 
above.  
‘Determinant’ is a term commonly used to address the influential factors that are believed to 
affect or have empirically demonstrated to affect the outcome of an application (Nilsen, 2015). 
Proctor et al., (2011) discuss the variety of terms used interchangeably with ‘determinants’, 
such as challenges, hinderers, enablers, impediments, and many other similar terms amongst 
academia. Proctor et al., (2011) further emphasise the variety of terms accounting for the 
“application outcome”, such as adoption, compliance, behaviours, use and uptake of a concept 
or practice, which are influenced by determinants. The extraction of determinants is achieved 
by reviewing the competencies required, at the highest level of maturity, in BIM maturity 
models that are applicable to FM organisations. The selection is also focused on the socio-
technical aspects of BIM, in line with the focus of this research.   
 
 BIM Maturity Models 
Various definitions of maturity are proposed by researcher studies. Azzouz et al., (2016) 
suggests maturity is the state of full development or development that has reached its optimal 
state. Fahrenkrog et al., (2003) proposed a similar definition of maturity as defining, managing, 
measuring, or controlling a specific process, by which the consistency and capabilities of the 
organisations for managing its projects can be indicated. In line with this, Cooke-Davies, 
(2004) points to organisational maturity which defines the ability of an organisation to deploy 
a certain process, through the use of process documentation, management, measurement, 
control and continuous improvement. Schumacher et al., (2016) also refers to the 
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organisational maturity as the organisational improvement and advancement of processes over 
a certain period of time. Process maturity is commonly used to describe how productivity and 
quality can be improved in an organisation through consistent and efficient processes 
(Almarabeh and AbuAli, 2010; Khoshgoftar and Osman, 2009; Paulk, 1995). As such, 
organisation maturity is led by its ability to perform certain processes in a well-defined manner 
with clear roles and responsibilities (Khoshgoftar and Osman, 2009). Achieving a higher level 
of maturity is likely to result in greater chances of success in projects (Vaidyanathan and 
Howell, 2007).  
There are various BIM maturity models developed across the globe, which can be utilised by 
organisations and industry practitioners (Chen and Luo, 2014; Giel and Issa, 2013; Mom and 
Hsieh, 2012; Succar, 2010). Existing maturity models are focused on a variety of BIM 
capabilities, including the various applications of BIM (e.g.4D, 5D), BIM modelling, 
organisational readiness, maturity of BIM processes and procedures, and technological 
facilities (Chen and Kamara, 2011; Giel and Issa, 2013; Mom and Hsieh, 2012; Succar, 2010).  
Continuous assessment of BIM maturity in organisations assists them with the setting of 
achievable goals that will eventually lead to the highest-level of BIM maturity within an 
organisation (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004; McCormack et al., 2008). By structuring and 
categorising various aspects of BIM, maturity models assist organisations to make changes to 
one aspect at a time. This enables better monitoring and management of improvements and 
changes and allows for an optimum approach towards reaching the higher levels of BIM 
maturity (Cooke-Davies, 2004; Khoshgoftar and Osman, 2009). Hence, BIM maturity can be 
considered as the ability to execute BIM repeatedly with a certain degree of quality (Succar, 
2010). In order to achieve maximum benefits from BIM, users must achieve BIM competencies 
to the level that determines a mature implementation of BIM in an organisation (Giel and Issa, 
2013). A mature implementation of BIM translates into an improved quality of service and 
enhanced collaboration and coordination amongst those involved (Giel and Issa, 2013; Nepal 
et al., 2014; Succar, 2010), therefore, reducing the challenges and shortfalls which create 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in BIM-FM (see sections 2.3.3.1).  
Various organisational maturity models to identify the BIM determinants which contribute to 
a more cybersecure BIM in FM are reviewed below. The focus area of each model is presented 
in Table 3 to enable better comparison:  
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• The NBIMS Capability Maturity Model was developed by the National Institute of 
Building Science in 2012. The model is used to evaluate implementation of BIM in 11 
areas, while using it on a 10 level scale (NIBS, 2015). A final score is calculated using 
weighted scoring methods for all the 11 areas which are then mapped to the five-grade scale 
of the maturity model, where the lower level is level 1, indicating initial improvement and 
the highest level is level 5, indicating continuous improvement (Maradza et al., 2013). This 
model is focused on the data and modelling capabilities, including interoperability, 
precision, and richness of information, as well as the graphical and spatial capabilities of 
the data, throughout the BIM lifecycle. Hence, it can be used by all stakeholders involved 
in a BIM project (McCuen et al., 2012). This model has been criticised for lack of clear 
definitions for the maturity determinants which has resulted inaccurate maturity rating, due 
to various interpretations by the maturity evaluators (Kassem and Li, 2020).  
• The Construction Industry Council (CIC) was developed as a BIM planning guide for 
facility owners-version 2.0, in 2013, which was accompanied by an owner BIM matrix 
which is considered to be amongst the most effective BIM maturity models, due to its 
specific focus on FM organisations and its clear description of evaluation methodology 
(Construction Industry Council, 2013). This was later updated in 2018 as part of CIC’s 
efforts in addressing the most recent demands of the industry. In this guide, the planning 
phase is focused on the needs of facility owners by understanding their information 
requirements and goals (Dakhil et al., 2019) The guide comprises of 6 key elements that 
help in planning BIM implementation (Kassem and Li, 2020) : 
• Element 1- Strategy: Identifies strategic aspects such as goal, vision, mission, and 
objectives from which the purpose of adopting BIM can be determined. 
• Element 2- Implementation: Discusses the methods and stages of BIM implementation; 
including generation, processing, communicating, executing, and managing.  
• Element 3- Process: Describes the means of implementing BIM which could be 
continuous, or transitional.  
• Element 4- Information: Facility data such as the level of details, data, and model 
breakdown.  
• Element 5- Infrastructure: The medium needed for BIM implementation such as 
software, hardware, or physical space.  
• Element 6- Employee: Capabilities, roles and responsibilities, training requirements, 
change management and education are all part of it.  
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The model has adopted a holistic approach towards evaluating maturity in FM/owner’s 
organisations, where the people and processes of BIM implementation are taken into 
account. 
• The Owner’s BIMCAT is another model that is used to evaluate maturity of BIM in owner 
organisations (Wu et al., 2017). This model is  an extensive evaluation tool covering every 
aspect throughout the lifecycle of the asset (Azzouz et al., 2016). This maturity model is 
divided into operational, strategic, and administrative competencies, where the main focus 
is on the operational considerations pertaining to the quality of information (data richness, 
geometry, technology, etc.). The user can evaluate the BIM deliverables and define the 
requirements with respect to the extent that the organisation uses BIM in its projects. The 
strategic competencies relate to documentation, project standards and goals. The model 
also focuses on administrative competencies including project procedures, polices and 
cultural aspects, as well as the operational considerations (Giel and Issa, 2013). The model 
is more comprehensive when compared to others, as it assimilates competencies from the 
literature and a number of existing models such as NBIMS and BIM Maturity Matrix. 
However, this model has been criticised by the clients, for its complexity of use in 
comparison to the five level models (Wu et al., 2017). Also, the justification of the selected 
methodology for the development of this model was found to be vague (Giel and Issa, 2013; 
Kassem and Li, 2020).  
• The Netherland’s Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) developed a 
maturity model called TNO’s BIM Quick Scan in 2012, which was superseded by BIM 
Compass in 2019 (Kassem and Li, 2020). BIM Compass was developed for all 
organisations who intend to adopt BIM, with particular focus on the design, engineering, 
and construction firms. Organisation and management, cultural aspects, information 
structure and flow, and tools and applications were the four criteria that were included in 
this model. The evaluation process addresses ten aspects that include strategy, organisation, 
resources, partners, mentality, culture, education, information flow, standards, and tools 
(Sebastian and Van Berlo, 2010). This tool is not applicable for small and medium 
organisations and is more targeted towards the pre-built phases of a BIM project (Van Berlo 
and Hendriks, 2012; Kassem et al., 2013). 
• The Indiana University’s BIM Proficiency Matrix was developed in 2009. This model was 
mainly focused on both the designer and contractor competencies in BIM, where all 
categories were allocated the same weight (Dakhil et al., 2019) .A score between zero and 
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one is given for each category with zero indicating that this element is not existing and one 
indicating a fully-functional element in the model (Indiana University, 2009). The model 
was criticised for being subjective with limited technical-evaluation capabilities and its 
inconsistencies that make it unreliable in many cases (Succar, 2009). These limitations 
were overcome by the Succar Maturity Model in 2009 which provided comprehensive 
explanations for each category, from which the inconsistences were minimised and more 
attention was given to socio-technical aspects (Giel and Issa, 2013; Succar, 2010). 
• One of the highest-rated  efforts in the development of maturity models was the work of 
Succar in 2009, which took into account all aspects of technology, process and policy 
(Kassem and Li, 2020; Succar, 2015). This five-point scaled evaluation-model can be used 
by different types of organisations. The model comprised BIM-capability sets, BIM-
maturity index, BIM-capability stage, and organisational scale. These components were 
linked to form the BIM maturity matrix. The model offers a distinction between BIM 
capability and maturity inside an organisation and the BIM capability stages (Kassem and 
Li, 2020; Succar et al., 2013). In this model the capability is defined in the model as the 
ability to deliver a certain service or product while maturity is related to the quality of 
delivering and executing a service (Giel and Issa, 2013). The model was based on a 
combination of NBIMS and CMM, which narrows the gaps between process, policy, and 
technology. The model is one of very few that indicate the management of data access and 
information security in BIM-enabled organisations (Li et al., 2017). The model later 
contributed to the BIM Excellence online platform by Change Agents (AEC) in Australia 
(Kassem and Li, 2020). 
• The UK BIM maturity model was developed in 2008 by Bew and Richards (Bew, M., and 
Richards, 2008). This model was considered as the main component in the strategy adopted 
by the UK for BIM implementation, however, it serves as a capability model that is used 
as the base of a number of BIM maturity models that were later developed (Succar, 2015). 
BIM Compass is one of the models that uses the Bew Richards BIM maturity model to plot 
the scores (Kassem and Li, 2020). 
• The Vico BIM Scorecard was developed by Vico Software in 2011, to assess the use of 
BIM in the day to day tasks within the general contractor organisations (Kassem and Li, 
2020). This model is mainly focused on product and cost control as well as some 
organisational process-related capabilities (Giel and Issa, 2013). 
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• The Construction Project Information Committee developed a BIM assessment form (CPIx 
BIM-Assessment) in 2011, with the aim of evaluating the maturity of BIM in supply chain 
organisations and consultancies. Therefore, its main focus is on the understanding and 
capabilities of the organisation in modelling, planning and operating BIM, with minimal 
focus on the people and process aspects of BIM implementation (Kassem and Li, 2020). 
• The National Federation of Builders (NFB) developed an online assessment of BIM 
maturity to evaluate the competency and readiness of organisations to improve the maturity 
of their BIM implementation. It includes consideration for both people and processes 
regarding digital collaboration in BIM-enabled organisations. 
• Constructing Excellence (hosted by Scottish Futures Trust) developed a compliance-
evaluation tool that assesses the maturity of BIM adoption, based on the level of compliance 
against levels 1 and 2 BIM in the UK (Kassem and Li, 2020). The results of the evaluation 
provides a grade to show where the organisation stands with respect to the industry 
standards of level 1 and 2 BIM (Kassem and Li, 2020). 
• The VDC Scorecard was developed in 2012 by Stanford University (Calvin Kam et al., 
2013). The intent of this model was to conduct a comprehensive adaptive assessment that 
was practical and flexible to the users (Calvin Kam et al., 2013; Kam et al., 2014).  The 
model was mainly intended to assess BIM maturity in projects, but it also includes 
organisational readiness competencies. The user can analyse input data when using VDC 
Scorecard and assess whether they comply with the pre-set objective.  However, its 
credibility has been largely subject to criticism, due to the small number of case studies 
used in the development of the model (Azzouz et al., 2016). 
 
Table 3- BIM Maturity Models Evaluation Focus 




Maturity Model  
Data generation and delivery (graphical, spatial 
capabilities, interoperability, delivery method, etc). 
Processes and procedures  





Succar’s BIM Maturity 
Model (Succar, 2009) as 
part of BIMexellence  
Focused on People, Policy, Technology 
Collaboration processes among multiple 
departments or external stakeholders 
Information management strategies 
Alignment of BIM implementation techniques with 
strategies (goals at organisational level) 
BIM supporting infrastructure (hardware, software, 
network) 
BIM management and leadership 
Organisational BIM responsibility hierarchy 
Employee performance in BIM implementation 
Design 
Construction 





Development of BIM formal documentations and 
contracts  
Compliance and quality control plans  
BIM COMPASS (Replaced 
TNO’s BIM Quick Scan, 
Sebastian & Berlo, 2010) 
Organisational Management  
Technical & Modelling  
Cultural considerations and employee performance  
All stakeholders 
Scottish Futures Trust BIM 
Compass  
Compliance with level 2 standards (some of which 
are now superseded by ISO19650:  
1. Collaborative Management: BS1192:2007 
2. Design Management: BS7000-4:2013 
3. Library Objects: BS8541 
4. Information Management (CAPEX): PAS1192-
2:2014 
5. Information Management (OPEX): PAS1192-
3:2014 
6. Information Exchange: BS1192-4 
7. Soft Landings: BS8536 
8. Security: PAS1192-5 
Applicable to procurers and 
suppliers in all phases of a 
BIM project. 
BIM Proficiency Matrix 
(Indiana University 2009)  
BIM execution plan (BEP) standard 
BIM-enabled project delivery methods and 
deliverables requirements 
Planning, design, construction, operation phase 
uses 
Asset management, space management, 
design/programming, construction cost data 
Design, construction, as-built model geometry 
Design collision detection, construction clash 
detection 
For Owner’s/FM’s use to 
assess maturity of designers 
and contractors 
CIC Research Program’s 
BIM Maturity Matrix 
(2012) 
CIC BIM Protocol (2018) 
Purpose of BIM implementation (goals, vision, 
mission, objectives) 
Method of BIM implementation (generating, 
processing, communicating, executing , managing) 
Means of BIM implementation (current ,target , 
transition) 
Information requirements of the facility (model 
element breakdown, level of details ,etc) 
Infrastructure required to support BIM 
implementation(software, hardware , workspace) 
People (responsibilities, hierarchy , education, 
change readiness) 
Owners/FM 
Owner’s BIMCAT (Giel 







Owners (Possibly FM) 
UK BIM Maturity Matrix 
(Alliance for Construction 
Excellence 2008)  
Focused on modelling capabilities and data 
handling, 
Compliance to standards and guidelines  
Generic 
NFB Online BIM Maturity 
Assessment  
Strategy 
Knowledge & skills  
Information management processes 
Technology Excellence  




CPIx BIM Assessment 
Form 
Modelling and technical capabilities  Supply-chain  
Consultants  
Vico BIM Scorecard Organisational BIM processes  
Project specific capabilities  
Modelling and technical considerations  
General Contractors (mainly 
pre-construction) 







Alignment of project goals with organisational 
objectives (planning) 
Organisational BIM processes (adoption) 
Technical modelling and data-related 
considerations (technology) 
Project Performance  
Generic (for all AECO 
stakeholders to assess their 
organisational readiness 
along with project maturity) 
 
 Selection of maturity model  
The maturity models intended for assessing organisational BIM maturity were investigated for 
their applicability to the facilities management organisations and their focus on the aspects of 
BIM which were related to people and processes. Particular attention was given to the models 
that refer to the management of BIM data security from a non-technical perspective, however, 
data security was either overlooked across most models, or considered as part of the technical 
and technological considerations. Although several models were identified as applicable to the 
FM organisations, not all of them focus on BIM maturity in FM organisations, in relation to 
people and processes. Models such as the VDC scorecard, CIC BIM Maturity matrix, BIM 
compass, Scottish Futures Trust BIM compass, the Succar BIM Maturity matrix and BIM 
Compass (Netherland) all include people and process aspects of BIM maturity in organisations 
and target the FM organisations, as their users (Azzouz et al., 2016; Kassem and Li, 2020; Wu 
et al., 2017). However, many of them have limitations in terms of people and processes aspects 
that they focus on. To exemplify, the VDC scorecard is mainly focused on project maturity in 
BIM organisations, however, it also includes organisational readiness capabilities as part of its 
assessment (Dakhil, 2017). The Scottish Futures Trust BIM compass is mainly based on the 
organisation compliance to standards and guidelines, where it is assumed that compliance 
guarantees maturity, and overlooks considerations related to people and processes to achieve 
compliance. Furthermore, although Netherland’s BIM compass includes considerations for 
people and processes, it mainly encompasses modelling and technical capabilities (Kassem and 
Li, 2020). The NFB online BIM maturity assessment includes some consideration for people 
and processes which include information management processes, training and education, and 
strategy, however, it does not include many additional factors, unlike both the Succar maturity-
model and CIC BIM-maturity matrix which include quality assessment, cultural 
considerations, and risk management.  
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The maturity models of both Succar and CIC focus on aspects of BIM maturity in organisations 
that relate to people and processes as well as technical and policy considerations. (Azzouz et 
al., 2016; Dakhil et al., 2019). These two models did not align with any particular BIM standard 
to develop their models, therefore, the generic nature of these models increased their 
applicability to the FM organisations, as well as allowing for an integration of their proposed 
determinants with cybersecurity determinants. Also, both the Succar and CIC models have 
been found more credible for providing a detailed explanations of the assessment philosophy 
and methodology, to provide a holistic understanding of BIM competencies and maturity levels 
(Dakhil et al., 2019; Kassem and Li, 2020).  
 BIM-FM Determinants 
The maturity models of both Succar and CIC were chosen to be studied for the identification 
of determinants applicable to BIM-FM that contribute to minimising the cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities arising from the challenges of BIM implementation in FM. The selection of 
determinants was based on the following defined set of criteria:  
• As this research was focused on people and process considerations for improving the 
cybersecurity of BIM-enabled FM organisations , determinants pertaining to technical 
and technological aspects of BIM were ruled out in the selection.  
• The applicability of determinants to the facilities management organisations was 
derived from the literature review in the domains of BIM-enabled FM, BIM benefits in 
FM and BIM challenges in FM.   
The determinants were identified from the review of  both the Succar and CIC maturity models 
and presented in the following section. The following references were used in writing the 
description of each determinant (Chunduri et al., 2013; CIC, 2013; Giel and Issa, 2013; Isikdag, 
2012; Kassem and Li, 2020; Kelly et al., 2013a; Succar, 2010).  
2.5.1.2.1 Purpose of BIM Implementation (Goals, Vision, Objectives)  
Strategic considerations including goals, vision, and objectives to portray the purpose of BIM 
implementation in an organisation were indicated by many of the maturity models, including 
the Succar and CIC models, together with the Netherland BIM-Compass and NFB Maturity-
Assessment. The importance of visioning what the organisation was striving to accomplish has 
been emphasised in achieving a mature implementation of BIM. In the CIC model, goals, 
visions, and objectives lead the organisation towards reaching its optimum purpose. Hence, in 
a facilities management organisation, a transformation from the traditional ways of working, 
49 
 
to the BIM-enabled ways of working, requires a clear purpose, that sets the direction and acts 
as a reference goal. The purpose of BIM implementation within an FM organisation would be 
the benefits of BIM within FM. According to the Succar BIM maturity model, the strategic 
planning of BIM mission, vision and objectives should be created by the management of an 
organisation and should set the scene for all operational teams. A clear purpose would affect 
the performance at all levels, and when well-integrated within all strategic plans, would stream-
down through the implementation processes.  
2.5.1.2.2 Infrastructure required to support BIM implementation (Software, Hardware, 
Network) 
Many maturity models have addressed the importance of investment in advanced BIM 
infrastructure, including software, hardware, and networking systems, and some have also 
focused on competencies that are more inclined towards the managerial efforts that lead to 
technological excellence. The CIC model describes infrastructure maturity as the availability 
of updated software and hardware that is capable of undertaking BIM operations and 
modelling. The Succar model has expanded the scope of infrastructure maturity, by also taking 
into account the strategic and implementational considerations required, to manage and 
maintain technological excellence in a mature implementation of BIM. It describes the 
optimum state of infrastructure maturity as the availability of a strategic plan to continuously 
monitor, control, update and improve the functionality, deliverables, and communication 
processes. It also refers to the data interoperability considerations as well as regulating 
communications and exchange of data, in line with organisational strategies. The compatibility 
between the degree of technological advancement and strategies in place is emphasised by the 
Succar model. Hence, considerations for implementing the required BIM infrastructure should 
encompass foundational strategies that can support the uptake of advanced BIM technologies.  
2.5.1.2.3 Interaction Co-ordination and Communication Processes with contractors and sub-
contractors 
This determinant is indicated in a number of the maturity models including the NFB online 
maturity assessment, CPIx BIM assessment form, and the Succar and CIC models. However, 
each maturity model had its own unique lens for assessing the maturity of this determinant. 
Whilst Succar’s model was more inclined towards the operational and technical aspects of 
stakeholder interaction, collaboration and communication, the CIC model emphasised the 
documentation of BIM processes, both at the organisation and project level. This pertained to 
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the development of documents such as the BIM execution plan (BEP) and general procedures 
related to BIM works, to improve the management of internal and external communication 
processes. The CIC model was the only one which specifically targeted the development of 
plans that led to the accomplishment of implementation goals. Hence, it considers the 
objectives and potential benefits, that are achievable through the interaction, coordination, and 
communications processes with reference to the strategic goals.  
2.5.1.2.4 Competent BIM Implementation Management  
A competent and mature approach towards managing BIM implementation in projects has been 
addressed by many maturity models, each through a different lens. Each model has indicated a 
number of factors that this competency entails. CIC maturity matrix refers to the management 
of BIM implementation in terms of the project uses and organisational operations. The first 
factor pertains to the extent of BIM use in projects and the extent of digital collaboration 
associated with the projects. The second factor pertains to the extent of BIM integration with 
the daily operational tasks of an organisation. For the CIC model, the availability of data in 
real-time and the information use during the lifecycle of a project was deemed crucial for 
competent implementation-management in BIM projects. The Succar model, on the other hand, 
focuses on the quality of data exchange and the information loss within the transitions. It also 
focuses on the compatibility of the implementation management with the organisational 
strategy. Both CIC and Succar’s models have focused on the development of information 
requirements, BIM execution plans (BEP) to document processes, and contracts specifying 
information need and model structure, to ensure a competent management of BIM 
implementation in the  operations of the organisation.  
2.5.1.2.5  Arrangement of BIM Duties and Roles 
Arranging the roles and responsibilities within a BIM-enabled organisation is pointed out by 
the majority of the maturity models, including Netherland’s BIM compass, NBIMS capability 
Succar’s maturity matrix and CIC BIM maturity matrix. In a BIM-enabled organization, BIM 
roles and responsibilities are incorporated within the job descriptions. Roles are the functional 
duties that the employees are required to carry out. Each BIM role is assigned one or multiple 
obligations which are labelled as BIM responsibilities. The CIC and Succar models have both 
addressed the importance of having an organisational hierarchy of BIM roles and 
responsibilities to ensure a smooth flow of BIM processes and procedures. Both models have 
also indicated that defining BIM roles and responsibilities should be followed by ensuring that 
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those assigned have sufficient capabilities to undertake their responsibilities. It is further 
pointed out that defining roles and responsibilities enable the identification of suitable training 
and education for employees. The Succar model further emphasises that an optimised maturity 
in BIM entails BIM roles and duties that are continuously assessed to ensure employees can 
fulfil the organisational BIM process requirements.  
2.5.1.2.6 BIM Knowledge and Skills  
BIM knowledge and skills were included within many of the maturity models, from both the 
operational and managerial aspects. Netherland’s BIM Compass and the VDC scorecard were 
focused on the need for both technical and modelling skills for a BIM-enabled  project, while 
other models such as Succar and CIC also indicated knowledge management being a 
requirement depending on the roles and responsibilities of employees. Furthermore, the two 
models also take into account the BIM leadership and management capabilities with respect to 
the extent of their support as well as the employee awareness and readiness to take on the digital 
shift brought by BIM.  
2.5.1.2.7 Compliance with BIM Standards and Guidelines 
The Succar, CIC, and Owner’s BIM CAT models have the highest focus on compliance 
measures contributing to the maturity of BIM within an organisation. The Succar model 
considers the adherence of contractual agreements regarding BIM processes and procedures, 
risk management, and the delivery of project deliverables important, whilst the CIC model has 
indicated the importance of developing BIM documentation in compliance with best practice 
guidelines and standards and using the standard document templates (e.g., BEP templates). The 
CIC model further takes into consideration the compliance of information sharing regulations, 
information requirements and the structure of the model with best-practice guidelines and 
standards.  
2.5.1.2.8 Quality Control Plans 
Quality control was considered an important determinant for a mature adoption of BIM within 
an organisation. The Succar maturity matrix, Netherland’s BIM Compass and NBIMS have all 
included this determinant as a competency that should be measured. However, the focus is 
commonly shifted towards the quality of deliverables rather than process benchmarking. 
Although the Succar model considers monitoring, revising, and improving the various 
competencies to the optimum maturity level, to ensure the processes and procedures of BIM 




 Cybersecurity Considerations in BIM-FM 
The review of BIM maturity models illustrated a lack of focus on the issue of cybersecurity in 
BIM-enabled FM. The existing maturity models tend to point to the management of both 
information and communications, together with cybersecurity considerations as part of the 
infrastructure maturity (section 2.5.1.2.2). This implies a technical view of the issue of 
cybersecurity in BM-FM, and does not consider the effects of strategies, processes, and people. 
This also results in an isolated approach, where only those involved with the IT and 
infrastructure are responsible for managing and maintaining cybersecurity. Section 2.4 
emphasised the importance of considering both people and processes aspects of managing 
cybersecurity, as well as technical considerations. Therefore, this research proposes the 
integration of cybersecurity in strategies, processes, and performance, to ensure a cybersecure 
implementation of BIM in FM.  
Therefore, to bridge the gap between the BIM and IT in FM, this section seeks to identify the 
cybersecurity determinants which can be integrated with the BIM-FM determinants identified 
in section 2.5.1.2. This approach is in line with the study of Dourish and Anderson, (2006) who 
propose a holistic approach towards the issue of cybersecurity within organisations, by 
incorporating secure intra-organisational and extra-organisational collaboration methods, 
regulations and policies, and technologies in a unified strategy. A cybersecurity-minded 
working strategy within an organisation, results in a proactive approach towards assuring the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of digital information and optimum resilience against 
malicious cyber-activities (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). Hence, the integration of 
cybersecurity determinants with BIM-FM determinants enables a unified approach towards the 
management of cybersecurity, as part of managing BIM in FM organisations. 
 Cybersecurity Management Guidelines and Resources 
There are standards, best practice guidelines, frameworks and models developed by the 
regulatory bodies and academics to assist organisations to achieve cybersecurity within their 
working processes.  
Academic contributions towards producing models that assist organisations in a better 
cybersecurity management, differ in both approach and perspective. To exemplify, the Gerber 
and Von Solms (2005) approach is criticised for overlooking people, process and policies and 
for limiting their focus to the cybersecurity of systems. Alternatively, Da Veiga and Eloff, 
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(2007) offer a view that is inclusive of the effects of people, process and technology on the 
cybersecurity of an organisation. The various viewpoints can be perplexing to organisations 
who wish to select the most compatible approach for incorporating cybersecurity best practices 
within their business processes (Paulsen, 2016). However, it can also complicate the adoption 
of a strategic approach within organisations who are at the early stages of improving 
cybersecurity (Minoli et al., 2017; Toth, 2016). 
Standards and best practice guidelines developed by the regulatory bodies also offer various 
viewpoints on the issue of cybersecurity by focusing on technology, process, people and 
policies (Bayuk, 2012; Wang et al., 2015). In effect, standards direct organisations to optimise 
cybersecurity, by improving their structure, processes, plans and culture (BSI, 2007). As 
organisational cybersecurity is rooted in its information security foundations, various resources 
are available to assist organisations in defining and developing their cybersecurity strategy in 
line with their business framework (Brackney and Anderson, 2004; Sallos et al., 2019). Some 
of the most commonly used standards and procedures include  ISO27001, COBIT, ISO 20000, 
ISO 38500 , ISO 17 799, NIST Special publication 800-160, BS1192:5, PAS 555:2013, 
IASME (Ula, Ismail and Sidek, 2011; BSI, 2012). ISO 27001 and COBIT 5, have integrated 
the technological aspects of cybersecurity with the key aspects of cybersecurity management, 
taking into account people, process, and policies (Information security forum, 2005; ISACA, 
2012a). These are further explored below:  
• COBIT: The primary efforts of ISACA (Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association) towards the development of COBIT 5 resulted in a framework with a focus 
on aligning IT and business strategies. The framework was further revised in 2003 to 
deliver a unified approach towards the management of cybersecurity risks, as part of a 
unified risk-management. COBIT 5 considers all levels of management, operations, and 
executive business units to contribute to the development of a cybersecure organisation. 
It further accentuates the roles of stakeholders and governing bodies on the quality of 
cybersecurity implementation within an organisation. Its main focus is on the 
management and monitoring of principles, processes, and policies at all levels within 
an organisation (ISACA ,2012). COBIT 5 encompasses factors that determine the 
cybersecurity stance of an organisation, including cybersecurity goals, principles, 
organisational hierarchy for information security, processes and procedures (Bin-Abbas 
and Bakry, 2014).  
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• ISO Series: This is an international source of guidance on the management of 
cybersecurity primarily developed as BS7799. The ISO series includes a wide range of 
standards for managing different aspects of cybersecurity such as the information-
security management system (ISMS) addressed by a sub-division of ISO, labelled as 
ISO/IEC 27000:2016,2017. This standard offers a systemic approach towards the 
management of cyber-risk (BSI, 2016). For organisations taking their first steps 
towards establishing a cybersecurity-oriented structure, ISO/IEC 27001 contains the 
baseline requirements for the management and maintenance of cybersecurity, whilst BS 
ISO/IEC 27002 offer further details on other aspects including processes and 
procedures, technology enablement, rules and regulations, and roles and 
responsibilities. As per BSI, (2012), alternative ISO standards including ISO/IEC 
27005:2011, 2018 and ISO/ICE 27032:2012 are efforts towards preparing organisations 
to adopt a cybersecure approach within their everyday job tasks. The ISO series are 
well-recognised around the world and particularly in the UK, and they remain as 
traditional guidelines for the management of cybersecurity within organisations (Culot 
et al., 2019). Their limited indication towards the interactions of people and technology 
is usually criticised by those who believe the ISO series are overly restricted to the 
cybersecurity of systems (Nye, 2018).  
• NIST special publication 800-100:This standard proposes the integration of 
cybersecurity within organisational policies and accentuates the importance of having 
the commitment and push from the management team to accommodate suitable 
cybersecurity training for employees, and the allocation of sufficient resources to 
support the integration (Bowen et al., 2006; Paulsen, C. Toth, 2016). As per Bowen et 
al. (2006), factors such as a competent security team, development of a cybersecurity-
oriented organisational structure, and effective monitoring and auditing are proposed 
by NIST. Thomborson (2010) also encourages investigating the cybersecurity 
requirements of the organisation, to achieve an understanding of the resources required 
to support the full integration of cybersecurity measures. It proposes a qualitative, rather 
descriptive modelling of requirements, which elicits cybersecurity requirements by 
taking into account the protection, and prevention systems to deal with cyber-attack 
with all their corresponding actors. The cybersecurity-requirement model is then used 
by the senior-management team to make cybersecurity-aware decisions on budget 
allocations, organisational structure, and strategic plans.  
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• NIST RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK: In an effort to develop a 
comprehensive, yet detailed solution for risk management, the NIST Risk Management 
Framework was published in 2014 to manage risks to critical infrastructure (NIST, 
2014). It covers all aspects of risk management, including identification, protection, 
detection, response, and recovery. However, it is criticised for overlooking unknown 
and unwanted risks, which are commonly known as unpredictable attacks (Hutchins et 
al., 2015; Task Force Transformation Initiative, 2015). Hence, it does not provide 
guaranteed resiliency to the evolving nature of cyber-attacks in the world today. 
• IASME: ISO, NIST and COBIT 5 are not compatible with all sizes of organisations. 
IASME (Information Assurance for Small and Medium Enterprises) plays an important 
role in ensuring the resilience of small and medium sized organisations, in maintaining 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information and reducing the 
impact of a potential attack on both cyber and physical assets (NIST, 2003). IASME is 
an attempt to support compliance with ISO 27001 to enhance and improve information 
security within small and medium sized organisations (Clarke, 2015).  
• PAS555:2013: As part of the efforts of the British Standards Institute (BSI) to address 
organisational cybersecurity management, the publicly available specification PAS 
555:2013, is another popular source of guidance for the implementation of a 
cybersecurity-oriented strategy within organisations. It addresses the strategic, 
operational and technical aspects of cybersecurity integration by accentuating the need 
to assess the stakeholder cybersecurity-posture to enable successful integration of 
cybersecurity at the operational level (BSI, 2013b). 
• NCSC Cybersecurity Guideline: To promote the development of a cybersecure 
culture within organisations, the NCSC document “10 steps to cybersecurity” assists 
them to improve on the existing knowledge, skills and level of awareness which would 
lead to an improved security posture (NCSC, 2018) .  
 
The review of the available guidelines and standards showed the variety of focus and approach 
to organisational management of cybersecurity, therefore, none of them could be adopted in 
isolation, for a comprehensive and inclusive integration of cybersecurity within an 
organisational context (Tropina, 2020). However, a number of frameworks and models attempt 
to bridge and unify some of the guidelines, by offering more inclusive guidance that covers 
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previous published materials and overcomes some of the conflicting instructions by proposing 
a unified approach.  
For instance, the HMG Information-Security Policy Framework and the CESG Cybersecurity 
model are amongst the frameworks that are built upon the previous efforts in the area of 
information security and cybersecurity. The CESG cybersecurity model covers the IAMM 
(Information Assurance Maturity Model) and IAAF (Information Assurance Framework) and 
is in full alignment with the Luftman (2000) model for evaluating the organisational 
information-security maturity levels. Furthermore, it complies with the BS ISO/IEC 
27001:2005 risk-management principles and BS ISO/IEC 27001 information-assurance 
principles. The CESG provides a more comprehensive and inclusive oversight into the 
regulatory principles of information security and in particular cybersecurity management 
within organisations.  
In the context of BIM within the AECO industry, there are no FM-specific guidelines for the 
cybersecurity management of BIM-enabled working processes and procedures. The PAS1192-
5 recently replaced by ISO19650-5 was among the first efforts for addressing the issue of 
cybersecurity in BIM. This publicly-available specification portrays a cybersecurity minded 
BIM organisation, which is far from the current stance of BIM-FM organisations (Patacas et 
al., 2015). Yet, there are no standards or guidelines to address cybersecurity in FM 
organisations. Therefore, the next section explores cybersecurity determinants that can be 
integrated with BIM determinants to improve the cybersecurity of BIM-FM.  
 
 Cybersecurity Determinants  
Many resources have considered distinct categories for the factors affecting cybersecurity 
management within an organisation. To exemplify, Evans and Reeder (2010) highlight factors 
such as training, culture, and strategy development as internal factors, whilst regulations and 
stakeholder requirements are deemed as external factors. In line with this, Dzazali and Hussein 
Zolait (2012) suggest that the interchangeable effects of the internal and external categories 
unify the factors in such a way that both categories can be developed to address the other. 
Furthermore, Sommer and Brown, (2011), suggest that the management of cybersecurity is 
directly influenced by external factors such as regulations and orders, and directed by the intra-
organisational factors such as compliance, monitoring and auditing. Therefore, compliance 
with standards and guidelines should be accompanied by specific determinants to enable the 
fulfilment of the requirements set out in the best practice documents (Azzouz et al., 2016; 
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Dakhil et al., 2019; Patacas et al., 2015). A selection of determinants that contribute to an 
improved cybersecurity in organisations is presented below. Technical determinants were ruled 
out to maintain the focus of the research on the people and process aspects of cybersecurity. A 
number of peer reviewed journals in the organisational cybersecurity-management domain and 
the standards and best practice guidelines reviewed in section 2.5.2.1 were used as resources.  
2.5.2.2.1 Systems Security Design 
 Systems security design is a determinant which has the focus of many cybersecurity specialists 
within the industry and academia (Butcher, 2019; Gerber and Von Solms, 2005; Mayo and 
Snider, 2016; Von Solms and Van Niekerk, 2013; Wood, 2000). An effective design of security 
for information systems requires regular updates to keep up with the ever-growing capabilities 
of hackers and malicious cyber-intruders (Srinivas et al., 2019). It has also been discussed that 
a silo approach to cybersecurity, stems from an over-reliance on security systems and technical 
cybersecurity-solutions protecting systems security. Hence, the approach of Gerber and Von 
Solms (2005) is criticised for overlooking the important aspects of cybersecurity that entail 
people and processes, whilst over-focusing on technological aspects. In the light of this, the 
requirements and regulations of SSE CMM (2003) and ISO/IEC27010 (2012) have insisted on 
employing the effective management of knowledge, human resources and risk to design, 
manage and maintain cybersecurity systems with respect to the requirements and regulations. 
The attempt by the Information Systems Security Association (2004) to identify, assess, 
manage, and mitigate the cyber-risks to information systems has also focused on an IT-centric 
framework. Although such an approach can face criticism for its technological fundamentals, 
it can be of merit when supported by transparent processes and analysis rationale. The attempt 
by the Cobit 5 framework  (ISACA, 2003) to address IT-centric cybersecurity systems and 
solutions, in relation to the strategic goals of the business has also been criticised for not 
delivering sufficient insights into the role of strategies and implementational plans. Hence, the 
design of information systems to detect threats or protect from attacks, will improve the 
management of cybersecurity when accompanied by the right strategies and implementational 
plans.  
2.5.2.2.2 Security Risk Management 
Risk management within the context of information-security risk has been recognised by many 
standards, frameworks, and best-practice guidelines. SSE CMM ,SEI, BSI and NIST have all 
indicated the importance of establishing an effective risk-management plan to improve the 
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organisational information-security resiliency (British Standards Institution (BSI), 2012; 
CMU, 2003; NIST, 2013; “SEI Capability Maturity Model’s impact on Contractors”, 1995). 
Establishing a holistic risk management that incorporates all risk functions has been 
increasingly challenging within FM organisations (Parn, 2019c). The digitalisation of 
processes accompanied by the adoption of BIM requires a holistic approach towards cyber-
risks and physical-risks and their impact on the facilities as well as managing and maintaining 
stakeholders  (Mayo and Snider, 2016). A holistic security-risk management entails the 
correlation of infrastructure, processes, procedures and people (Amin, 2019). It also includes 
the identification, analysis, mitigation and reporting of a cyber-risk and facilitates resiliency 
against its impact (Iden et al., 2017). As proposed by many researchers including Mandani and 
Ramirez (2019), security-risk management is constructed upon the integration of IT security 
with business strategy. Hence, effective communication between the IT and business teams is 
required to achieve a holistic management of risk within a digitalised organisation, such as a 
BIM-FM organisation (Posthumus and Von Solms, 2004; Wood et al., 2019).  
 
2.5.2.2.3 Security Requirements Engineering 
The engineering of the security requirements pertains to the identification of specific security-
needs for the systems and infrastructure. This factor is acknowledged by many publications 
such as BSI (2002). As stated by Mellado et al., (2010), the identification of systems-security 
requirements assists in achieving a robust plan for organisational cybersecurity-resiliency. This 
factor is accompanied by technological excellence, and is supported by continuous monitoring, 
improvement, and advancement. Acohido (2015) emphasises the importance of incorporating 
risk-management results within the engineering of security requirements, to ensure risk aware 
decision making in the development of identity-management plans, access control, incident-
response plan, business-continuity plans, and configuration of information assets. Furthermore, 
the literature suggests the alignment of business teams knowledge of risk towards the business 
functions with the skill set and knowledge of both IT and technical security-specialists, to 
ensure an optimised design for the security requirements of systems (Glantz et al., 2016) 
2.5.2.2.4 Compliance with security regulations 
As indicated by ISO 31000:2018, standardisation and compliance with the best practice 
guidelines and standards, positively contribute to the organisational cybersecurity-management 
approach (Hutchins, 2018). However, it has been identified that not many organisations within 
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the construction industry have adopted compliance to standards and best-practice guidelines 
(HM Goverment, 2015). Seeking certification from approved third party professional bodies 
who assess organisational strategies, processes and procedures against the best-practice 
security guidelines and standards, leads to an improved level of cybersecurity management 
(Mohan et al., 2018). The literature also acknowledges the importance of an effective 
relationship between research, academia, professional bodies, and industrial organisations, to 
ensure an effective implementation of standards and regulatory guidelines (CERT, 2015). 
2.5.2.2.5 Organisational modelling of information security requirements  
Understanding and identifying the data-security requirements at an organisational level 
pertains to several factors. SEI, SSE CMM and  ISACA have addressed the identification of 
the scale of risk tolerance as an important contributor to defining the organisational 
information-security requirements (CMU, 2003; ISACA, 2012a; “SEI Capability Maturity 
Model’s impact on Contractors”, 1995). To maintain a balanced approach towards securing 
information in the implementational tasks, strategic risk-aware decision making is required to 
take into account the risk-tolerance boundaries and business goals and objectives, and compare 
them against the threat impacts (Anderson and Choobineh, 2008; Ekstedt and Sommestad, 
2009; Johansson et al., 2006). The importance of recognising the level of information security 
required for the informational assets within an organisation has been indicated by (Liu et al., 
2012). However, this will have to be backed up by the realisation of the potential cost that may 
be incurred for an organisation to recover from a potential breach of cybersecurity (Edwards, 
2018) 
2.5.2.2.6 Defined security practices 
 NIST (2014, 2018), ISO/IEC 27000 and COBIT recommend that the implementation of 
cybersecurity strategies in organisations should rely on the transparent definition of their 
security practices. Bhattacherjee (2012) and Tsoutsos et al., (2020) raised concerns regarding 
organisations whose primary operations were not focused on information security or providing 
technological solutions. Both studies demonstrated that developing formalised security 
practices is often forgotten. The Federation of European Risk Management Association 
(FERMA) and the British Standard ISO 31000:2009 also support the management of 
cybersecurity risks within organisations, using defined plans, processes, and procedures to 
identify, respond to, mitigate, or recover from, a malicious cyber-attack. Therefore, defined 
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cybersecurity practices are deemed as an essential determinant to successful management of 
cybersecurity within a digitalised BIM-FM organisation.  
2.5.2.2.7 Continuous security process improvements 
The nature of cybersecurity in the world today is ever changing (Nye, 2018). As stated in NIST, 
(2020), the evolution and advancements of technology has brought evolving cyber-threats to 
the digital systems and digitally-enabled organisations. Hence, the continuous improvement of 
security processes is emphasised, to enable organisations to keep up with the complexities of 
new threats and challenges. Across academia, many studies have pointed to the importance of 
change management within the strategies and processes (Fairholm and Card, 2009; Lacey, 
2010). In this regard, Baskerville et al. (2002) insisted on the importance of accounting for the 
continuous change of strategy and process-redirection within an organisation, to enable an 
effective response towards the unpredictable needs of customers, stakeholders, systems and 
assets. Costello (2011) further recommends organisations to employ a rapid deployment of 
devices and systems, as well as a rapid upskilling in the use of new tools. Bechtold (1997) also 
pointed to the theory of continual change to the strategies, processes, and procedures, based on 
the feedback from various levels of an organisation. In support of the continuous process 
improvement, Leidner et al., (2011) emphasised the vital need for such an approach in complex 
and dynamic organisations, such as FM, which entails the involvement and collaboration of 
many stakeholders on a wide range of projects. Hence, a continuous security process would 
empower  the delivery of unique outputs with cybersecurity incorporated at every step of the 
process (Information security forum, 2005)  
2.5.2.2.8 Competency of security team  
The competency of the security team has been highlighted by Ekelhart et al., (2009) and NIST, 
(2020), as a necessity when implementing and executing information-security strategies in an 
organisation. As stated by ISACA (2012) and Stanton et al.,(2004), the organisational 
management of information security relies upon the technical and institutional knowledge of 
the user, which determines the level of information-security maturity. Therefore, the 
cybersecurity knowledge of the technical teams and security specialists should be accompanied 
by knowledge of organisational strategies and working procedures (Kure et al., 2018). Stanton 
et al., (2005) further elaborate on the alignment of the roles and capabilities of users for 
managing and maintaining the security of digital information. Hence, this determinant pertains 
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to the competency of the cybersecurity team in managing the security of information, taking 
into account the organisational goals and objectives (Kure et al., 2018)  
2.5.2.2.9 Security conscious employees  
Bowen et al., (2006) and NCSC, (2018) accentuate the inclusion of behavioural determinants 
in organisational cybersecurity-management models and highlight its importance in tackling 
insider cyber-threats and malicious activities by those trusted. (Smith and Brooks, 2013), found 
that improving cybersecurity consciousness in users resulted in an increase of 72% in their 
resiliency against phishing attacks. Cybersecurity awareness or consciousness has also been 
proposed by NIST, (2020), as a protective measure to support the ability of the organisation to 
minimise or evade the impacts of a potential cybersecurity attack (Liu et al., 2009). The 
overriding importance of the cybersecurity consciousness of employees has been demonstrated 
by Griffin, (2019) and Kabanda, (2018), as an empowering support for the technical 
cybersecurity solutions. In improving the security consciousness of employees, Al-Janabi et 
al., (2016) propose both effective communications to employees and organisational teams as 
well as continuous training, as a way of improving the cybersecurity culture of the organisation. 
According to  Zwilling et al., (2020), the cybersecurity consciousness of employees is the 
enabler of cybersecure decision-making within dynamic and complex organisations. Hence, 
embracing the challenges of a dynamic BIM-FM organisation is not possible without a 
combined technical and socio-technical approach to the management, that takes into account 
the behavioural aspects of employees as users (Malatji et al., 2019). 
2.5.2.2.10 Security leadership 
Scovetta, (2013) has described leadership as the comparative analysis of the external factors, 
such as the market status, with internal factors, to set the right direction, vision, and mission 
for the organisation. Managerial behaviour and characteristics play an important role in the 
adoption of new technological advancements such as BIM within an organisation (Kuo and 
Lee, 2011; The International Organization for Standardization, 2012). Existing literature 
demonstrates that leadership and management qualities are the foundations of technology 
adoption, because of their empowering effect on the compatibility of both task and technology 
(Schumacher et al., 2016). Bello, (2012) further elaborates on the performance improvements 
of employees that is achieved by leadership efforts, through working towards a shared goal. 
This concept is equally applicable to the cybersecurity-management initiatives and strategies 
that require prioritisation from the leadership, to provide effective intra-organisational 
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cybersecurity training and awareness programs (Joint Task Force, 2018). In leading the 
cybersecurity incentives of an organisation, it is the responsibility of senior management to 
align the cybersecurity strategy with business goals (Kayworth and Whitten, 2010). This 
would, in turn, encourage resource allocation towards cybersecurity-management processes 
and procedures (Amaio, 2009) 
2.5.2.2.11 Business enablement of cybersecurity  
Digital systems such as BIM are implemented to achieve increased profitability by reducing 
the need for financial and human resources and improving organisational competitive-
advantage through operational efficiency (Smith, 2014). However, a cybersecurity strategy 
commonly requires additional resources, and does not always demonstrate an increased 
profitability in the short term (Hedström et al., 2011). The process of managing and 
maintaining the cybersecurity of data is usually deemed as a labour intensive, time consuming 
and costly task that jeopardises financial goals (Scully, 2011). Hence, many industrial 
organisations consider cybersecurity reactively, after an incident takes place, at which point 
irremediable losses have incurred. These could include injury, loss of life, huge financial losses, 
and reputational loss (Scully, 2013). Therefore, it is important to assess the value of 
cybersecurity, by modelling the potential impact of a cyber-attack and understanding the 
implications following the compromise of a system (Lagazio et al., 2014). This can in turn 
justify the requirements for implementing a cybersecurity strategy organisationally and will 
provide a clear understanding for the business teams (Borum et al., 2015). 
 Primary Research Framework  
Figure 6 illustrates the selected BIM-FM and organisational cybersecurity management 






Section 2.5 demonstrated limited literature on incorporating cyber security within BIM-FM. 
This is also accompanied by a lack of common guidance for implementing cybersecurity within 
BIM processes in FM, which has resulted an isolated approach towards cyber security 
management in BIM-FM organisations. Findings from the literature review further illustrate 
shortfalls and challenges within the strategic, implementational, and performance aspects of 
BIM-FM organisations in managing cybersecurity (section 2.3.3). Hence, the integration of 
cybersecurity determinants with BIM determinants, in strategy, implementation and 
performance layers of an organisation, would create a unified approach towards a cyber secure 
management of BIM-enabled facilities management organisations.  
The strategic integration is directly associated with the organisational process of 
defining its strategy, direction and goals (Carter et al., 1991; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 
2010; Martins and Terblanche, 2003). Decisions will be made for allocating resources in line 
Figure 6- Synergy of Identified Determinants for a Cybersecure BIM-FM 
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with the defined strategies and goals. Every strategy requires a robust action plan which 
encompasses the objectives and prepares for the implementation process (Kitchin and Kitchin, 
2018; Oxtoby et al., 2002; Peansupap and Walker, 2005). The integration of cybersecurity for 
BIM implementation is conducted through the identification of processes and procedures 
required (Khajuria et al., 2017; Malatji et al., 2020; McPhee and Khan, 2015) . The successful 
implementation of strategies is linked to the employee performance (Carter et al., 1991; Supić, 
2005). An organisation should efficiently execute its strategy to achieve its performance-
improvement goals. The organisation culture is often the most important determiner for 
successful execution. Hence, performance management is often viewed from a perspective 
which considers both the culture and the people (Khorrami et al., 2016; Kure et al., 2018; 
Wamala, 2011).  
Using the descriptions from sections 2.5.1.2 and 2.5.2.2, determinants were categorised under 
strategy, implementation, and performance. Thus, the primary research framework was 





This chapter offered a multi-disciplinary review of the literature in BIM, cybersecurity in the 
built environment and BIM-FM domains. The review of the literature in the BIM domain 
entailed the exploration of BIM project phases, data produced/exchanged at each stage and 
digital collaboration in BIM projects. The review of the literature in the cybersecurity of the 
Figure 7- Primary Research Framework 
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built-environment domain entailed looking at the concept of cybersecurity within organisations 
and in particular, organisations within the AECO industry. It demonstrated various cyber-
threats, the potential impacts of cyber-attacks within the built environment, the cyber 
vulnerabilities introduced by digitalisation of the built environment, and the adoption of BIM 
within AECO organisations. The review of the literature identified the shortfalls and challenges 
associated with the issue of cybersecurity within the BIM-enabled AECO industry. Hence, a 
conceptual cybersecurity-risk model was developed to portray the cyber-risks associated with 
various phases of a BIM-enabled project. The model proposed that the criticality of cyber risk 
is relatively higher than in other phases of a BIM project, henceforth, the focus of the research 
was on the FM organisations. To further explore the issue of cybersecurity within BIM-FM, 
the implementation of BIM in various task areas of a facilities management organisation was 
reviewed. The benefits and challenges associated with the implementation of BIM was also 
identified.  
Based on the findings in the cybersecurity domain, the impact of a cybersecurity breach in 
various task areas of a BIM-FM organisation was summarised in a BIM-FM specific 
cybersecurity risk matrix, demonstrating the criticality of risk and its implications on the 
facilities and their managing organisations. Therefore, section 2.5 identified the requirements 
that BIM-enabled facilities management organisations can seek to improve their cybersecurity 
profile. This was conducted by the secondary-data analysis to identify the determinants 
contributing to improved cybersecurity of BIM in FM. Through the exploration of maturity 
models, best-practice guidelines, standards, and peer reviewed journals, the social and 
managerial BIM determinants applicable to the FM organisations were extracted from the 
BIM-maturity models of both Succar and CIC. Also, the social and managerial determinants 
for organisational cybersecurity-management were extracted from the existing resources in the 
domain of cybersecurity management. The synergy of the extracted determinants formulated 
the primary-research framework. The following chapter outlines the approach adopted to 






 Chapter Three: Methodology 
 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design and the methods used to answer the research question 
and achieve the research objectives. It provides a detailed explanation of the steps taken to 
respond to the research question and justifies the selection of research methodology and 
research design. It also discusses the underpinnings of designing research and the way in which 
it directs the researcher towards setting their priorities. In doing so, Section 3.2, discusses the 
philosophical positioning and world view of the researcher. This is followed by an overview 
of methodologies compatible with the philosophical positioning in section 3.3. Furthermore, 
Section 3.4 presents the research approach, which clarifies the reasoning behind the choices 
made. Section 3.5 provides a summary on the overall approach towards achieving the aim of 
this research project with reference to the existing literature on various philosophical concepts 
of the research design. This is followed by a discussion of the research methods in section 3.6, 
which describes the process of how knowledge is established in this research. Section 3.7 
discusses the way the research quality is ensured, and section 3.8 concludes the chapter by 
identifying the ethical considerations that have been made throughout the study.  
 Research Philosophy  
The theoretical perspective of a researcher represents the way in which they view the world 
and the reasoning behind every research assumption that is made throughout a research project 
(Gray, 2014; Saunders et al., 2019). This theoretical perspective is known as the philosophical 
paradigm, or philosophical positioning, which supports the decisions taken in the research 
design and the choice of research methods for the purpose of achieving the research objectives 
(Leavy, 2017; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2012). Saunders et al., (2019) defines three main categories 
for the relationship between the process of creating knowledge and the output of that process, 
labelled as ontology (views of the world), epistemology (human knowledge of the world) and 
axiology (the effect of the researcher on the knowledge). Gray, (2014) states that ontology is 
concerned with the relative assumptions about the reality of knowledge. Ontological 
assumptions are characterised by two main categories, namely objectivism and subjectivism, 
which are stances at both ends of the ontological spectrum. Crotty, (1998) defines objectivism 
as a view where social objects are exterior to social actors, whilst subjectivism views social 
phenomenon as the result of the actions taken by social actors.  
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Saunders et al., (2019) highlighted that researchers commonly implement an ontological view 
in between the two ends of the spectrum, depending on the research aims and objectives.  
Considering the research aim (Chapter 1), identifying the requirements of a cybersecure 
management of BIM-enabled FM organisations from a socio-technical view requires an 
exploration of the interactions between people and technology, collaboration processes and the 
challenges involved in the handling and management of BIM project information. Therefore, 
a subjective ontological approach is required to acknowledge the subjectivity of the captured 
information about the reality, depending on the opinions and experiences of the social actors 
(e.g., BIM project stakeholders).  
 Critical Realism 
A critical realist approach to the research supports the view that reality or truth exists regardless 
of human activities. However, it also appreciates that the complexities of the social world 
represent an open system that pushes access to the actual truth beyond reach (Carlsson, 2009). 
Critical realism acknowledges the assumptions regarding human knowledge, also known as 
epistemological assumptions, whilst being strongly focused on the ontological aspects (Sayer, 
2000). As shown in figure 8, the critical realism view is based on the belief that the truth exists 
beyond our observations, however, our observations can increase our understanding of the 
unobservable structures that exist as part of the actual reality (Archer et al., 2013; Mingers, 
2004). 
Although an interpretivist philosophical stance holds similar views to critical realism, it 
overlooks the unobservable of the truth by solely depending on understanding the phenomenon 
from the perceptions and experiences of the individual (Capps, 2019). Alternative 
Figure 8-Critical Realism View (Mingers, 2004) 
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philosophical stances such as positivism would be suitable for research where an existing 
theory is subjected to test and evaluation (Myers et al., 2004). 
Thus, approaching this research from a critical realism perspective, acknowledges the 
subjectivity of the knowledge that is captured about the actual reality (Saunders et al., 2019). 
Therefore, the axiological considerations, pertaining to the effects of researcher on the creation 
of knowledge should be discussed. Hence, the collection of empirical and theoretical 
knowledge and their synchronisation would assist the researcher with better interpretation and 
apprehension of knowledge. Furthermore, the self-awareness of the researcher regarding the 
possible biases raised by the beliefs, gender, background, and other positions of the researcher 
are also important in collecting and interpreting information throughout the process of research. 
Thus, in the process of data collection and analysis of this study, to avoid bias, the researcher 
sought neutrality in the approach taken.  
 Methodology in Critical Realism 
Yin, (2014) define research methodology as the underpinning principles, processes, and 
procedures of a scientific investigation. Saunders et al., (2019) state that the logical thought 
process and philosophy of reasoning supports the application of a research methodology and 
the choice of research methods. As discussed in section 3.2, this research is based on a critical 
realism philosophy of reasoning. Although critical realism is compatible with both qualitative 
and quantitative research methods (Zachariadis et al., 2013), it has also been postulated that 
qualitative methods are more aligned with critical realist views (Mingers et al., 2013). This is 
due to the capability of qualitative methods for exploring meaning through the perspectives, 
experiences, and thoughts of the participant, and therefore, enabling a better understanding of 
the stance of the researcher, in relation to the reality (Yin, 2018). In contrast, quantitative 
methods fall short of providing an in-depth description of the matter under investigation, and 
have limited capability for explaining the interactions between complex mechanisms.  
(Mingers et al., 2013) and Sayer (2000),also acknowledge that although critical realism allows 
flexibility in the choice of research methods, the nature of the matter under investigation and 
the aim of the study should also be considered. As this research aims to incorporate 
cybersecurity considerations in BIM-FM, in-depth understanding of the concepts of BIM, 
cybersecurity, and the interaction and experiences of people with technology is required. 
Therefore, this research mainly uses qualitative methods to enable in-depth exploration of the 
concepts under investigation.  
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 Research Approach 
Creswell, (2015) suggested that the research approach is the way in which the researcher plans 
the roadmap towards the collection and analysis of data. There are various research approaches, 
including inductive, deductive and abductive (i.e. a combination of inductive and deductive), 
which are used to tackle research of different nature and scope (Pohontsch, 2019; Woiceshyn 
and Daellenbach, 2018). A deductive approach commonly begins with a theory which might 
be subjected to further expansion or modifications, and then later tested and evaluated. This 
approach is usually accompanied with objectivism and is popular in the natural sciences and 
for the clarification of concepts and phenomenon (Bradford, 2017). A deductive research 
approach involves the collection of data to assess a hypothesis, with the aim of approving or 
rejecting the underpinning theory (McGhee et al., 2007; Pohontsch, 2019).  
Alternatively, as shown in figure 9, an inductive approach is commonly accompanied by 
subjectivism, where the process commences with exploratory observations (Trochim and 
Donnelly, 2001). In light of this, Bryman, (2016) adds that an inductive approach involves 
exploration and observation of the phenomenon, leading to the formation of hypotheses that 
are later explored to provide general conclusions.  
Kothari, (2004) and Merriam, (2009) also assert that the inductive approach to research 
involves open-ended exploration during the preliminary stages of the project, that facilitates 
the apprehension of meanings and their social connections to events. In contrast to the 
deductive approach, inductive research is usually associated with the collection of qualitative 
data, where the flexibility of the research design allows for the change of research focus 






Figure 9-Inductive Research Process (Trochim and Donnelly, 2001) 
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with large sample sizes to generalise the findings, an inductive approach is more concerned 
with constructing a knowledge block that facilitates an in-depth understanding of the research 
topic.  
Considering that the research aims to incorporate cybersecurity considerations in BIM-FM 
organisations, preliminary exploration of the subject was required to identify where the issue 
lies. Therefore, an inductive approach was suitable to be employed to allow open-ended 
exploration of the topic in multiple domains of BIM and cybersecurity in the built environment. 
Given that cybersecurity entails the interaction of people with technology such as BIM, an 
inductive approach also enabled the investigation of the social aspects, where the subjectivity 
of knowledge is taken into account (Kothari, 2004; Oleskeviciene, 2020). Thus, this research 
commenced with a review to identify the gaps in the literature for BIM and cybersecurity in 
the built environment, which directs the focus of the research to the socio-technical aspects of 
cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations.  
 Research design  
Research design is a sequential representation of the way various components of research such 
as aims, objectives, research methods, techniques and boundaries connect (Creswell, 2015). 
(Bryman, 2016) state that the research design demonstrates the application of research methods 
and data analysis in the research. Yin, (2014) also states that the research design portrays the 
ways in which the application of the selected research methods and data analysis techniques 
lead to the development of responses to the research questions. Creswell and Poth, 
(2016)further point out the connections between the research methodology and the 
philosophical positioning (paradigm) of the research and emphasise the importance of research 
design in elucidating the research process. Hence, in a research design, the nature of the 
problem under investigation, philosophical positioning, timeframe of the research, and 
resource availability must be taken into account to prevent any potential shortfalls (Saunders 
et al., 2019; Yin, 2014). This will ensure the repeatability of the research by acting as a map 
that represents the interconnections of the steps taken along the research process (Maxwell, 
2013).  Royer and Zarlowski, (2001) state that research design is part of the research process 
and is formed following the identification of the research theme. It entails exploratory research 
into the research theme and leads to the formation of research questions.  
The preliminary literature review of  cybersecurity and BIM illustrated that the issue of 
cybersecurity is critical within the in-use phase of the BIM lifecycle, therefore, the focus of the 
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research was directed to the BIM-FM organisations, as the main stakeholders involved in 
managing and maintaining the facility in the in-use phase. It showed that the cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities within organisations are overly dependent on the technical cybersecurity 
solutions provided by infrastructure suppliers and IT teams to manage the cybersecurity of 
information. Therefore, the focus of the research was further narrowed down to the people and 
process aspects of managing cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations. Hence, the research 
question and the succeeding research objectives were developed (chapter 1). 
To fulfil the second research objective, a critical review of the literature was conducted to 
highlight the challenges associated with the implementation of BIM in FM, that heighten the 
risk of a cybersecurity attack in BIM-enabled facilities management organisations. The 
literature review was further expanded to explore the complexities in the management of 
cybersecurity BIM-FM, whilst highlighting the people and process aspects of cybersecurity in 
BIM-FM. 
In fulfilling the third research objective, the requirements of a cybersecure BIM-FM 
organisation were investigated. This entailed the collection of theoretical data from secondary 
information sources and empirical data from semi-structured interviews with industry 
professionals. The collection of data from two different sources improves the quality of the 
results and assists the researcher in the interpretation of information. Owen, (2014) and Taylor, 
(2012) assert that the assimilation of various qualitative methods, such as qualitative 
exploration and analysis of secondary data, followed by semi-structured interviews, results in 
justifiable research findings. Therefore, the next stage of the research was designed to analyse 
the information collected through the second stage.  
Dixon-Woods et al., (2005) suggest that thematic analysis explores the similarities, diversity, 
typologies, and existing trends in the existing resources and hence offers an in-depth insight 
into the interconnections between various themes. Thematic analysis of both primary and 
secondary data led to the next stage of the research, where the research framework was 
developed.  
Finally, following the synchronisation of all findings, a qualitative validation of the research 
framework was conducted through experts’ review. Sandelowski (1998) suggests that in 
validating qualitative research, experts can best criticise the research outcome by asking the 
right questions, not by providing the right answers. Sandelowski, (1998) further elaborates on 
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this by saying that experts can assist the researcher in resolving the shortcomings and defects 
of the final research product.  
The research design, as presented in Figure 10 below, was thus constructed to plan the process 
of fulfilling the research objectives.  
Define Research 
Focus














findings to develop 
BIMCS-FM 
Framework
Objectives 1,2 Objectives 3,4 Objectives 3,4






 Qualitative Research Methods  
Qualitative research methods transform reality into various representations, such as a 
discussion, interview, photograph or memo (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). In this research, to 
identify what makes a cybersecure BIM-enabled facilities management, in-depth knowledge 
of collaboration processes and procedures, and an understanding of the way BIM-FM 
organisations manage and handle digital information is required. FM professionals’ experience 
and perspective provide meaningful insights into the challenges of a cybersecure 
implementation of BIM in FM. Cresswell (2018) points out the importance of the viewpoints 
of participants and the subjectivity of their perspectives, which are captured during the course 
of a qualitative data collection. Therefore, this research used interviews to capture the 
understanding and insights of FM professionals regarding the  concepts of BIM and 
cybersecurity.  
A key characteristic of qualitative research methods is the effect of researchers on the collection 
and analysis of data (Cresswell, 2018). To minimise the researcher-bias it is recommended to 
use multiple sources of data such as documents and images is recommended to enable 
comparison and improve the accuracy of the results (Merriam, 2009). Thus, this research 
collects theoretical data through the review of literature, to allow more accurate interpretation 
Figure 10- Research Design 
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of empirical results. The synchronisation of both empirical and theoretical findings then forms 
the research output.  
The choice of research methods used in the collection and analysis of data is explained in the 
following sections: 
 Preliminary Explorations- Review of Literature  
The first stage in the design of this research entailed a broad exploration of both BIM and 
cybersecurity domains (research objective 1).This was carried out through a literature review, 
with the aim of establishing knowledge and apprehension of the current research in both 
domains. Snyder (2019) stated that a literature review describes the stance of existing studies 
and their contribution to the understanding of the research problem under investigation. Snyder 
(2019) further suggests that a literature review enables new interpretations of the previous 
studies and leads to the identification of the areas in need of additional work. Steward, (2004) 
further emphasise that the review of literature illustrates where the research focus lies in the 
context of the existing studies. The review of the literature for BIM and cybersecurity in the 
built environment domain demonstrated that the impact of cybersecurity risks is critical within 
FM organisations. Thus, the research focus was narrowed down to the cybersecurity of BIM-
enabled facilities management organisations, which encouraged further investigation of the 
literature (research objective 2) in the application of BIM in FM, to fulfil the second research 
objective. 
The review of literature illustrated the cybersecurity risk and vulnerabilities in BIM-FM 
organisations. Further investigation also demonstrated that BIM and cybersecurity concepts 
were commonly coupled from a technical point of view, which impedes the people and process 
aspects of cybersecurity of BIM-FM. This resulted in a further demarcation of the research 
focus to the people and process aspects of cybersecurity management in BIM-FM (research 
objective 3). Therefore, the third research objective was approached from a people and process 
perspective.  
 Secondary Data Analysis 
Hakim (1982) defined secondary data analysis as “any further analysis of an existing dataset 
which presents interpretations, conclusions or knowledge additional to, or different from, those 
presented in the first report on the inquiry as a whole and its main results”. Secondary data 
analysis is particularly used in multi-disciplinary studies where a primary approach to data 
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collection often requires high levels of expertise in all targeted disciplines that may not be 
present within a small group of researchers (Cheng and Phillips, 2014). Although using 
secondary data means a larger breadth of information can be used from various resources, they 
may not always include the response to the questions of the researcher (Boslaugh, 2009). In 
topics of a multi-disciplinary nature, the existing resources may only address one area of the 
research focus, therefore, an assimilation of resources might be required to cover all aspects of 
the research (Gale et al., 2013).  
The third research objective seeks to identify the people and process related determinants of a 
cybersecure BIM-enabled facilities management (see secondary data analysis in figure 11). 
This entailed looking at multiple disciplines of cybersecurity and BIM-FM from both social 
and managerial perspectives. Although various BIM maturity models have previously 
identified the determinants of a successful implementation of BIM, limited consideration has 
been given to the people and process aspects of cybersecurity. Therefore, best practice 
guidelines and standards, as well as peer-reviewed journals in cybersecurity management were 
used to identify the people and process related cybersecurity determinants, applicable in BIM-
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Figure 11- Multi-disciplinary analysis of secondary data for identification of determinants 
The extraction of determinants from various resources was achieved using the thematic 
analysis of secondary data. This is concerned with identifying the knowledge and core elements 
together with an evaluation and coalition of the existing resources to depict specific aspects of 
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the phenomenon (Braun and Clarke, 2012). Thematic analysis was chosen because the problem 
required knowledge from multiple disciplines regarding both cybersecurity in the built 
environment and BIM-FM. As per Dixon-Woods et al., (2005), thematic analysis explored the 
similarities, diversity, typologies, and existing trends in the existing resources and hence offers 
an in-depth insight into the interconnections between various themes. The selected resources 
were explored, and findings were interpreted by the researcher, to enable appreciation of the 
interchangeable phrases and terminologies used to communicate the meanings and concepts of 
the phenomenon. The resources were manually selected based on the scope of the research, 
filtered by inclusion and exclusion criteria, and bounded by the key focus of the publication. 
Following the review and analysis of this first set of publications, a subset of these were 
considered for further review with respect to their relevance, focus and research domain 
selecting only those with a social and managerial focus to BIM and cybersecurity, whilst 
omitting those concentrating purely on the technical aspects. 
Through the assimilation of findings identified from the cybersecurity and BIM data sources, 
the primary research framework was proposed which integrated both cybersecurity and BIM-
FM determinants. The concepts proposed by the framework required further investigation, to 
ensure they were fit to fulfil the third and fourth research objectives. Hence, the next stage of 
the research involved collecting primary data, to expand and revise the primary framework.    
 Primary data collection- Interviews  
Eriksson and Kovalainen, (2008) suggested that interviews enable the researcher to gain an 
insight into both real-life experiences and expert opinions regarding the matter under 
investigation. Furthermore, interview is a common research method within qualitative studies 
that elicit various perspectives in the form of discussions between the participants and the 
researcher (Qu and Dumay, 2011). Structured interviews are those designed with a previously 
constructed set of questions. As per Stuckey, (2013), this type of interview allows for the 
speedy collection of data with the lowest potential for bias. However, Lewis-Beck et al., (2012) 
have criticised this method as being susceptible to bias, because the demarcation of 
conversation through structured questions might induce specific point of views or omit 
opinions that fall outside the boundaries set by the researcher. An alternative option is the 
unstructured interview, where there is a high level of flexibility in the discussions between the 
participant and the researcher (Qu and Dumay, 2011). However, it does not allow further 
exploration of the concepts already extracted from the secondary data collection. The 
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discussions should address the objectives, whilst allowing the collection of new knowledge. 
Unstructured interviews have the risk of not hitting the targeted research domain, as the 
participants are responsible for choosing what is relevant (Woods, 2011).  
The semi-structured interview was chosen because it has the advantage of having a structure 
within the boundaries of the research objectives whilst allowing for further knowledge to be 
shared (Adams, 2015). Semi-structured interviews allow a degree of flexibility in the 
discussions, whilst ensuring the conversation is not heading in the wrong direction. (Myers et 
al., 2004) states that in a semi-structured interview the questions allow the respondents to share 
their opinions openly, however, the discussions can be kept within the boundaries, by using 
prompting and probing questions. Sapsford and Jupp, (2012) further suggest that semi-
structured interviews also allow the researcher to repeat a question or slightly change the 
wordings and phrases to achieve more precise responses from the participants. Also, Bryman, 
(2016) states that a semi-structured plan of an interview is deemed as an interview guide, that 
maintains the balance between flexibility and the research boundaries. Therefore, using semi-
structured interviews in this research enables further expansion and exploration of the 
determinants proposed within the primary research framework.  
 Interview Set-up 
The undertaking of interviews can be done through various settings, including face-to-face (in-
person) interviews, telephone/audio calls or videocalls (Stuckey, 2013). Each setting is 
associated with a number of advantages and disadvantages. The advantages associated with an 
in-person interview is the non-verbal communication and the facial expressions that are 
observed by the researcher during the interview session. These can assist the researcher to 
clarify any doubts and confusions instantly (Woods, 2011). However, this set up requires a 
higher level of communication and improvisation skills. More importantly, meeting in person 
with all the participants is time consuming, difficult to arrange and is commonly associated 
with geographical barriers (Sekaran and Bougie, 2016). Although the interviews in this 
research were primarily planned to be undertaken in a face-to-face setting, a global pandemic 
resulting in a nationwide lock-down of all businesses and institutes arose during this phase of 
the research project, hence, the researcher considered audio calls as an alternative setting for 
conducting the interviews. This choice also had a number of advantages including overcoming 
geographical limitations. Audio calls were significantly more convenient for most participants 
and certainly helped with interviewing a larger sample. It was also advantageous in cases where 
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respondents felt pressure and a degree of anxiety to attend an in-person interview session (Flick 
et al., 2015; Kvale, 2011a).  Despite the advantages, some disadvantages regarding 
technological challenges (i.e. a low signal/internet connection) as well as missing out on the 
non-verbal expressions were identified as the limitations of this set-up (Allmark et al., 2009; 
Knox and Burkard, 2009). Although the latter disadvantage could be partly resolved using 
video calls, a number of participants expressed that they would prefer an audio call due to them 
needing to work from home and also having weak internet connections that did not allow for a 
video call without interruptions. Hence, to maintain consistency, audio calls were used to 
collect the empirical data.  
 Structuring interview questions 
Findings from the literature review were used as a guide for structuring the interview questions. 
Questions were designed to address strategic, implementational and performance-related 
aspects of cybersecurity integration in BIM-FM. Although the questions were set to further 
address the identified determinants from the secondary data analysis (i.e., the lead 
determinants), they were flexible to allow any new knowledge to be discovered through the 
exploration of the experiences of professionals in practice. The empirical data also allowed an 
overview of the existing trends in practice, and hence, enabled comparison with the findings 
of the secondary data analysis through interactions with industry professionals. The focus of 
each interview question is discussed in section 4.2.2. 
 Participant Selection 
Findings illustrated that the cybersecurity vulnerabilities arise from the challenges associated 
with the mature implementation of BIM in FM. Therefore, the interviews aimed to collect the 
perspectives, understanding and experience  of FM in managing the cybersecurity of data in 
BIM-FM organisations. For this purpose, FM professionals with knowledge and experience of 
working in a BIM-FM organisation would provide the required information. The selection of 
this sample can be rationalised by the complex phenomenon investigated in this research which 
requires the contextualising and in-depth understanding of FM, but more importantly BIM-
FM. Hence, the experts targeted would support identifying issues related to cybersecurity 
within BIM-enabled FM. As the primary research framework propose determinants within the 
strategy, implementation and performance layers of an organisation, individuals in senior 
positions and key decision makers within BIM-enabled FM organisations were targeted to 
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capture their experience and insights on the issue of cybersecurity management. The roles of 
the participants and the sector of their organisations are tabulated in table 4. 
 
 
Table 4- Participants' Roles & Organisational Sector 
Interviewees’ roles No. Organisational Sector (No. of Participants) 
Project Manager 3 General Contractor (2) Commercial/Residential (1) 
Facilities Management Director 4 General Contractor (3) Education (1) 
Facilities Manager 5 Commercial (2) Health (1) Residential (2) 
Head of Information Management in FM  2 General Contractor (2) 
Head of Technology & Innovation in FM  1 Public/Commercial (1) 
Managing Director of FM 2 Commercial/Residential (2) 
Director of Estates & Facilities 1 Education (1) 
Associate Director of Technology in FM 2 Financial/Commercial 
Head of Digital Transformation in FM 1 Education (1) 
 
BIM-enabled facilities management is still at its early stages of transition and hence, finding 
professionals with experience of working in BIM-enabled facilities management organisations 
required a multi-step approach to finding the ideal participants that would meet the selection 
criteria for the data collection. Participants for the interviews, were selected based on their 
expertise in BIM-FM.A direct approach being made to professionals within the facilities 
management organisations who have adopted BIM as their modus operandi or have been 
involved in BIM-enabled projects. Almost all participants were initially either contacted via 
professional social-media platforms such as LinkedIn, or their professional email address. 
Furthermore, the experiences of participants were examined with specific focus on 
management positions (e.g., facility manager, project manager, information manager, 
innovation manager). Following the primary contact with the selected participants, some 
snowball referrals took place with peer recommendations.  
As Saunders et al., (2012) state, the sample population (also labelled as the sampling frame) is 
representative of the whole total. Various methods are utilised to distinguish the representative 
sample from the grand total, including systematic sampling, simple random sampling, non-
probability and many more. In the context of this research, determining the total population 
would be unfeasible, considering the various states of BIM maturity in FM, and the variety of 
BIM use in organisations (ad-hoc, organisational implementation, etc).Also, the interviews 
were not aimed at reaching a saturation point, but to achieve an in-depth understanding of the 
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issue. Therefore, 25 professionals in senior positions with relevant knowledge and experience 
of working in a BIM-enabled FM organisation were selected to be interviewed. With the chosen 
interview setup being audio/phone calls, the participant selection was not limited to 
geographical restrictions, hence, adding to the value of the primary-data collection (Kvale, 
2011a)Considering that the BIM regulations and working processes differ around the world, 
only organisations operating within the UK were considered for participant selection. 
Furthermore, due to the differing characteristics of various industries, in terms of the available 
resources, government support, and nature of work, the participants were selected from 
facilities management organisations from a variety of industrial sectors (e.g., education, 
healthcare, etc). The decision to employ purposive sampling supports the achievement of new 
insights into the matter under exploration (Saunders et al., 2019). The research specified that 
the selection of participants should be based on their knowledge and experience of BIM 
projects and their history of working with, or within, a facilities management organisation. 
Therefore, participants were selected from various organisations with various roles (e.g., 
Facilities Manager, Information Controller, Project Manager, etc.) to ensure that a balanced 
representation of strategic and operational roles were represented within the data. The 
participants selection was undertaken regardless of gender to avoid any bias.  
 Thematic Analysis of Data 
The number of qualitative studies using interviews as their method of data collection has grown 
over the last couple of decades, and there are many studies of how to undertake interviews. 
However, studies describing the process of developing, analysing and validating qualitative 
interviews are still exceedingly rare (Kvale, 2011a). As per the approach to qualitative data 
analysis proposed by O’Leary, (2021), a valid analysis of interviews can be achieved by 
following five key steps, as used in this research, which were:  
i. Review and revise interview transcripts to understand the content and for the 
identification of certain patterns, themes, or new ideas.   
ii. Develop descriptive and interpretive categories using the contents of the transcripts 
and the preliminary review of the literature. 
iii. Revise the content within each category, to determine any existing inter-
connections.   




v. Revise the primary set of codes, to narrow down the code list and identify the 
themes that best contribute to the research question.  
For the transcription of the interviews, the researcher opted for a verbatim transcription of the 
interview sessions, rather than limiting the data to the selective transcription of the interview 
discussions. As per Kvale, (2011a) this ensures that no information is overlooked during the 
analysis. Following a thorough review of all transcripts, the researcher chose to input the 
transcripts into NVIVO12, which is a qualitative data analysis software tool that enables the 
structuring, analysis, and representation of qualitative data. The decision to use this software 
tool was made, based on its ability to store, structure and analyse large volumes of qualitative 
data (Tookey et al., 2011).  
 Framework Validation: Expert’s Review 
Validation of the research output requires the examination of a body of evidence from other 
research, both causal and descriptive, drawn from other experiences or settings, or from 
reflective practitioners (Leviton, 2015). This research used expert’s review to validate the 
research output (i.e., the BIMCS-FM framework). Expert review or judgement is a common 
method used for validating a framework’s relevance, applicability, and representativeness for 
a particular phenomenon (Haynes et al., 1995). As defined by Escobar-Pérez and Cuervo-
Martínez (2008), this method provides informed opinion, judgement, and assessment from 
qualified experts with a track record of experience/knowledge on the research topic. The 
comments collected from the experts are used to add or omit elements, or to improve the clarity 
of the concepts proposed by the research construct (Garrote et al., 2015). In conducting 
validation using expert opinion, identifying the expert selection criteria as well as the method 
of data collection play a key role. The selection of the experts is often based on their theoretical 
or practical knowledge of the topic under investigation, however, alternative criteria can be 
considered, depending on the purpose of validation and research characteristics (Escobar-Pérez 
et al., 2008). Various methods can be used to collect experts’ opinion, either individually or in 
groups. These methods can result in either qualitative or quantitative judgement of the strength 
and weaknesses of the research construct (Hyrkäs et al., 2003). In using expert review as a way 
of validating the research construct, correct performance of the procedures is of great 
importance. Therefore, employing formal methods in the selection of the experts, and the 




 Expert selection criteria 
Beecham et al., (2005) suggests that tactical experts with experience and knowledge of the 
subject matter improve the scientific validity of the study. Therefore, the selection of experts 
was based on their knowledge and experience of either BIM-enabled facilities management or 
cybersecurity management in organisations. The purpose was to validate the research 
framework using experts from both backgrounds to ensure the aspects of both cybersecurity 
and BIM-FM were considered. Only experts in senior management positions were selected, to 
incorporate their experience of management and implementation in their feedback. Therefore, 
the validation of the framework was conducted using seven experts, to allow the collection of 
their perspectives and opinions. The roles and organisational sector of the respondents are 
shown in table 5 .The steps taken to select and contact the experts is detailed in section 6.2.   
Table 5- Participant's Roles & Organisational Sector 
Participants’ roles No. Organisational Sector                          
Head of Digital Asset Security in FM 1 Public  
Cybersecurity Consultant for FM 1 Construction/Engineering/FM 
Facilities Manager 2 General Contractor  
Information Manager in FM  2 Public/Commercial 
Project Manager in FM 1 Education 
 
 Open-ended questionnaire 
In selection of the data collection method, qualitative methods were considered to enable a 
richer insight into the opinions and thoughts of the experts. The choice of an open-ended 
questionnaire over other methods, such as interviews or focus groups, was made by considering  
the purpose of validation, the characteristics of the research output and the sensitive nature of 
the topic under investigation. The BIMCS-FM framework developed following the 
assimilation of both the theoretical and empirical findings of this research, encompass a number 
of determinants and their interconnections within the three layers of strategy, implementation, 
and performance. The description of each of the determinants together with an introduction to 
the framework and its purpose was also developed to give the experts a better understanding 
of the research output. Considering the complexity of the framework, a questionnaire enabled 
the experts to spend time reading and comprehending the definitions and framework 
description and provided a more comprehensive response to the validation questions. This 
would not have been accommodated within a focus group or interview setting, where a 
spontaneous response and engagement in the discussions is required of the experts. Also, the 
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open-ended design of the questionnaire enables the experts to freely express their opinions and 
allows suggestions for new additions to the framework. Alternative methods such as focus 
groups would also enable rich discussions and extraction of new ideas, however, being focused 
on organisational cybersecurity management, the sensitive nature of the framework would limit 
the expression of ideas in a focus group setting. Hence, the experts were provided with an open-
ended questionnaire (see section 6.3 and 6.4), and sent to the experts, together with the 
description of the framework and the description of the proposed determinants. Upon the return 
of the questionnaire, the feedback of the experts was qualitatively analysed to assess how the 
responses addressed the purposes of the validation. 
Although the use of a questionnaire for expert validation is well established, it is recommended 
that the validation of any research construct using this method should be continually reviewed 
and improved. Therefore, the research quality is also addressed in section 3.7, which explains 
the reliability of the methods and techniques used during the research process.  
 Research Quality 
Empirical data in qualitative research has often faced criticism and scepticism as to whether 
the research presents reliable results (Pohontsch, 2019). In this regard, Allmark et al., (2009) 
emphasised the importance of maintaining high quality throughout the research design and 
analysis. The research quality represents the reliability and trustworthiness of all aspects of 
research. As stated by Leavy, (2017), research reliability is an indicator of the quality of the 
methods and techniques used within qualitative research.  
Despite the emerging number of qualitative studies, a limited number of resources have 
described the validation processes for the quality of qualitative research, particularly for those 
involving in-depth interviews. Research quality is often addressed by reference to explicit 
criteria that leads to a transparent research methodology that can accurately report on the 
strength and limitations, whilst optimising the quality of research throughout (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2008). It has been argued that in order to establish the research quality, the research 
paradigm, types of data and data analysis procedure should be taken into consideration and 
accurately incorporated within the research methodology (Bryman et al., 2008). Hence, the 
following section will describe how the research quality was maintained throughout the 
research process.  
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 Reliability and Trustworthiness 
Research quality represents the reliability of the methods and techniques used to achieve the 
objectives of the study. This also involves the trustworthiness of the research in all aspects, 
including all processes and procedures to collect, analyse and report data (Pohontsch, 2019). 
In the context of this research, consistency, transparency, and accuracy were sought in 
reporting the research design, methodology and findings, based on high moral principles 
(Beecham et al., 2005). For instance, to ensure a transparent and consistent approach to primary 
data collection, interviews were audio-recorded and followed by verbatim transcription 
techniques (Cohen and Crabtree, 2006).  
In qualitative research, using semi-structured interviews, where a degree of flexibility is 
required to explore deeper aspects of a phenomenon, replicability is a challenge (Lewis-Beck 
et al., 2012). Considering the variations in the personal attributes of the researcher, such as 
interview skills and research skills, a degree of variation is inevitable (Sapsford et al., 2012). 
Hence, the possibility of achieving the same results with the same techniques by another 
researcher might be affected (Bryman et al., 2008). However, bias as such can be minimised 
by first acknowledging that each researcher has their own way of explaining concepts, and 
secondly, seeking to use a standardised procedures (Noble and Smith, 2015). For instance, in 
this research, efforts have been made to ensure interviews were conducted in accordance with 
the interview guide (i.e., by semi-structured questions), with minimum variations and with 
specific focus on the lead determinants, derived from the secondary data analysis. Furthermore, 
the researcher sought to document every step of the data collection and analysis with maximum 
possible transparency and precision. Thus, the aforementioned steps inherently improve on the 
credibility of research and increase the reliability and trustworthiness (Bhattacherjee, 2012; 
Lewis-Beck et al., 2012; Sapsford et al., 2012) 
An alternative criterion representing the trustworthiness of the research, is the research rigour, 
which is described as the quality of findings, or the contribution that results from the output of 
the research (Bryman, 2016). This particularly represents the authenticity of the interpretations 
of researchers regarding academic standards, based on various forms of internal and external 
validity (Myers, 2013).  In the light of this, Flick (2008) states that qualitative research validity 
is strongly dependent on the trustworthiness of the data collection and analysis and the 
reporting of the findings. Hence, in the context of this research, the rigour is assured through 
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the transparency, trustworthiness and reliability of the processes, procedures, and methods used 
(Bashir et al., 2008).  
 Ethical considerations  
This research was conducted in compliance with the Birmingham City University research 
ethics rules and regulations. Substantive percentages of this research have relied on secondary 
data, including the literature review that entailed the use of peer-reviewed journal papers, best 
practice guidelines and standards, maturity models and frameworks. Hence, note taking and 
precise citation of the resources was implemented throughout the research (Bloomberg and 
Volpe, 2018). The primary data collection through interviews with 25 participants, was 
performed based on the ethical practices of Birmingham City University and the appointed 
supervisory team. In the pre-interview phase, all respondents were provided with a research-
participants brief which included a summary of the research, the purpose of data collection and 
how they will be contributing to the creation of knowledge for this research. Furthermore, the 
document elucidated the confidentiality and anonymity of the information given by 
participants. In the light of this, the participants were asked for permission to use their 
responses in the research and were informed of their right to withdraw from the research at any 
given time. Hence, the involvement of participants in the data collection was fully voluntary, 
with comprehensive information about the procedures of the interviews, recording of the 
interview sessions and their rights specified to them (Rudestam et al., 2014). As recommended 
by UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), a formally written consent form signed by all 
participants, affirmed their understanding and appreciation of their ethical rights, the potential 
risks and benefits to them, the research processes and procedures used, the level of their 
involvement and any other relevant information. Hence, every effort was made to articulate 
and communicate the aforementioned information to all participants, prior to the data 
collection.  
The ethical considerations should also be addressed in the design of the interviews (Kvale, 
2011b). Hence, in the design of the interview questions within this research, effort was made 
to ensure questions were not distressing to the participants, by omitting any psychological, 
personal and/or brand specific questions that might disregard the confidentiality, anonymity, 
and professionalism of the interviews. Sections 3.9.1 and 3.9.2 illustrate the way in which 
anonymity and sensitivity of the interview questions were managed and controlled in favour of 
the participants and in accordance with the ethical rules of the BCU research regulations.  
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 Confidentiality & Anonymity 
To ensure all the ethical considered were addressed, the researcher was responsible for 
managing and maintaining the confidentiality of the personally-identifiable information, that 
might pose risks and create undesirable consequences for the participants and their 
organisations (Allmark et al., 2009). Many studies have accentuated the importance of 
codifying personal information to preserve the rights of the participants and avoid any negative 
implications for those involved (Rudestam and Newton, 2014). The terms “confidentiality” and 
“anonymity” are commonly used jointly. Confidentiality is the secure management of 
information to ensure that the information is not used for any purpose other than that stated and 
is secured from unauthorised access (Wiles et al., 2008). Harding, (2018) stated that anonymity 
is obscuring the source of identity, and hence, it affects the decision of the respondents to 
participate in the research. Therefore, in this research, the anonymity of respondents was 
maintained throughout both the data analysis and the reporting of the results. The researcher 
chose to codify respondents with numbers, so as to be able to organise their responses and 
address their quotations in the discussion of findings. In accordance with the data protection 
act (1998), this research sought to use all information fairly, lawfully, and solely for the purpose 
that was stated. The collected information will be held responsibly and for no longer than the 
research enquires. 
 Level of Sensitivity  
Cybersecurity and in particular, organisational management of cybersecurity is in nature, a 
sensitive topic. It is interrelated with competitiveness, reputation, compliance and might trigger 
thoughts regarding confidential processes, procedures, and information that many employees 
are not allowed to share or would not be willing to share. As the selection of participants is 
focused on those involved in the managerial positions, this issue might be heightened as they 
may feel responsible for managing and maintaining good practices within their daily jobs. To 
avoid any frictions and potential distress, every effort has been made to ensure no question 
required confidential information. All questions were designed to collect personal opinions 
regarding the concepts of cybersecurity within BIM-enabled FM, and only the general 
perception of their experience was of interest to the researcher. It was also made clear to the 
participants, that they are free to reject any question that they do not feel comfortable to discuss 
or for which do not wish to disclose information.  
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Taking into consideration the preliminary research findings, showcasing the poor management 
of cybersecurity within BIM-FM practices, the participants were assured that their answers 
would be solely used for the development of a framework to improve the current cybersecurity 
stance of the BIM-enabled FM industry and for encouraging cybersecurity-mindedness in 
digitalised organisations such as BIM-enabled facilities management. 
 
 Conclusion  
This chapter presented discussions around the methodological decisions made by the researcher 
throughout the research process. For this purpose, the choice of research design, philosophical 
stance, research methods, techniques and tools were justified based on the discussion of various 
methods and views. The decision to employ an exploratory research approach to accomplish 
the research aims and objectives was made with respect to the nature of the study, research 
questions and the circumstances in which the research was conducted. The choice of critical 
realism as the philosophical stance enabled an exploratory study into BIM and cybersecurity, 
using the views and experiences  of experts, together with rich knowledge collected from best-
practice guidelines and standards, models, frameworks, and peer-reviewed journals. An 
inductive approach towards the research scope, coupled with qualitative methods of data 
collection and data analysis enabled the in-depth exploration of knowledge from various 
perspectives (Silverman, 2014). The chapter was finalised by the discussion of research quality 
and ethical considerations, to demonstrate the efforts of the researcher in the production of an 
authentic piece of work, with high academic values. This next chapter will present findings 











 Chapter Four: Empirical Findings- Interviews 
 Introduction  
In fulfilling the third research objective, empirical data was collected through interviews, to 
expand and refine the primary research framework (figure 6). A detailed description of the 
methods used to design the interview questions, interview set-up and participant selection is 
presented in Chapter 3. Hence, this chapter presents the empirical findings, from the qualitative 
analysis of interviews and identification of the determinants of a cybersecure implementation 
of BIM in FM organisations. 
Section 4.2 and its sub-sections demonstrate a structured description of themes extracted from 
the interviews, following the thematic coding of the interview transcripts. The identified 
themes (section 4.3) including BIM-FM determinants, cybersecurity determinants and 
challenges of cybersecurity integration in BIM-FM were divided into three subsections to 
showcase sub-themes pertaining to layers of strategy, implementation, and performance. The 
chapter concludes by providing an overview of the findings, later discussed in Chapter 5, to 
incorporate the results into the primary research framework.  
 
 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 Setup and Coding 
The empirical data was collected following 25 interviews, which were transcribed and 
qualitatively analysed using thematic analysis as shown in figure 12. 
 

































Figure 12- Data Analysis Process 
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IV Theme identification, and V. Structuring themes (Figure 12). For the purpose of Coding, 
NVivo was selected as the qualitative data analysis software for coding and analysing data 
incorporated with the multiple contexts of BIM, Cybersecurity and FM. NVivo allows for an 
organised approach to the coding of high-volume texts and transcripts. Ignatow and Mihalcea, 
(2018) point to coding as a way of labelling data, which avoids repetition and allows for a more 
structured approach towards the interpretation of the data. Hence, the transcripts were 
thoroughly reviewed and open-coded to extract and structure meanings from the lengthy 
transcripts. Thematic analysis does not rely on the word-counts as it thrives to understand the 
core ideas that represent a theme (Guest et al., 2014). A list of codes was produced as a result 
of applying the open-coding analysis to all 25 interview transcripts. The list was further 
narrowed down through closed-coding and constant comparison of codes with the quotes of 
the participants. The codes were abstracted from the transcripts to provide an insight into the 
practical challenges of the integration of cybersecurity in BIM-FM. Iterative closed-coding 
reveals overarching codes, contributing to the abstraction of themes which reflect the purpose 
of research. 
 Focus of interview questions   
From a critical realist perspective, various parameters affect the way truth is captured and 
understood by its observer (Archer et al., 2013). Therefore, the first three questions were 
structured to reflect on the profile of the participants, whose information included organisation 
sector, role and position and the area of facilities management for which they have experience 
of working. These questions enabled the justification and better understanding of the 
viewpoints of the participants gained through experience in various roles and organisations. .  
The viewpoint and initial perception of the participants affect their observations of the facts 
(Archer, 2016; Groff, 2004). As highlighted in sections 2.2 and 2.4, there are various 
perceptions of BIM and cybersecurity, depending on the knowledge of the participant and their 
experience. The review of literature also demonstrated how various perceptions lead to 
different approaches in the management of cybersecurity and BIM. Therefore, questions 4 and 
5 were added to capture the viewpoint of the participants on the BIM and cybersecurity 
phenomenon. This enabled the researcher to draw connections between the perceptions of the 
participants and their overview of the phenomenon and responses to other questions. 
Furthermore, considering the initial literature review findings (sections 2.2 and 2.4) regarding 
the one-sided views (due to over-reliance on the technology) around the multifaceted nature 
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(i.e., people, process, and technology) of both cybersecurity and BIM. Question 4 and 5 were 
designed to address this issue in a broad sense.  
Questions 6 to 13 address the strategy, implementation, and performance levels in integration 
of cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations. The questions were designed to address the primary 
research framework and seek new knowledge to enhance and tune the primary framework (See 
Appendix 3 for interview questions). 
 Thematic analysis results  
Three themes of: I. Cybersecurity Determinants, II. BIM-FM Determinants and III. Inhibitors 
and Challenges of Integration emerged from the thematic analysis of transcripts. A synthesis 
of findings from the 25 interviews is presented in Figure 13 which illustrates the codes and the 
emerging themes and sub-themes.  
 
Figure 13- Interview Themes & Sub-themes 
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The figure presents an overview of the findings from the thematic analysis of empirical data. 
It illustrates the themes and sub-themes leading to the identification of the determinants that 
contribute to a cybersecure BIM implementation in FM. Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.4 provide an 
insight into each theme, sub-theme, and their determinants. As evidence, interview 
respondent(s) who made comments leading to the statement made in the text is given (R 
followed by the respondent number). 
 General views of respondents on BIM and Cybersecurity  
Questions 4 and 5 were only used as an indication of the general views of the respondents on 
the concepts to enable a better understanding of their responses to the questions.  
 Perception of Cybersecurity (Question 4) 
Lack of a cybersecure culture in BIM-FM: Although 4 of the respondents believed that 
BIM-enablement of facility management organisations improve the cybersecurity of 
information, another 11 respondents pointed out an increased vulnerability brought about by 
BIM in FM. Also, 7 of the respondents agreed that BIM-FM organisations were behind the 
curve in the management of cybersecurity. The following statements support the above:   
“I think the (FM) organisation are a little bit behind the curve in terms of data security.”-R3 
“A lot of people talk about cybersecurity, but very few people practice it.”-R2 
“I’m going to say, not very mature. I think facilities management it’s been very much just get 
the job done whether it’s within the individual areas of cleaning, catering, security, individual 
specialism if you like”-R4  
Managing access to BIM data using CDEs: Although cybersecurity concerns were 
evident amongst the responses, 4 respondents pointed out that the information-management 
capabilities were enhanced by the use of CDEs. Particularly, they believed that the control and 
management of access to data made possible by such digital advancements was deemed as an 
effective method of maintaining the cybersecurity of data. In support of this view, one 
respondent claims: 
 “… in regular projects within the facilities management, data security would not be much of 
a problem as long as the systems in place are safe within CDEs and other spaces”-R17 
Need for process to support technology: The level of trust of cybersecurity in digital tools 
differed between respondents. Whilst 4 respondents believed that CDE data-management 
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capabilities were sufficiently protecting data within a BIM project, 12 respondents strongly 
believed that working with CDEs and alternative digital tools required established processes 
and procedures to be in place, as well as certain knowledge, skills, and a level of awareness 
being required. Examples of statements were: 
 “I haven’t seen cybersecurity prominently featured on any projects on BIM. User access to a 
common data environment and managing the password and multi-factor authentication are 
used but it doesn’t seem to be particular to building the asset. It’s just any kind of data and the 
need to know because of access regulations. So, I have not seen the 1192-part 5 standard being 
applied literally to a project yet.”-R19 
“When information becomes manageable from our end then there is another department which 
is called ISS. This information systems security department would look at how we manage 
different things, like servers, access to information and security.”-R23 
Data sensitivity depends on clients’ requirements : As part of question 4 and depending 
on the overall nature of response, respondents were asked about their experience in dealing 
with sensitive data at any point in their jobs. 13 respondents touched on the  information 
security requirements of the client from which 6 pointed out that government projects are 
usually the ones which require a higher level of security. Hence, the sensitivity of data is 
commonly defined by the clients and is project dependent. Examples of statements in support 
of the above were:   
“Its simple things like floor planning and room number and things like that depending on the 
facility that you are at, and there would be a different security classification for managing that 
information”-R1 
“I have worked in hospitals and there is a sensitive nature to some of the information about it 
….”-R3 
“… The facility that you are at would have a different security classification to show how you 
manage that information”-R11 
Lack of cybersecurity standards:  18 respondents have raised the issue of lack of a 
mandated approach to managing information security within digital facilities management. The 
following statement was one example:  
“FM is still learning, and I think we are in a very good place in terms of being self-aware, but 
I think we need to get better. For example, I do a lot of work with the IWFM. We have only just 
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set up a technology special-interest group. We don’t have a mandated approach for managing 
the information.”-R3 
 Perception of BIM (Question 5) 
Respondents expressed their views on a number of BIM features as well as a number of 
challenges associated with the adoption and implementation of BIM. 
 
Information management aspect of BIM: The analysis of data demonstrated that 17 of the 
respondents were well aware of the information management capabilities of BIM and 
acknowledged the process of change associated with the adoption of BIM. In support of this, 
the following statements were made: 
  
“To me BIM is a process it’s not software. It’s a process centred around an information model 
and that information model is not necessarily a 3D model it can be just data in a database. It’s 
a collection of structured data, unstructured data, and 3D geometry and how you could 
collaborate together”-R11 
 
“BIM is a combination of processes, people and different digital technologies to improve the 
way assets are designed, constructed and managed.”-R23 
 
Modelling aspect of BIM: Despite the above, 8 views were more focused on the modelling 
capabilities brought with BIM. As stated by the two respondents: 
 
“It’s a digital representation. I see it as software.”-R16,  
“Well by experience, using BIM is using technology you know, the advantage is to improve 
communication, avoid errors, to make things clearer and more organised.” -R12 
 
BIM benefits in FM: Respondents further acknowledged the benefits associated with the 
adoption of BIM in FM. An example of this was: 
  
“….to ensure the most efficient (and that means in every sense of the word), management of 
the asset when in use, so whether it makes it more efficient in terms of energy, whether it makes 
it more efficient in terms of people and space, or in terms of cost, future maintenance and all 
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of those perspectives. So, it’s putting all the right level of information together in the first 
instance so you can undertake that task effectively.”-R5 
 
Challenges of BIM in FM: 16 respondents have also touched on the issue of cost. The 
general belief is that there is a lack of investment in BIM implementations, and it is difficult to 
justify the upfront costs of the full adoption of BIM. In support of this, the following statements 
were made: 
“the biggest hindrance is cost. It’s the upfront cost which is the problem. If you look at the cost 
and the benefits over the longer term then it is justified of course, but the upfront cost is the 
issue.”-R17 
 “… it’s a very conservative attitude and no investments within facilities management, because 
it’s all about keeping the cost to the minimum to manage the asset over its lifetime”-R19 
The respondents’ views on BIM illustrated a degree of understanding of the process change 
and culture shift associated with the adoption of BIM. However, the degree of understanding 
amongst industry professionals differ. Also, the understanding of the changes required for this 
digital transformation is inconsistent amongst the professionals. Most demonstrated a fair level 
of understanding of the benefits of adopting BIM, however, the challenges associated with 
implementing BIM in FM was also acknowledged (e.g., cost). Many respondents also affirmed 
the inconsistency in the way organisations approach the fulfilling of BIM requirements and 
pointed to the inconsistencies in BIM processes and procedures in organisations. 
Findings from questions 4 and 5 were combined into the following themes.  
 Theme One: BIM-FM determinants  
Theme one presents BIM-FM determinants identified from the thematic analysis of interviews. 
The sub-themes underpin strategic, implementation and performance related determinants, 
affecting the successful management of cybersecurity in BIM-FM. An overview of each sub-
theme is described in the following sections. The empirical results showcase the relevance of 
each sub-theme throughout the analysis.  
 Sub-theme I: Strategic Determinants (BIM-FM) 
This sub-theme highlights the strategic determinants, pertaining to the strategic competencies 
required within BIM-FM. The significance of developing a strategy for BIM-enabled facilities 
management was touched on by 22 of the respondents. As per the following statement:  
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“As soon as the management sets up the correct strategies, it means that everybody else which 
is procured will ultimately check the security box as well internally within the organisation”-
R25  
The competencies of top-level decision makers and their understanding and awareness in the 
management of BIM-FM play a significant role in BIM documentation, defining information 
requirements and quality of collaboration. Hence, it is interpreted that having a top-down 
approach towards the management of cybersecurity in BIM-FM is critical. The following 
respondent confirms this:  
“… how do the management and executives want to lead the supply chain to behave with that 
information. There are a lot of information requirements that need to be captured and 
documented on behalf of the client to enhance supply chain working. ”-R13 
 
18 respondents have also pointed out the importance of considering cybersecurity within the 
requirements documentation. This is confirmed by the following statements: 
 
“…what I expect from the client is what was formally called the employers information-
requirements. So, what are they trying to achieve? what  do they want? and how do they want 
information to be handled and managed? Without those in place, you kind of don’t know what 
 they are trying to achieve at their project”-R6 
 
“… it (cybersecurity) should be in the organisational requirements, you know the OIR 
(Organisational Information Requirements), and it should feed all the way down through EIRs 
all the way through the BEP(BIM Execution Plan).”-R3 
 
Almost all respondents pointed to the importance of developing a BIM strategy, which aligns 
with the organisational objectives. The following respondent adds to this by saying that there 
should be a success measure to work towards: 
 
“Without a clear strategy no project would be successful. You need to work towards a certain 
goal.”-R24 
 
14 respondents further emphasised that a defined strategy acts as a reference for all BIM 




“Obviously it would have been great if there were some sort of indications of a clear BIM 
strategy within FM organisations”-R9 
 
In this regard, it was suggested that strategic planning should be dependent on the BIM lead. 
Hence, it can be interpreted that the quality of BIM leadership affects the success of strategies 
and consequently the overall success of a BIM project. As the following respondent comments: 
 
“I’m not sure of any existing strategy plans. It would be more to do with the BIM lead. But 
everyone should have access to it I don’t know if they are still working on it and that’s why 
they have not shared it with us.”-R12 
 
It is also evident that the BIM lead is responsible for sharing and communicating strategies 
with all employees. This further affirms the importance of a top-down approach that feeds 
through all processes and procedures of the organisation. BIM standards and best practices are 
identified as an important determinant for the BIM-FM organisations. 7 respondents have 
demonstrated a customised approach towards the use of a combination of standards and 
guidelines. Examples of the comments of respondents are: 
 
“.. Because the PAS documents have been superseded by the ISO documents so we wrote our 
last EIR document when PAS was the standard at the time so within that document, we would 
refer to documents such as PAS555 secure cybersecurity. We also call upon other documents 
you know, such as ISO27001”-R23 
 
“We comply with the ISO standards so we have our own approach to how we would talk to 
clients about BIM, but we are set out to deliver projects with compliance to those …”-R3 
 
19 respondents have suggested that the BIM documents, such as the OIR, EIR, BEP and other 
requirements specifications should be developed based on the BIM standards and guidelines to 
ensure comprehensiveness and accuracy of content. One comment was: 
 
“YES. ISO19650 part 1 &2. The PAS1192-5 is very good. It just needs a lot of linking to the 
BIM execution plan and the information requirements and the exchange information 




Although not many respondents referred to any specific cybersecurity standards within BIM-
FM, 5 of them pointed to the PAS1192-5 standard. An example of the responses states:  
 
“PAS1192-5 is about implementing additional security protocols, so as you read through that, 
it is about assessing and applying different procedures in place so that would be possibly 
locking down your USB ports, or other procedures”-R6 
 
Despite all available standards and guidelines, 19 respondents commented on the immature 
approach of FM in complying to those standards. In the light of this, one of them asserts that 
compliance would assist with improving processes and guides organisations towards an 
informed adoption of BIM for the FM: 
 
“I believe all UK BIM documents and standards are very good, but the problem is people don’t 
read or follow them …”-R15 
 
  Sub-Theme II. Implementation Determinants  
This sub-theme demonstrates the determinants of BIM implementation that influence the 
management of cybersecurity within BIM-FM organisations. Responses to interview questions 
illustrated a number of these determinants. 20 respondents accentuated the critical importance 
of developing defined processes for BIM-enabled projects (i.e., BEP document). 14 have 
referred to documenting BIM processes and defining information requirements in accordance 
with the FM task requirements. One of them said:  
“BIM documentations would be beneficial in terms of the information security objectives for 
the implementation plan. It’s not common practice and it really depends on the organisations 
and the projects they are dealing with.”-R14 
 
Another respondent further elaborates by emphasising that effective collaboration requires an 
understanding of information requirements for FM tasks, and it is what makes a BIM project 
successful: 
  
“The successful BIM project or digital project is something which is defined by collaboration 
and the quality of collaboration between the parties and that requires an intelligent client (FM 
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in this case). A client who is able to define the requirements in terms of the digital information 
needs and processes, is absolutely crucial to the success of the project”-R25 
 
Examples of documentation within BIM-FM are mentioned by the following respondent:  
“…the BEP can be used to either communicate initially what the client would expect to see in 
this space by the questions or the lay out of the BEP but certainly on the post-contract BEP, 
exactly how the supplier intends to work in this environment in a security minded way.”-R13 
 
Respondents have also commented on the positive implications of having defined BIM 
processes, on improved management of cybersecurity. One example was:  
 
“…defining the processes is absolutely crucial to the success of the project. So as soon as the 
client sets it up the correct principles, it means that everybody else which is procured will 
ultimately check the security box as well internally within each organisation.”-R25 
 
Amongst respondents, 12 pointed out the variety of software, hardware and network systems 
used to enable BIM within a facilities management organisation. They indicated that the 
network solutions, CDEs and appropriate hardware and software is supplementary and project 
dependent. Hence, data exchange, access control and developing processes to support the 
operational tasks are identified and established on a client-dependent basis and between project 
stakeholders. One of them commented that:  
“The diversity of infrastructure specifically the extent to which certain software or networking 
systems is used within the facilities management organisations is very much project- 
dependent.”-R13 
 
One respondent mentioned cost as another factor which contributes to the diversity and in most 
cases, acts as a restriction to the adoption of infrastructure required for BIM implementation. 
 
“In terms of infrastructure facilitating BIM projects these are cost-driven, so it is really up to 
the budget available and the facilities management organisations are usually reluctant towards 
full implementation of cloud-based systems”-R14 
 
Despite the comments above, 10 respondents specified the need for a well-managed and 
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strategic approach towards BIM infrastructure. In particular, one of them pointed towards the 
use of CDEs and cloud-based communication, and the benefits associated with it in terms of 
enabling easier management of information security: 
 
“We are now taking measures to launch our own systems and own the data from start to finish. 
So, we procure through a common data environment system. I’m responsible for setting up the 
user groups to ensure everything is secure and share only with the people who need it”-R7 
 
The importance of having a responsible body who manages and monitors the infrastructure and 
digital platforms was raised by one respondent: 
 
“Typically, the idea of the project team working on a single platform, which in most cases its 
either BIM 360 or Aconex, has to be a single platform maintained and managed by somebody, 
and that somebody is appointed either by the client or by the principal agent, as being the 
empowering body, the appointing party.”-R16 
 
Amongst the respondents implementing a more mature approach towards BIM infrastructure 
through using CDEs and their underlying processes, security concern was prominent. 14 
respondents also touched on the access to data provisions as well as the control and 
management of information exchanged through CDEs. However, the success of managing the 
cybersecurity of data depends on the solution that is implemented to address this issue. 
Although maturity in BIM infrastructure facilitates the adoption of advanced technical 
cybersecurity solutions, it will not guarantee a successful management of cybersecurity. 
Respondents have expressed their concern about the insecurities within digital platforms and 
systems: 
  
“The other issue is the insecure architecture of some of the common data environments and 
some of the CAFM systems.”-R1. 
  
“I think that there is a perception that if the data sits on the supplier system and it doesn’t 
interact with the client system, then it should be okay. But when you get to check that, you find 
that the supplier system is actually having to hold on to sensitive data whether it be credit card 




One of the regularly occurring themes identified by the respondents was the need to identify 
and document project information requirements within facilities management.  19 respondents 
indicated that by defining the project information-requirements for FM tasks within the BIM 
process, the documentation would help to improve efficiency in organisational working-
processes, both in terms of time and cost. As one comment highlighted: 
 
“…if you could have put security protocol within there it will only give you the information 
that is relevant to you, so therefore you’re going to spend less time and money searching for 
data that necessarily doesn’t have anything to do with you. It’s good in two cases”-R9 
  
One respondent affirmed that, by emphasising that to be able to secure the information, 
organisations should identify which information is required and which stakeholders should 
undertake a certain task: 
  
“…you need to be able to secure a data base but keep it free to the people who need to know it 
and are assigned to know it.”-R19 
 
Respondents also argued that having project information requirements identified, managed, 
and documented, leads to organised and well-structured information management processes. 
Some have also pointed to the effects of this determinant on managing the security of 
information, by giving a clear indication of who needs to see what. An example of one of these 
responses was: 
 
“…you do not need to worry about the security of that information as long as you are being 
pretty restrictive about you only need to know what you need to know… that depends on the 
service and what you are asking them to do.”-R18 
 
Across all respondents, compliance with BIM standards and guidelines was described as 
challenging, yet beneficial. 6 respondents expressed a lack of knowledge the contents included 
within BIM standards and guidelines. They assumed that their organisation complies with best-





“Yes, we certainly do (comply with standards) and I think it’s very beneficial. I’m not so close 
to the standards so I can’t say off the top of my head. I have not really been heavily involved 
in using the standards that common. So, yeah, at this point I’m not sure.”-R21 
 
On the contrary, there were 7 well-informed respondents who claimed that their organisation 
was in compliance with the British Standards (BS), PAS suite and/or ISO standards. Examples 
of such responses was: 
 
“YES. ISO19650 part 1 &2. The PAS1192-5 is very good. It just needs a lot of linking to the 
BIM execution plan and the information requirements and the exchange information 
requirements of the asset, to help people manage the security requirement as well.”-R7 
 
There is a difference between the respondents whose organisations complied with standards 
and those who were not mature in terms of their compliance status. The compliant organisations 
were more likely to develop structured processes for the management of information. Also, 
they were more likely to consider the cybersecurity of data as an important aspect of 
information management. Although some argued that the standards and guidelines were overly 
abstract in some instances, there was still a consensus on the benefits of compliance. As 
demonstrated by the following comment: 
  
“…being in compliance with those standards will provide a better cyber security status for 
90% of the projects within facilities management. But the problem is they don’t tell what should 
be done so they assume the person who is doing the security knows what he is securing…”-
R22 
 
Interviews also revealed that education was required to facilitate compliance. The comments 
of respondents exemplified that the regulatory bodies in charge of developing the standards 
had failed to engage industry in the development process and hence, those standards were 
missing examples and practical insights. Hence, industry was failing to understand the 
applicability of the content. One comment was:  
 
“I think that we are very naïve in that world, but I think the fault is with the industry. I think it 
is the fault of two areas. One is CPNI and the people who wrote part 5 because they didn’t 
make it consumable enough with examples and this is the fault of UK BIM Alliance for not 
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engaging properly in the educational world…we go back to the original BIM where there was 
place for engaging education and they failed to educate people in part 5.”-R9 
 
Although standardisation at strategy level was deemed critical, the extent of applicability to 
practice was argued by some respondents. One of them claimed that in some cases, strategies 
are standardised but there is insufficient guidance as to the way in which compliance can be 
achieved in the implementation and execution: 
  
“You know the PAS1192-5 was labelled as optional which should have really been made 
compulsory. You know that although something is included in the EIR, it’s just lightly touched 
on, which is not sufficient for the appointment documentation! It should be clear what each 
organisation needs to do to be in compliance with the standards and best practice guidelines.”-
R25 
 
18 of the respondents pointed to the audit trails and monitoring processes. However, the 
differences were in the type and target of assessments. 11 of them commented on the 
importance of audits for improving processes to achieve a higher performance. One said: 
  
“Auditing processes are the only way of somehow assessing the overall performance of the 
organisations and improve the processes according to the outcome”-R24 
 
Amongst these respondents, 7 have commented on the importance of both auditing and 
monitoring. Responses around auditing are commonly linked with checking compliance to 
organisational rules and regulations as well as best practice guidelines and standards. In 
contrast, 5 participants pointed instead to a quality check which is project-dependent and is 
carried out to check if the project requirements are met. Hence, the target can include 
performance quality or output product quality. Both have been proposed by respondents as 
critical to maintain and improve effective organisational strategies and processes. Two of the 
comments were: 
  
“… as long as it’s being audited to ensure they are actually carrying out what ever those duties 




“Yes, there is, we get audited at every quarter and it (cybersecurity) should be something that’s 
picked up every time, I can’t say if it is, so we have an external company that used to do it…they 
are auditing the projects that we are working on, are in compliance with company policies, 
and if applicable, ISO standards statuary requirements etc. etc.”-R3 
 
Furthermore, the monitoring processes, particularly the data handling processes including data 
exchange, access and archive processes were pointed out by the respondents. 7 of them stressed 
that monitoring enables protection against cybersecurity vulnerabilities and provides an insight 
into the processes and procedures in need of revision and improvement. Two of them 
commented: 
  
“We have robust data exchange processes. Our data security team is monitoring every aspect 
of data security within BIM projects. Of course, there is always room for improvement.”-R13 
 
“Probably a good record of the historical data and the history of movement and where things 
are going. A good tracking of every movement within that environment so that if something 
changes or something disappears, they know why and who has done it or if someone has added 
a file, just know who and when that has been done.”-R12  
 
BIM-FM entails tendering with various stakeholders contributing to the project. 16 respondents 
have raised concerns regarding the inconsistencies across organisations. Particularly, the 
variety of information management and data-handling practices were identified as affecting the 
quality of collaboration within BIM project stakeholders. They proposed an evaluation of 
capabilities, competencies, and processes of the stakeholders at the pre-tendering stage. It was 
also suggested that certification would demonstrate their capabilities, however, there still needs 
to be evaluation procedures to ensure processes and procedures are in line with both 
organisational and project requirements. One comment was: 
  
“The facilities management should have some sort of a standard in tendering so they should 
really look at the security levels of the stakeholders and assess them against the security 
requirements of the project. This in itself requires a broad understanding of what needs to be 




Another respondent further points to the alignment to ISO27001 when evaluating the 
competencies and capabilities of stakeholders: 
  
“I think it’s important that when we issue an invitation to tender an ITT to the design team, we 
issue a supply chain capability summary document and the section in there on information 
security and management and we would expect our design teams to have a knowledge or even 
better certification aligned to documents such as ISO27001 so we would ask them a number of 
questions aimed at how the design team could aim to ensure that project information is secure 
all the times.”-R23 
 
 Sub-Theme III. Performance Determinants  
This sub-theme pertains to the social and people related BIM determinants which affect the 
successful management of cybersecurity within a BIM-FM organisation. Both concepts of BIM 
and cybersecurity entail socio-technical factors which facilitate the execution of 
implementation plans and the achievement of strategic goals.  
In light of the above, respondents have pointed to a number of capabilities required by the BIM 
management team which enables the cybersecure leadership and management of BIM. 
Examples include the competency of the management team in assigning roles and 
responsibilities to the right individuals and teams. As one comment showed: 
   
“… but ultimately there is a responsibility on whoever that is appointed to that job to do that 
with a level of competency, and you know who I am appointing to do that you know it’s my 
competency as the member of the executive”-R1 
 
Furthermore, respondents have indicated that the management support when implementing 
BIM, in terms of resource allocation entailing budget and human resources, affects the 
cybersecurity management capabilities of the organisation. Hence, it was proposed by one 
respondent that there needs to be an allocation of budget to provide suitable infrastructure (e.g., 
software, hardware, and networking systems) to facilitate the achievement of optimum benefits 




“In terms of the maturity of infrastructure facilitating BIM projects these are cost driven, so it 
is really up to the budget available and the facilities management organisations are usually 
reluctant to support a  full implementation of cloud-based systems”-R14 
 
Affirming this point, another respondent commented:  
 
“Again, every decision is cost driven within the FM world. Not much consideration apart from 
the cost is put into the selection and purchase of infrastructure. The maintenance procedures 
follow a similar trend”-R6 
 
Another respondent comments on the importance of training and education in using 
infrastructure that facilitate BIM: 
 
“I think if you have everything locked, we go through this with clients all the time, they say I 
need to use this system and we say well this is how it’s going to be used and structured and we 
should train you to be able to use it correctly”-R19 
 
It was also indicated by 9 of the respondents that understanding the roles and responsibilities 
required for managing a cybersecure BIM project is important for implementing a top-down 
approach to achieve a security-minded BIM implementation in FM. Hence, the need to comply 
with standards and best-practice guidelines have been mentioned by some respondents. One of 
the comments was: 
 
“… the responsibilities set out in part 5 are pretty clear, and that is, you need to think about 
what is it that you are trying to do and set out what you are going to do for any job stages. 
Even if that’s the case then we just need to ensure that somebody confident is appointed to that 
role, such as the built-asset security strategy manager.”-R1 
 
All respondents have referred to the need for BIM knowledge and skills, including the ability 
to work with BIM authoring tools and to understand BIM models used for FM purposes. It has 
been pointed out by the respondents that in fact, many FM organisations are yet to be trained 
to benefit from BIM in the in-use stage of a facility. The discussions around BIM knowledge 
and skills also necessitates an understanding of FM data requirements. A comment in 




“The issue with the construction industry as a whole, is that they rush into digital ways of 
working without realising what it takes to fully achieve the benefits. So, with BIM, there are 
many organisations who claim they do BIM, but their performance is poor due to their lack of 
awareness, knowledge and skills.”-R4 
 
The comments of respondents exemplified the positive impacts of BIM knowledge and skills 
on the cybersecurity of project information. Where the knowledge and skills pertain to the 
ability to manipulate and understand BIM models and authoring tools, it leads to the right 
modelling procedures such as the production of layered models. Respondents argued that in 
this way, various views can be shared with different stakeholders according to the task 
information-requirements. Hence, only essential information is shared. As commented by one 
respondent: 
 
“When we first got BIM, we were sort of under the impression that a BIM model is going to be 
one model, not multiple models’ kind of stitched together. You know in a big hospital you might 
have zones of BIM models, but I think within an MEP model and a finishes model, maybe there 
is a lot of information which really need structuring and layering to be able to efficiently 
collaborate with the other parties securely.”-R20 
 
For 9 respondents, BIM knowledge and skills entailed the understanding of BIM processes and 
acknowledging the potential advantages of BIM for managing project information. They 
believed that this would lead to BIM projects that are carried out in compliance with the 
standards and guidelines that operate through the development of the right information 
requirement documents such as EIR, OIR, etc. 12 respondents also acknowledged that the 
development of accurate information-requirement documents significantly benefits the 
cybersecurity of project information. One comment was: 
 
“BIM within facilities management is only beneficial if there is valid data available which can 
be managed and if the facilities management team know which data is required for which task. 
Then there can be some sort of use of BIM capabilities but if the data is not there then facilities 
management would have a hard time just to get that data. The use of BIM across the facilities 
management team is very scarce and it is not quite clear, what the requirements are for 




Furthermore, another respondent emphasises the importance of understanding both BIM 
models and information management processes in BIM by stating that: 
 
“Unfortunately, what BIM is understood as it a way of doing projects but in technical terms. 
So, when BIM is stated, it is usually about having a pretty 3D model which represents the 
building or the facility. So, what is not taken into consideration are the skills for modelling and 
design. The information-management aspect of BIM projects is still poorly performed. The 
value of BIM is not fully captured within the facilities management organisations due to the 
poor adoption of BIM capabilities.”-R15 
 
11 respondents have further indicated that BIM Knowledge pertains to the understanding of 
what is required for implementing a mature BIM in an FM organisation. This view is more 
inclined towards the managerial positions who decide the processes, responsibility 
assignments, budget, and human resources. In this regard, knowledge, and awareness of risks, 
particularly at higher organisational levels and where the strategic decisions are made, is also 
taken into consideration by the respondents. One of them commented:  
 
“..., they do essential training, like awareness training which everybody needs to do, 
understanding what the environment is like and where the potential is for these, but there is 
definitely a requirement for focusing on particular roles. This should be not many though, 
essentially just executive management, the lead design position, the BIM user and then finally 
the administrative staff. So just basically for the sense of information, you’ve got decisions 
being made at one level but there are executive decisions at a higher level, and each of those 
should have a bit more focus on what the potential risks of decisions at that particular level 
were.”-R14 
 
Whilst BIM knowledge and skills are found to be essential for the adoption and implementation 
of BIM within FM, it is also argued that successful implementation of BIM within FM requires 
continuous improvement of knowledge and skills. 19 respondents insist on continuous training 
and argue that it is one of the key enablers of process improvement. One of the comments was: 
  
“I guess training would be the best thing that can be done because there needs to be some sort 
of an educational course for staff, and it needs to start from baseline but as we get better it 
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needs to be more focused and more detailed. Because the thing is technology is improving 
every day and it is changing every day so there needs to be an ongoing training session for 
everyone to keep up to date with the things, they need to know about the technologies they use 
as part of their jobs.”-R12 
 Theme Two: Cybersecurity Determinants  
Theme two also contributes to addressing the second research objective, by investigating the 
determinants contributing to the achievement of cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations. The 
sub-themes address determinants for the strategy, implementation, and performance layers of 
BIM-FM. This approach assists with maintaining consistency with the primary research 
framework proposed in Chapter 2. An overview of each sub-theme is described in the following 
sections. The empirical results showcase the relevance of each sub-theme throughout the 
analysis.  
 Sub-Theme I: Strategic Determinants   
This sub-theme demonstrates the strategic determinants, pertaining to the strategic 
determinants for cybersecurity, applicable to BIM-FM.  
Amongst most respondents, the prioritisation of cybersecurity management within BIM-FM 
organisations was a matter of concern. The respondents argued that the modus operandi of 
facilities management organisations is overly cost-driven, and the focus is on “getting the job 
done”. They also commented on the effects of this on the quality of processes and procedures, 
particularly within a BIM-FM project which requires sufficient technological, financial, and 
human resources. Examples of comments were: 
“….it would have been great if there were some sort of a clear strategy but unfortunately 
Facilities Management organisations are not focused on this. The priority is with getting the 
job done with minimum cost.”-R9 
 
“…I think part of the problem is that your data security is so often not as high on your priorities 
list that probably should be.”-R1 
 
Respondents further indicated that an immature approach to BIM currently exists amongst 
many stakeholders who are solely focused on the modelling capabilities of their digital 
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infrastructure, whilst overlooking cybersecurity considerations during their operation. As the 
following comment shows: 
  
“…I would then look at what systems solutions software etc are going to be used throughout 
the BIM project, but we kind of go one step further, in terms of, you know, the client is probably 
more interested in the capability of that software and how that capability will actually bring 
benefit to the client or the asset or the project. I am also focused on where that solution is 
hosted, does it need penetration testing, is it cloud based? Do we need to visit the data centre 
etc, etc.”- R13 
 
Value identification was captured from the responses of the respondents as an influential BIM-
FM determinant, supporting better strategic decision making. As the following comment 
illustrates:  
 
“I don’t think we as a business have really sort of thought about the value of it and how we 
should be securing the model in terms of what information should be shared, who can see what, 
etc.”-R1 
 
The respondents also touched on the importance of a balanced approach towards the 
management of cybersecurity. There was a consensus that the cybersecurity strategy must not 
jeopardise organisational operations. Hence, the value identification was essential to ensure the 
cybersecurity strategies are aligned with the goals and objectives of the organisation. 
Respondents comments, on identifying the values created by implementing cybersecurity risk 
management strategies, support these points: 
 
“….and therefore, how you derive value for the organisation, so you need to keep the 
transparency to a level! you don’t want the operations to be disrupted or awfully complicated 
due to security measures.”-R4 
“…its actually quite difficult to get across the convincing business case to do it. I am doing 
some of that now. Where we are trying to say to people that we know this is the right way and 
the right direction to travel, but the CFO will say well how much is it going to save me? That’s 





Furthermore, modelling organisational security requirements has also been identified as an 
essential capability for the cybersecurity leadership team. Respondents have pointed towards 
the importance of considering the cybersecurity requirements, with respect to their 
collaboration processes and procedures. As the following respondent comments:  
“FM companies should really improve their cybersecurity scope and how they manage the 
cybersecurity issues as a business not just for specific projects. I think if FM companies got the 
right processes and procedures to meet their security requirements, then  
that would automatically follow for a BIM perspective...”-R20 
 
Respondents particularly point towards understanding the cybersecurity risks against the 
organisational business goals. An interpretation of such statements stimulates the 
organisational risk appetite and have an impact on security requirements modelling. Some 
organisations might face less cybersecurity threats due to the nature of their work, however, 
others may face severe loss as a result of a cyber-attack. Therefore, the risks should be 
identified and the extent to which the organisation can absorb the risk should be determined.  
As mentioned by the following respondent: 
 
“… I used to work for a very small consultancy for which there is not much cybersecurity risk 
you need to worry about in that. I worked for another company and they had a security section 
in the basement where you need a special key to get through their front door...”-R14 
 
Respondents have also pointed to the standards and guidelines as a determinant influencing the 
cybersecurity management strategy within BIM-FM organisations. The comments of 
respondents entailed compliance with a variety of standards in the domains of BIM (e.g., PAS 
suite) and information security (e.g., ISO 270001): 
 
“…if the data is sensitive then the PAS1192-5 standard should be used. Now that standard has 
been converted to an ISO standard at the moment so should be available as an ISO standard 
maybe this year or later.”-R1 
 
“…we have ISO270001 and that kind of thing which just means that we are up-to-date with the 




Whilst respondents insisted on the importance of compliance within FM practices, they were 
heavily reliant on IT teams or technology providers and were lacking the cybersecurity in their 
FM processes and procedures. As the following respondents commented: 
  
“… in general, most projects promise a data security point of view which is making sure that 
the common data environment is being proposed from a reputable company that follows proper 
standards for their data centres and they rely I suppose on the providers of those systems to be 
secure in the data.”-R15 
 
“…Perhaps to a certain extent, security is someone else’s problem, so it’s not even considered 
in an environment like a BIM model”-R10 
 
Although respondents claimed to have robust processes for the exchange of digital data in 
compliance with the best-practice guidelines and standards, they also pointed to the barriers 
and complications associated with maintaining compliance in the multi-stakeholder nature of 
BIM projects. In light of this, one respondent pointed out the diverse range of standards which 
cause inconsistency in BIM projects which involve multiple stakeholders globally. 
 
“…there is a complete lack of standards even though they are a number of standards available. 
It’s the diversity of standards which potentially causes major issues. There are American 
standards, UK standards, some of the European standards, Middle East standards and the Far 
East standards for instance…”-R14 
 
Another respondent also elaborates on the barriers of compliance by indicating to the divergent 
capabilities and characteristics of stakeholders involved: 
 
“PAS1192-5 is about implementing additional security protocols so as you read that that is 
about assessing and applying different procedures in place so that would be possibly locking 
down your USB ports, or other procedures. We do look at it but unfortunately the nature of the 
clients that we work with, are not grasping the common data environment fully yet so we still 
need to have some of that open”-R6 
 
In addition to the aforementioned determinants, financial resources appear to be one of the key 
determinants of a successful management of cybersecurity within the FM industry. 
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Respondents commented on the cost driven nature of FM practices and emphasised that the 
facilities management organisations are more focused on cost efficiency than improving 
cybersecurity. One of the comments received was: 
 
“When you remove something like cost then you can discuss other things because for getting 
all the data you need in all that formats and doing all those stuff costs a lot and it’s the first 
barrier that you need to cross and I’m sure there are other things that you need to value as you 
remove barriers, but the main issue is cost effort and time! It’s those three things.”-R8 
 
Furthermore, respondents proposed that value identification can encourage budget allocation 
for cybersecurity considerations. They also suggested that the competence of the BIM 
leadership, entailing risk awareness amongst the management team is an important factor in 
understanding the long-term gains of investing in cybersecurity best practices within BIM-FM. 
In this respect, one respondent comments: 
 
“so, the way that I would handle it, is to first brief everyone where the problem lies, to make 
sure that people are aware, that it isn’t just a case of dealing with cybersecurity. It isn’t just a 
case of dealing with physical security. You have to be persistent to make sure it’s a combination 
of all those things that need to be in place for the right approach to managing security and 
therefore the level of understanding needs to be broadcasted, advised, top to bottom. Any new-
starter inductions need to take place, so everyone is aware of how that a security-minded 
approach flows from top to bottom in that organisation.”-R11 
  Sub-Theme II: Implementational Determinants   
This sub-theme demonstrates the cybersecurity determinants that benefit BIM-FM 
organisations in implementing cybersecure BIM practices. By integrating cybersecurity 
determinants in BIM implementation, the structures and competencies will have cybersecurity 
at their core. Hence, an organisation achieves a seamless integration of cybersecurity within its 
plans, processes, and procedures. 
Considering the above, respondents discussed the organisational approach towards 
cybersecurity risk-management. Many respondents claimed that their risk-management plans 
do not include cybersecurity: 
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“…we have a risk management plan, it includes all the health and safety aspects, but it does 
not touch on information security I don’t believe it does.”-R17 
 
“The facilities management to my knowledge don’t have such thing as cybersecurity or 
information security risk management maybe they have the risk-assessment briefings and tick 
boxes to make sure that its safe but not to my knowledge.”-R25 
 
Whilst 19 respondents believed that including cybersecurity in the risk assessment of BIM-FM 
is critical, 6 respondents did not consider it as part of the role of facilities management. One of 
the respondents mentioned:  
 
“BIM is a software tool a digital tool or a database what-ever you want to call it, so, yeah, it’s 
IT/IS functionality I think to control the access”-R20 
 
Respondents claimed that the cybersecurity risk-management plans are solely focused on the 
CDE or systems cybersecurity. As one of them commented: 
  
“That’s got to be organisation by organisation, so as a prime organisation you would do 
cybersecurity-risk assessment on the software or hardware that you are thinking of 
procuring.”-R24 
 
Respondents also pointed out the need for identification of the level of sensitivity for various 
data within BIM-FM. They believed that identifying the risks associated with different groups 
of data was critical for the information-security management and can further ease the data 
access permits. As one participant indicated: 
 
“… a risk assessment is carried out, then following that would be the realisation of what level 
of security is required for the systems, the hardware, the software, and who can see what, as I 
said earlier. So, the need-to-know basis would highly depend on the results of the risk 
assessment.”-R19 
Respondents also discussed the lack of risk-management plans across the FM organisations. 
Financial and human resource limitations and other challenges such as a lack of risk-aware 
decision making at the senior management level has resulted in discrepancies in the risk-
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management approaches. Responses expressed positive views on the establishing of a 
cybersecurity risk-management plan and further stated that it should be a shared responsibility 
between technical and non-technical departments of an FM organisation. A comment by one 
of them declared: 
 
“The problem I see is allocating resources to that, so it’s another undertaking that would 
probably need a little more collaboration between our own security department, but at the 
moment it probably hasn’t happened to the degree that it needed to. “-R23 
 
13 respondents also considered that the cybersecurity design of systems was a very important 
determinant in the successful management of cybersecurity in BIM-FM. They expressed the 
view that cybersecurity should be integrated within the processes to ease everyday working 
tasks rather than adding an extra pressure on staff. Hence, an effective cybersecurity design for 
systems can facilitate an easier integration. 20 of respondents pointed to the system access 
permits designed for CDEs used within BIM-enabled projects as an example of cybersecurity 
design for systems. As one participant said:  
“…we are now taking measures to launch our own systems and own the data from start to 
finish. So, procure through a common data environment system. I’m responsible for setting up 
the user groups to ensure everything is secure and shared only with the people who need it”-
R7 
 
Respondents believed that the technological integrity and reliability of the cybersecurity 
systems were important and pointed that an optimum design of such systems cannot be 
achieved without the collaboration of IT and FM teams. As exemplified in the following 
comment: 
  
“… there is a lot of collaboration between what the IT team you know understands, and the 
people who understand the operation, so that they could somehow work together to find the 
best solution.”-R21 
 
Respondents expressed divisive opinions regarding cybersecurity accountability across the 
BIM-FM organisations. It was shown that the responsible body is labelled as information 
manager, BIM manager, information security manager, etc. and requires a different set of 
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competencies compared to typical BIM managers or project managers. Some statements from 
respondents supporting these points follow:  
“… the appointment of an information manager is really critical to the move to the CDE in 
BM. It’s not something that you can leave to a single BIM manager who is responsible for only 
one discipline. This needs to be somebody who has a better idea for the project management, 
risk assessments, the legal and contractual arrangements all of which in most cases exceeds 
the bounds of the typical role of a BIM manager, so it would be a person who would be 
appointed specifically to manage that aspect of the documentation. That is rather a particular 
and more specific task.”-R14 
 
Respondents also referred to the BIM guidance documents and standards (e.g., PAS1192-5), 
with one of them proposing the assignment of a built-asset security strategy manager. 
 
“…we just need to ensure that somebody confident is appointed to the role of built-asset 
security strategy manager.”-R1 
 
Alternatively, respondents also believed that there was a lack of knowledge and skills across 
the FM teams for involvement in cybersecurity-related duties. Hence, this responsibility was 
solely assigned to the IT teams and/or system providers. 
  
“I believe the responsibility is lost within the organisations and specifically with the facilities 
management, there is extreme lack of processes and lack of knowledge in terms of monitoring 
cybersecurity of data. The responsibility should be with the information manager or the project 
manager, whatever it’s called, but there should be someone responsible.”-R24 
 
“… it should be the facilities management team, for every asset we are talking about and that 
it is up to them to ensure that the platform they are using is providing them with an adequate 
service and that should be fairly well scoped in terms of agreement with the software provider 
....”-R2 
 
The silo approach was criticised by 4 respondents, shedding light on the knowledge and 
awareness shortfalls. In this regard, respondents explained that the IT teams lacked the 
necessary awareness of the FM information requirements and data sensitivity levels, whilst the 
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FM team lacked an awareness of the systems vulnerabilities and technical cybersecurity-
solutions. Hence, it is suggested there is a need to have robust processes for both departments 
and to have effective communications and collaborations in the management of cybersecurity: 
  
“I believe the IT department within the university or the main client organisation usually takes 
on cybersecurity which I don’t think is sufficient to fully take care of the cybersecurity 
complications that might arise in FM.”-R25 
 
“ the only way it is going to work is by a collaboration between the technical geeks and FM 
geeks, but the problem is to find a common language for both of them to use so they understand 
what they are saying to each other, which is going to be a challenge….”-R22 
 
Furthermore, respondents indicated that a top-down approach was an effective way of ensuring 
cybersecurity is fed into all processes and procedures. However, successful cybersecurity 
management will not be accomplished without a security-minded culture and that requires 
sufficient knowledge, skills, and awareness for all employees within FM: 
  
“I don’t think it’s necessary for every team to have like an individual who is the cyber guy! 
that to me is to me probably unaffordable and you don’t integrate that cyber-awareness and 
knowledge into the team”-R19 
 
“It’s up to the users to ensure the work they do with software or their use of the devices is 
executed in a secure manner. But also, they need to know how to perform securely. Each 
software and each device or let’s say different common data environments require certain 
considerations to be taken into account. “-R3 
 
Respondents were questioned on the data-exchange processes, including access and storage of 
information in a BIM-enabled project. They argued that the client’s requirements play a key 
role in the processes and procedures. This is particularly related to the maturity of the client in 
the understanding of BIM infrastructure and financial affordability. As noted in one comment:  
  
“The reason is underinvestment and people in senior levels not understanding the importance 
of cybersecurity I think and its often very fragmented you know…things can go very wrong if 




Respondents stated that many clients have not yet adopted a CDE and hence, collaboration 
procedures will differ to the ones who have one and have sufficiently invested in BIM 
infrastructure. 
  
“PAS1192-5 is about implementing additional security protocols so as you read through that 
that is about assessing and applying different procedures in place so that would be possibly 
locking down your USB ports, or other procedures, we do look at it but unfortunately the nature 
of the clients that we work with, are not grasping common data environment fully yet so we 
still need to have some of that (security protocols) open but we do have some practices in 
place…”-R6 
 
Respondents have also claimed that each organisation has its own ways of working. 
Furthermore, the organisation-specific regulations commonly incur contradictions and restrict 
collaboration. As one respondent indicated: 
  
“It depends on the client and it depends on the asset, so I work with a lot of clients across all 
different sectors with different levels of security and what that security means, is it around the 
design of the asset, is it around the operation of what that asset is going to physically do, is it 
around the  output of the asset i.e., smart manufacturing you know lots of intellectual property 
etc etc.”-R13 
 
The comments of the respondents illustrate a lack of defined processes across FM organisations 
which leads to prejudice of the cybersecurity within digital data exchange and archive 
processes. As one respondent comments: 
 
“Information Security is indeed an unpopular topic in the facilities management organisations. 
Of course, it is dependent on the projects and clients and if for them, information security is a 





 Sub-Theme III: Cybersecurity Performance Determinants   
This sub-theme presents the determinants that contribute to a cybersecure performance 
amongst professionals working in BIM-FM organisations.  
Both concepts of BIM and cybersecurity entail socio-technical factors which facilitate the 
execution of implementation plans and the achievement of strategic goals. Amongst these 
factors, 14 of the respondents agreed about the importance of management-team competencies 
in cybersecurity. Respondents believed that cybersecurity oversight at board level will feed 
into all processes and procedures. The following comments exemplified this:  
“There needs to be that consciousness of the importance of cybersecurity and that it needs to 
be applied to every task. For people to see it as important as the data itself. There should be a 
top-down approach because if it starts with the top then it would easily cascade down”-R21 
“… Clear and open protocols of risk assessment need to be implemented along with the 
training and understanding of what the cyber threats are, because the majority of the facilities 
managers may be familiar with the concepts on a very generic basis, but they wouldn’t be very 
technically savvy. They need to have explained to them how the digital information 
transformation would be risky and how they should manage the security of that system and 
they need to have the guidance document which would guide them through how they can 
successfully maintain security knowing the vulnerabilities and risks.”-R2 
 
“There needs to be appointment at executive level with a clear set of responsibilities ultimately 
for everybody appointed to do any job then if they are incompetent to do it or if they are not 
doing their job probably, they should be sacked.”-R1 
 
Additionally, knowledge and skills are identified as a major enabler in implementing a 
cybersecure BIM within an FM organisation. Respondents have raised concerns regarding the 
lack of cybersecurity knowledge and skills amongst non-technical FM professionals. The 
following respondents further illustrated the importance of training and educational programs 
for all FM professionals who are involved in a BIM-enabled project. 
  
“There is lack of knowledge and awareness which is not only within the facility management 
sector, but also across all industry.  ... So, they are producing digital data but in general they 
print it up or they make it a pdf. The exchange of information has always been through 
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something static that you know rather than data exchange. In general, there is a lack of 
knowledge and skill about the data exchanges.”-R15 
 
“I think the challenge comes back to that naivety and the fact that people don’t quite 
understand how to do it and what to do. And they need to have a lot more education a lot more 
examples and guidance to help them to do that.”-R9 
 
As the FM industry is evolving from the traditional ways of working to a digital modus 
operandi, FM employees need to improve on their technical proficiencies. Technology is 
becoming part of the everyday working-procedures and professionals need to be aware of the 
challenges and vulnerabilities of technology-enabled working environments. Respondents 
have demonstrated that integrating cybersecurity within the strategies and work processes will 
only succeed if employees are sufficiently competent to follow the instructions and practice 
cybersecurity in their day-to-day job. The following respondent emphasises the need for 
training: 
 
“…and the problem there, is that once you say, yes, everybody has got to be on here 
(centralised system) is that everybody has got to be trained.”-R18 
 
Respondents have also indicated that a cybersecure BIM within facilities management 
organisations requires a change of mindset and a shift in the organisational culture. This entails 
the transformation of views and commitments and values and is deemed essential for a 
successful execution of strategies and processes. 18 respondents agreed that facilities 
management employees were not willing to get involved in the cybersecurity considerations 
and did not make efforts to improve their technical skillset. This is further demonstrated by the 
following respondent who says that FM professionals believe that the IT team and system 
providers can fully protect the data from any cyber threat.  
 
“I think it is not in the top priorities for our job. We have an IT department who look after all 
data and security stuff, so I don’t see any point in that.”-R17 
 




“…what I have observed is people are obviously more willing to pay money for a new system, 
but they find it much harder to change behaviours and that itself is a large investment. To make 
people do things differently is what is required. So, paying for a new technology is just the tip 
of the iceberg.”-R19 
 
Interviewees also commented on the lack of internal collaboration and communication amongst 
various facilities management departments. This was interpreted from some responses as 
relating to the processes and procedures, in which the respondents were unaware of the 
common procedures or regulations of the organisation: 
 
“I can’t comment on that. I’m sure there are rules, but I have not been exposed to them. I 
probably haven’t been within the right environment to have that exposure, where I would pick 
up that information.”-R21 
 
“…as far as I am aware, some sort of a risk assessment was done a while ago maybe something 
was communicated but I don’t remember. But it’s certainly not recommunicated and not 
updated, and I think cyber threats are evolving so quickly that it’s important to communicate 
on a regular basis as the landscape changes.”-R10 
 
 Theme Three: Challenges of CS Integration in BIM-FM 
Theme three investigates the barriers and challenges of integrating cybersecurity within BIM-
FM organisations.  
This theme entails three sub-themes that each present inhibiting factors of integration at various 
levels of strategy development, implementation, and performance (execution). Identifying the 
existing barriers to integration along with the enabling determinants presented in themes I and 
II, illustrates the steps that can be taken to achieve a successful integration of cybersecurity 
within BIM-FM. An overview of each sub-theme is described in the following sections. The 
empirical results showcase the relevance of each sub-theme throughout the analysis.  
 Sub-Theme I: Inhibitors at Strategy development layer 
This sub-theme presents the inhibiting factors associated with the integration of cybersecurity 
in BIM at the strategy development layer. These factors address the existing challenges and 
shortcomings within the facilities management organisations that impede a successful 
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management of cybersecurity and jeopardise the achievement of the full benefits of BIM as a 
result.  
Through the interpretation of responses, it was identified that the integration of cybersecurity 
within BIM strategies was not well managed. Respondents expressed that a lack of a top-down 
approach in cybersecurity has adversely affected their approach to BIM and hence, most 
organisations lack cybersecurity considerations within their BIM strategies. Respondents have 
specifically indicated that if cybersecurity is integrated with a top-down approach, it feeds the 
feeds down through robust strategies that lead the processes and procedures. Although the 
importance is acknowledged by the respondents, yet there are concerns regarding a lack of 
cybersecurity leadership within the facilities management organisations:  
“There needs to be that consciousness of the importance of cybersecurity, and it needs to be 
applied to every task. For people to see it as important as the data itself. There should be a 
top-down approach because if it starts with the top then it would easily cascade down”-R21 
 
“There is a lack of awareness and the need for training and perhaps there is a lack of a top-
down push”-R10 
 
Another inhibiting factor that impedes successful cybersecurity management is the differences 
in BIM and cybersecurity maturity within facilities management organisations. Organisations 
have adopted advanced BIM authoring tools and demonstrated high levels of modelling skills 
but lacked robust data-exchange processes that encompass cybersecurity best practice at their 
core. Hence the main focus is inclined towards the model rather than the process. As 
exemplified by the following comments from respondents:  
 
“The traditional BIM guys, for them BIM is the geometric model, but it should be understood 
much wider, but people can’t just get their head around it”-R19 
 
“Well, I would say you have to have strong modelling and data base skills, definitely, you have 
to sort of have the communication skills as well”-R21 
 
11 of the respondents also expressed dissatisfaction with the standards and guidelines available 
and the way these have been developed by the professional regulating bodies. They raised 
concerns regarding the practicality and applicability of the standards and guidelines (e.g., 
121 
 
PAS1192-5) by stating that they lack examples and case studies that would have assisted the 
industry with compliance. It was also stated that the lack of industry engagement in the 
development of guidance documents has resulted complexities within the industry. One 
respondent stated: 
 
“I think it’s that point that the fault is with the industry I think it is the fault of two areas. One 
is CPNI and the people who wrote part 5 because they didn’t make it consumable enough with 
examples, and this is the fault of UK BIM Alliance for not engaging properly in the educational 
world….”-R9 
 
Furthermore, respondents pointed to the overly generic statements within the standards and 
guidelines which allows multiple interpretations. Hence, the organisations compliance with 
standards and guidelines is dependent on their understanding and competencies in translating 
and interpreting them for their own use. Considering the multi-stakeholder nature of the BIM-
FM projects, every stakeholder will have their own understanding of best practice, causing 
inconsistencies with processes and procedures and eventually affecting the quality of 
collaboration. One respondent stated:  
 
“… The problem is they don’t tell what should be done so they assume the person who is 
responsible for the security knows what he is securing … so sharing of information happens in 
a way that gives access to who needs to know it, that level of intimate knowledge isn’t in the 
industry anywhere at the moment.”-R22 
The existing cost-driven culture in the facilities management organisations has been identified 
as one of the key inhibitors of the successful integration of cybersecurity in BIM-FM. 
Respondents have expressed that not only cybersecurity, but BIM adoption is hugely affected 
by the cost-driven decision making within FM. This has been confirmed by the following 
comments of respondents: 
 
“In terms of maturity of infrastructure facilitating BIM projects, these are cost driven, so it is 
really up to the budget available and the facilities management organisations are usually 




“It is always associated with a cost …When we try to explain to them that it’s a system for 
tracking information, it’s a system for controlling who gets to see what and when they start to 
realise that there are benefits to it but there is still a cost that they have to find the money to 
come.”-R6 
 Sub-Theme II: Implementation Inhibitors 
This sub-theme presents the barriers and impediments of integrating cybersecurity within BIM 
implementation in facilities management organizations. The identified inhibitors pertain to the 
factors that threaten the cybersecurity of processes and procedures within a BIM-enabled 
project.  
Within the interviews, a lack of process formalisation and documentation is reported by 14 
respondents. They have indicated that the working processes are hugely dependent on the client 
requirements and change for every project and every client. As the following respondents state: 
“… It depends on the customer requirements if you need a secure environment, because it 
could come under central government requirements or it could be private sector because they 
are doing sensitive work that would derive the cybersecurity issues in there.”-R20 
 
“…I mean does the FM sector look at the cybersecurity? in my experience no they don’t at all! 
and then does the client specify how the model is going to be used within the FM world? Some 
do and some don’t.”-R13 
 
Furthermore, respondents pointed out that the facilities management organisations should 
develop the information requirements of each task area and believe that this can positively 
affect the success of cybersecurity management within the BIM projects. Two respondents 
said:  
 
“A client who is able to define the requirements in terms of the digital information needs and 
processes, it’s absolutely crucial to the success of the project.”-R25 
 
“BIM within facilities management is only beneficiary if there is valid data available which 
can be managed and if the facilities management know which data is required for which task 




Respondents also discussed the inconsistent processes and procedures adopted by various 
stakeholders involved within BIM-enabled projects. Respondents have specifically pointed out 
that the diversity of processes and organisational regulations was a key determinant influencing 
the quality of collaboration within BIM-enabled FM projects. As one of the respondents 
commented: 
  
“…people tend to simplify them (i.e., process requirements set in guidelines and standards) 
and every organisation has their own preferences until that has become more homogenised 
and compatible”-R19 
 
Respondents further elaborated on this issue by stating that the inconsistencies also affected 
the stakeholder’s cybersecurity maturity and hence, not all stakeholders would be able to live 
up to the cybersecurity management standard suggested by best practice guidelines and 
standards. It has also been mentioned by the respondents that the size of organisations also 
contributes to the discrepancies by affecting the capabilities and competency levels. This was 
supported by the following respondents: 
 
“…  I have not seen much of it (cybersecurity measures in BIM-enabled FM) at all except on 
things that are overtly secure you would imagine they are doing this anyway. I would suggest 
that you probably find more larger organisations successfully adopting cyber secure BIM”-R8 
 
“So, our team is very small. We are around 35 people within a massive organisation. I would 
be responsible of taking care of the cybersecurity of data…”-R11 
 
Respondents raised that the successful management of cybersecurity within BIM-FM 
organisations requires knowledge and skills of both FM and IT related concepts. They further 
indicated that due to the complexity of the issue of cybersecurity requires effective 
communication and collaboration between the two teams. One respondent stated that:  
 
“…the problem I see is allocating resources to that, so it’s another undertaking that would 
probably need a little more collaboration between our own security department but at the 




The current status of the facilities management industry is more inclined towards a silo 
approach to cybersecurity management. 16 of the respondents have also demonstrated their 
organisations over-reliance on IT measures. The statement below exemplifies that view: 
“The understanding of the risks at the senior management levels is woefully lacking and they 
think it’s just a job for the IT guys and we might get the occasional spam emails and that’s it, 
but I don’t think they realise that a deliberate attack on any technical systems can have 
existential consequences.”-R2 
 
Different views have been expressed on the individual or team responsible for cybersecurity. 
In the majority of responses, the lack of cybersecurity responsibility was either directly quoted 
by the respondents or interpreted from their comments. In light of this, the statements which 
directly raised the concern for the lack of cybersecurity responsibility is presented below. The 
statement specifies that it is critical to assign cybersecurity responsibilities to a competent 
body.  
“I believe the responsibility is lost within the organisations and specifically with the facilities 
management, there is extreme lack of process and lack of knowledge in terms of monitoring 
cybersecurity of data. The responsibility should be with the information manager or the project 
manager whatever it’s called but there should be someone responsible.”-R2 
 
Also, the following comments were made by the respondents and interpreted by the researcher. 
Interpretation of the comments suggest that the lack of knowledge, skills, and awareness as 
well as a lack of a risk aware culture has resulted an over reliance on IT and technology 
providers to protect facilities management against cyber security threats: 
  
“This (cybersecurity) is the responsibility of the IT department and not us. you know we’re in 
the same team. We work for the university. IT department and we are all part of the 
university.”-R7 
 
“This I believe is the IT responsibility. I am not involved in the process, so I won’t be able to 




At last, respondents also emphasised that every individual who is involved in a BIM project 
should be held responsible for the way they use the data and systems. Hence, cybersecurity 
should be part of all employees’ responsibilities. As stated by the following respondent: 
 
“…it’s extremely important to take into considerations the user interaction with digital systems 
and of course every single person involved with a BIM project has a  responsibility to behave 
and perform in a secure manner….”-R1 
 
 Sub-Theme III: Inhibitors of cybersecure performance in BIM-enabled FM  
This sub-theme illustrates findings from the interviews which pertain to the impediments of 
cybersecure performance within BIM-FM organisations. Amongst the identified impediments, 
a lack of knowledge and skill was found through thematic analysis of the respondents 
comments. Respondents raised this as a major shortfall within the facilities management 
industry. The lack of knowledge of BIM processes, data requirements and best practice 
guidelines and standards have been stated by the interviewees. The following comments 
exemplify the abovementioned view: 
“… from the majority of government clients that I know out there is that they are telling us that 
they are using BIM, but they are not they are still using drawings. if the people looking at the 
document and not even really looking at the document let’s say the way you and I understand 
how they should use it the chances of them even thinking about the security is probably quite 
remote”-R5 
 
“…the difficulty with this is that the whole BIM and digital security within the space is not 
business as usual security. So, what often happens is that it gets overlooked. And it either gets 
in to the “it’s all too difficult” box or “we don’t understand it” box so we are not going to do 
it…”-R13 
 
Lack of technical skills in using BIM authoring tools and BIM-enabling infrastructure and 
networks is found as another barrier to the cybersecure execution of BIM. Respondents have 
indicated that lack of technical proficiencies amongst the non-technical facilities management 
employees result in an over-reliance on IT measures and hinders their accountability toward 
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performing securely. This finding was interpreted from the statement of respondents, some of 
which are presented below: 
 
“.. It’s more to do with the IT guys and we just follow what we think it’s right. IT just tries to 
make it simple for us. If anything happens, we just call the IT to help us with it. ”-R12 
“I am not sure; I wouldn’t know in detail but again this isn’t my area of expertise it’s down to 
the technical professionals.”-R4 
 
19 of the respondents either showcased or directly stated a lack of focus on cybersecurity in 
BIM-FM. They claimed that cybersecurity was an ad-hoc option, and it is not included in 
formal project documentations, except when the requirements of the client state that it should 
be included. Respondents comments follow: 
 
“… Some do include bits of cyber security but the majority not that I have seen much.”-R3 
“From those very few BIM-enabled FM organisations, there are even fewer organisations who 
even consider information security and they only do if they are asked to. So, it’s not a random 
practice.”-R5 
 
“They don’t get involved with security on a day-to-day basis, so it doesn’t affect their 
delivery!”-R22 
 
Furthermore, respondents indicate that cybersecurity is usually deemed as consuming cost, 
time and human resource and is only considered important in exceptionally sensitive projects. 
Some respondents further insist that cybersecurity must be embedded in strategies and 
processes and should be a way of working. They also stated that cybersecurity should be 
considered in the training and educational programmes. However, they are all in agreement 
that the facilities management organisations are yet very immature in this regard. Hence, the 
lack of a security-minded approach to BIM in FM should be addressed. The statements below 
exemplify this: 
 





“…if you have a high-profile sensitive project then you might find some security 
considerations, but this is not common practice across the facilities management industry”-R9 
 
A thematic analysis of the responses to the cybersecurity-related questions showed a lack of 
awareness of risks associated with BIM and digitally enabled FM projects. Although many 
respondents were aware of the various implications of a cyber-attack in BIM, some lacked 
insight and awareness of the vulnerabilities concerned. Amongst those who were not aware of 
the risks, many claimed that as long as the passwords, firewalls and alternative technical 
security measures are in place, FM should not be held accountable or involved in cybersecurity. 
In the light of this, respondent 17 comments: 
“Security of information…, I don’t think that is such an issue! No, I don’t think we would have 
concerns in that direction. I can understand that would be an issue for larger commercial 
projects but in the public services I don’t think it’s an issue. In a BIM project, it wouldn’t be 
anything other than the usual checks on IT systems.”-R17 
 
Furthermore, other respondents emphasised that a risk assessment which includes 
cybersecurity risks could help to educate FM about the cyber threats and their impact on the 
organisation and their assets. They further insisted that the outcome of risk assessments should 
be passed on to FM at all levels, to ensure a top-down approach as well as a risk-aware culture 
across all teams within the organisation. The comments of two of the respondents were: 
  
“There should be a security-minded approach in a security risk assessment. To me 
cybersecurity is just one aspect of information security but within the BIM environment it’s the 
main aspect of information security.”-R11 
 
“… We have a total lack of awareness and a total lack of concern about cybersecurity. Until 
we get to a further point up the stream, if you raise that just about that little benchmark, you 
will have massive improvement just with that.”-R14 
 
 Conclusion   
This chapter presented the results of the primary data collection using interviews. The thematic 
analysis of interview transcripts was described, and themes and sub-themes were presented 
following a multi-step coding procedure.  
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The themes illustrated the determinants of a successful implementation of BIM in FM, along 
with the determinants of successful management of cybersecurity within BIM-FM. The 
determinants were organised into three sub-themes of strategy, implementation, and 
performance within the BIM-FM organisation. The analysis of transcripts also highlighted the 
challenges associated with the integration of cybersecurity in BIM-FM, which were categorised 
as the third theme. It was identified that the general knowledge and awareness of the 
cybersecurity considerations within FM is generally limited or restricted by the tasks they are 
involved in and the problems they face in their day-to-day job. Also, findings demonstrate a 
considerably limited BIM knowledge in FM, which can lead to immature and inconsistent ways 
of working. These challenges have a significant effect on different aspects of a BIM in FM, 
including the cybersecurity of digital data exchanged and archived for various FM tasks. These 
considerations further led to the identification of more determinants contributing to a 
cybersecure BIM in FM.  
Thus, the next chapter will present a discussion of the findings through synchronising the 
empirical (chapter 4) and theoretical (chapter 2) findings to enhance and improve the primary-












 Chapter Five: Discussion 
 Introduction 
This section presents a discussion of the research findings and their contribution to addressing 
the third and fourth research objectives. The empirical (Chapter 4) and theoretical (Chapter 2) 
findings are discussed to show the patterns conveyed through the identification of 
interchangeable characteristics of codes as well as their connections to the primarily identified 
findings from the secondary data analysis. Section 5.2 presents the discussion of findings at 
each layer of strategy, implementation, and performance, leading to the refinement of the 
primary research framework in section 5.3. The chapter is finally concluded in section 5.4. 
 Assimilation of findings 
The primary data collection explores the factors contributing to a successful management of 
cybersecurity within BIM-enabled facility management (BIM-FM) organisations by 
employing a qualitative thematic analysis of interview transcripts. Thematic analysis seeks to 
explore the understanding of the interview respondents and provide an overview of the 
concepts of BIM and cybersecurity management in facilities management. The thematic 
exploration of ideas is based on the extrapolation of three groups of findings: 
  
I. The strategic, implementational, and performance-centric gaps identified from the literature 
(Chapter 2).  
II. FM applicable BIM determinants (Secondary data analysis) (section 2.5.1.2). 
III. Determinants of the successful management of cybersecurity within organisations 
(Secondary data analysis) (section 2.5.2.2). 
 
Following the thematic analysis of the interview data, and for maintaining consistency with the 
structure of literature-review findings, the cybersecurity integration within the facilities 
management organisations is investigated for the three layers of strategy, implementation, and 




 Strategic Integration of Cybersecurity in BIM-FM 
Hopkin, (2018) describes strategy as the business goal or target that defines what the 
organisation aims to achieve. However, Kaplan, (2011) provides a more comprehensive 
definition, by emphasising the importance of formalising the ways in which organisational aims 
and objectives can be reached through a structured plan of work, which forms the 
organisational strategy.  To develop a competent strategy, the literature review supports the 
idea of identifying the determinants that enable the accomplishment of business goals (Caralli 
and Wilson, 2004). Anderson, (2003) emphasises that the lack of a clear understanding of the 
sector-specific factors contributing to the successful management of cybersecurity within 
organisations lead to unproductive strategies being implemented.  
This section discusses the main determinants identified for establishing a cybersecure BIM 
strategy within facilities management. Understanding the underlying determinants of a 
strategic integration of cybersecurity in BIM and aligning them with organisational BIM-
objectives are the main scope of this section. Findings from both the secondary and primary 
data articulate how information management and the cybersecurity aspect of work tasks are 
managed within a BIM-FM organisation. The determinants identified were either directly 
quoted by the respondents or interpreted from their responses to the interview questions. 
Alternatively, the inhibitors and challenges of cybersecurity integration at the strategy level 
provided additional insights and offered a more complete picture of the baseline determinants 
of strategic integration. These determinants are presented in the table 6 below: 
Table 6-Strategy Layer Themes and Sub-themes 
Theme I: BIM-FM  Theme II: Cyber Security Management Theme III. Challenges of CS Integration in 
BIM-FM 
Strategic Determinants Strategic Determinants Inhibitors at Strategy development layer 
BIM Leadership (5.2.1.1) Prioritisation (5.2.1.2) Silo Approach to CS in BIM-FM 
BIM strategy development 
(5.2.1.4) 
Value Identification (5.2.1.3) Lack of leadership  
Regulations and Standardisation 
(5.2.1.7) 
Organisational Modelling of Information 
Security Requirements (5.2.1.5) 
Inconsistent BIM & CS Maturity 
 Budget Allocation (5.2.1.7) Low Investment 
  
Limitations in Standards and Guidelines 
  BIM Leadership 
Respondents 11 and 12 commented that the facilities management organisations need to take 
steps towards leading the BIM implementation process (Section 4.3.2.1). Respondents’ 
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comments in section 4.3.2.1 regarding the BIM documentation based on the standards and 
guidelines, identifying information requirements, budget allocation for improving BIM 
implementation as well as establishing a collaborative working relationship between the FM 
and IT departments, illustrate the abilities required to lead BIM in the right direction. In this 
regard, Sackey et al., (2013) has also stated that BIM leadership pertains to the development 
of a strategy plan to achieve the purpose of BIM implementation. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the BIM leadership determinant encompasses the Purpose of the BIM-
implementation determinant which was identified from the literature (section 2.5.1.2.1).  
Wong et al., (2000) has also emphasised on the significance of identifying the “purpose” to 
set the direction for the strategic plans. Hence, leadership is believed to demonstrate the 
commitment of the management team in stepping towards the organisational goals, such as 
the successful management of cybersecurity (Selamat and Ibrahim, 2018). Thus, For the 
integration of cybersecurity in BIM strategies, there needs to be leadership that sets the right 
visions, missions, and objectives for the development of strategic and implementational 
plans.  
The “RICS BIM for project managers” insight paper (2017) has stated the importance of 
leadership in translating the purpose of BIM implementation (e.g., visions, missions, 
objectives) into actionable strategic plans that enable organisation-wide implementation of 
BIM. As presented in Section 4.3.2.3, respondents also acknowledged the importance of the 
knowledge and capabilities of senior management teams in the cybersecure leading of BIM, 
in compliance to the cybersecurity standards, and with respect to the organisational business 
goals and objectives. The empirical data in section 4.3.3.1 demonstrated that the BIM 
management team should have cybersecurity high on their priorities list to lead a 
cybersecure implementation of BIM for all processes and procedures (R1, R9).  
 Prioritisation 
One of the frequent comments amongst the respondents (e.g., R1, R9 in section 4.3.3.1; R17 
in section 4.3.3.3) was that cybersecurity was not the priority of facilities management. It 
was also described as a matter which is not being considered within the facilities 
management organizations at all (e.g., R9,16 in section 4.3.4.3).  Prioritisation in the context 
of organisational management refers to the formation of a base for allocating resources for 
a specific cause (Apostolopoulos et al., 2016). Respondents claimed that prioritising 
cybersecurity in the development of BIM strategy would stream cybersecurity 
considerations down to all processes and procedures (Sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.3.3).  
132 
 
Respondents (e.g., R2 in section 4.3.4.2) stated that the prioritisation of cybersecurity 
requires an understanding of cybersecurity risks and their impacts at the top-management 
level and amongst senior decision-makers. Respondents also claimed that identifying the 
value of integrating cybersecurity encourages the introduction of effective cybersecurity-
management plans, however, this is reliant on the evaluation of the value of information and 
assets and the potential losses in the case of a cyber-attack (section 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.3.2). 
 Many researchers in the enterprise risk management domain have previously considered 
prioritisation as a strategic approach to define the organisational risk appetite for the top 
organisational priorities (Lam, 2017). Studies have indicated that prioritisation should be 
undertaken by the leaders and the managerial team who are involved in the strategic 
decision-making. Hence, it is suggested that prioritisation of cybersecurity should be made 
based on the organisational goals and risk appetite and in compliance with the standards and 
guidelines (EY, 2017). Therefore, it is concluded that the BIM leadership determinant 
(section 5.2.1.1) should be accompanied by cybersecurity prioritisation, to enable the 
integration of cybersecurity in strategic decision-making.   
The literature also suggests that the prioritisation should be undertaken as a collaborative 
task between all departments of an organisation. COSO, (2017), asserts that a siloed 
approach would lead to a false interpretation of what needs to be prioritised (e.g., the IT 
department would propose different requirements than the FM team, hence a balanced figure 
can only be achieved through effective collaboration of both teams).  
 Value Identification 
Value identification was interpreted from the responses of the  respondents as an influential 
BIM-FM determinant, supporting better strategic decision-making. This result aligns with the 
Business-enablement determinant that was identified from the literature (section 2.5.2.2.11). 
Value identification illustrates the impact of certain practices and applications on an 
organisation.  (Iden et al., 2017). Similarly, business enablement takes into account the value 
of an application or practice on the management of organisational goals and objectives (BSI, 
2012).  
Many respondents commented that having a risk assessment that includes cybersecurity risks 
can aid with value identification by identifying potential losses resulting from a malicious cyber 
intrusion (section 4.3.3.2). Accordingly, value identification assists with the recognition of the 
ways in which business can maximise value through the uptake or improvement of certain 
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strategies and practices (Bohnert et al., 2019; Shad et al., 2019; Slagmulder and Devoldere, 
2018).  
The literature also suggests that the adoption of BIM within FM organisations increases value 
by facilitating enhanced collaboration and communication, as well as increasing efficiency of 
working processes (section 2.3.2). Likewise, the risk matrix presented in section 2.4.3 
illustrated that a lack of effective cybersecurity management may compromise the values 
brought by BIM in FM. This can be avoided by the employment of effective cybersecurity risk-
management strategies to create value for organisations (Chronopoulos et al., 2017; Gordon et 
al., 2015). Such values are derived from an improved management of cybersecurity risks, 
creating a risk-aware culture which leads to risk-aware decision making at board level and 
eventually, an increased return on investment (Bohnert et al., 2019; COSO, 2017; Farell and 
Gallagher, 2015). Respondents also claimed that it was difficult to demonstrate the pounds and 
pence of the value (R3 in section 4.3.3.1). In this regard, the report by (McGill, 2018) points to 
the challenges and limitations of identifying and measuring such values. As identified in 
Section 2.5.2.2.11, the value of deploying a cybersecurity management strategy takes into 
account the effects of cybersecurity risks on the accomplishment of organisational goals and 
objectives, as well as the business functions and operations. Therefore, it enables a balanced 
approach towards a cybersecurity implementation of BIM in FM.  
 BIM strategy development 
Sections 2.5.1.2.4 discussed the importance of having a competent management plan for the 
implementation of BIM and highlights the importance of aligning organisational strategy with 
the BIM implementation plans. Section 2.5.1.2.1 further discussed the importance of having a 
strategy which transforms the BIM purpose to actionable plans of BIM implementation. This 
translates into the need for a BIM strategy that pertains to the vision of what an organisation 
strives to accomplish, through the adoption and implementation of BIM (Kassem et al., 2013). 
Many of the interview respondents, (e.g., R12, R24, R9 in Section 4.3.2.1), pointed to the 
importance of including the development of formal BIM documentation as part of the BIM 
strategy such as the Employer Information Requirements (EIR) and the Organisational 
Information Requirements (OIR). Respondents indicated that although cybersecurity is not 
commonly addressed in such documents, it is critical to include cybersecurity considerations 
in the BIM documentation (e.g. R9 in section 4.3.3.1). Chunduri et al., (2013) has also 
emphasised the importance of ensuring process consistency by developing a competent strategy 
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that is communicated throughout the whole organisation. This entails the development of 
information requirement documents and establishing the action plans in accordance with the 
organisational goals (Foss and Michailova, 2009). 
Hence, the development of a competent BIM strategy that includes cybersecurity results in 
cybersecure decision-making throughout all the processes. For this to be achieved, respondents 
claimed that the competency of the senior management team is critical (e.g., R1 in section 
4.3.2.3). A majority of respondents also pointed out the importance of the standards and 
guidelines in ensuring the development of a cybersecure BIM strategy that will act as a 
reference for the processes employed at the implementation layer (e.g., R1, R16 in section 
4.3.3.1). This was also identified as part of the findings in section 2.5.1.2.7, where compliance 
with best-practice guidelines and standards was recommended for the development of BIM 
documentation, as part of a BIM strategy. This concludes that BIM strategy development is 
supported by both theoretical and empirical findings as a determinant which contributes to the 
cybersecurity of BIM processes and procedures in FM. 
 Organisational Modelling of Information Security Requirements 
The interviews demonstrated that the level of risk tolerance is critical to maintain a balanced 
approach towards integrating cybersecurity within BIM-FM organisations (e.g., R19, section 
4.3.3.2). Respondents argued that excessive lockdown of information jeopardises business 
objectives and will act as a barrier to the normal operations of a facilities management 
organisation (e.g., R4, section 4.3.3.1). Respondents also pointed to determinants including 
value identification and senior management team competencies for managing BIM and 
cybersecurity oversight amongst the decision makers and claimed that such determinants would 
assist with identifying organisational information security requirements.  
Findings from Section 2.5.2.2.10 have also acknowledged the importance of this determinant 
as part of the cybersecurity leadership competency. Organisational information requirement 
modelling may be used as a reference for the implementational procedures (ISACA, 2014; 
Whitman and Mattord, 2012). Such requirements are based on the organisational visions and 
goals and need to be established by the senior management team (Barlette and Fomin, 2009). 
As identified in section 2.5.2.2.10, The senior management team in BIM-FM organisations 
must be able to define a framework that defines the boundaries of risk tolerance and make 
strategic decisions aligned with the framework. This will facilitate an integration of 
cybersecurity within strategic decision-making in the BIM-FM domain. Hence, the BIM 
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strategy will include cybersecurity elements which will feed through to the implementation 
plans and processes. 
 Regulations and Standardisation 
A number of respondents have commented that compliance to the best-practice documents and 
guidelines is an effective way of reducing the inconsistencies amongst stakeholders working 
processes (e.g., R14, section 4.3.3.1), however, some have argued that the diverse capabilities 
amongst different stakeholders acts as a barrier to compliance with best-practice guidelines and 
standards (e.g., R6, 4.3.3.1; R9, 4.3.4.1). This supports the theoretical findings in section 2.3.3 
where the barriers to compliance with guidelines and standards has been discussed. The 
comments of the respondents demonstrate a lack of investment towards compliance as a result 
(e.g., R5, R13, section 4.3.4.3). A lack of compliance with standards and guidelines has a 
negative impact on the strategic decisions, which may lead to an increase of cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in organisations (Berkman et al., 2018). Standards and regulatory documents 
play a key role in driving investments for cybersecurity management and risk control (Gordon 
et al., 2016). In this regard, Beautement et al., (2009) claimed that mandatory standards and 
guidelines are considered as a driving factor for positively influencing budget allocation and 
investment to enhance organisational cybersecurity capabilities. 
Findings identified in sections 2.5 showed limited adherence to the cybersecurity of BIM in 
facilities management organisations. Efforts were made towards developing BS1192-5 (British 
Standards Insitution, 2015) which was recently superseded by the ISO19650-5 standard. 
However, both documents are generalised for use in all phases of a BIM project, without 
addressing the specific requirements for a BIM-FM organisation. Limitations in guidance for 
a cybersecure implementation of BIM in FM has resulted in a customised approach to 
compliance. Some respondents argued that to integrate cybersecurity best-practice guidelines 
in the BIM strategy, international security standards such as ISO 270001 and BIM standards 
and guidelines such as the PAS suite, should be combined to provide a comprehensive approach 
to cybersecurity in BIM (e.g., R3,23, section 5.3.2.3). Considering the variety of standards and 
guidelines identified in Section 2.5.2.1, this could result in an inconsistent approach towards 
standardisation amongst the stakeholders. Nonetheless, findings in section 2.5.1.2.7 suggest 
that an active use of policies, standards and best-practice guidelines can lead to a higher level 
of maturity within organisations. 
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Although primarily identified as a contributing determinant in chapter 2, the respondents 
illustrated the internal and external aspects of compliance. The internal aspects of compliance 
pertain to the efforts of organisations to facilitate compliance with best-practice guidelines and 
standards. The comments of the respondents showed an interdependency of compliance with 
other determinants such as BIM leadership competency, strategy development, budget, 
knowledge, and awareness (e.g., R15, section 4.3.2.1; R25, R22, section 4.3.2.2). External 
factors pertain to the regulatory bodies and the efforts made to educate organisations on the use 
of such standards. Compliance is also associated with other external factors such as 
penalisation and certification from governing bodies (e.g., R14, section 4.3.3.1; R9, section 
4.3.4.1). Although the internal aspects of compliance were taken into consideration prior to the 
interview (section 2.5.1.2.7), the responses illustrated the external aspect of compliance as well 
as offering a more detailed view on the internal aspects. Respondents believed that both 
external and internal factors can significantly contribute to the maturity of an organisation in 
terms of its compliance. Therefore, the compliance determinant was replaced with regulations 
and standardisation to address both external and internal factors.  
 Budget Allocation  
The lack of sufficient fund allocation for the adoption of BIM at a mature level has been 
identified as the key inhibitor of cybersecurity within facilities management organisations. A 
majority of respondents pointed to the cost-driven nature of the facilities management 
organizations and claimed that the priority was to operate with the least cost (e.g., R14, R6, 
section 4.3.2.3). Hence, investments in training and educational programmes, and BIM 
infrastructure and authoring tools, would be undertaken with a focus on cost, rather than 
quality.  
Respondents also claimed that value identification would encourage investment on a secure 
BIM adoption and implementation, whilst avoiding bias in the budget allocation by identifying 
the risk appetite and information requirements (e.g., R19, section 4.3.3.3). The comments of 
respondents further demonstrated a connection between leadership competencies (e.g., 
knowledge of BIM and awareness of cybersecurity risks) with budget allocation (e.g., R11, 
section 4.3.3.1). 
Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 discuss how the impact of a cybersecurity attack on a BIM-FM 
organisation compromises the benefits of BIM. This concludes that the cost of implementing 
BIM would increase, in order to recover from an attack. Accordingly, many respondents 
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identified the difficulty in quantifying these losses, insisting that not all losses are either 
quantifiable or predictable (e.g., loss of reputation). Thus, needs to be an understanding of the 
likely risk impact amongst the senior decision-makers within the facilities management 
organisation. This supports the findings in section 2.5.2.2.10, where the senior-management 
team was encouraged allocate sufficient budget towards the cybersecure implementation of 
BIM in FM. Therefore, the allocation of sufficient funds towards facilitating cybersecurity 
training for employees and fulfilling the cybersecurity requirements has found to contribute to 
an improved cybersecurity within BIM-enabled FM. 
 Implementational Integration of Cybersecurity in BIM-FM  
This section discusses the key determinants contributing to cybersecurity in BIM 
implementation within the facilities management organisations. As (Hopkin, 2014) states, the 
success of integrating a concept such as cybersecurity within the strategic layer is dependent 
on the implementation. It is hence considered that implementation is a prescription for 
achieving strategic objectives within the deliverables of performance (Andronache, 2019). 
Mankins and Steele, (2005) define implementation as the connecting link between the strategy 
and performance. Furthermore, implementational factors are identified as determinants that are 
built upon both the structures in place and the managerial competencies (Thompson et al., 
2018).  
The empirical findings in Sections 4.3.2.2, 4.3.3.2 and 4.3.4.2 present the implementational 
determinants that contribute to a cybersecure implementation of BIM in FM. These 
determinants entail activities, programmes, systems, interactions and monitoring that provide 
the means of connecting strategies with performance (Mankins and Steele, 2005) 
To explore the integration of cybersecurity within the implementation layer, the review of 
literature illustrated a number of determinants pertaining to, both the successful 
implementation of BIM in FM, and the integration of cybersecurity within an organisation. 
Hence, empirical data collected during the interviews provided an in-depth oversight of the 
applicable determinants in a BIM-enabled facilities management by the exploration of 
integration challenges and inhibitors, as well as extracting integration enablers from the 
comments of the interview respondents. The determinants contributing to the integration of 
cybersecurity at the implementation layer are listed in the table below: 
138 
 
Table 7-Implementation Layer Themes and Sub-themes 
Theme I: BIM-FM  Theme II: Cyber Security 
Management 
Theme III. Challenges of CS 
Integration in BIM-FM 
Implementation Determinants  Implementation Determinants Inhibitors at Implementation 
layer 
Defined BIM-FM Processes (5.2.2.5) Cybersecurity Design (5.2.2.2) Lack of Formalised Processes 
BIM Infrastructure Maturity (5.2.2.3) Risk Management Plans (5.2.2.1) Budget Limitation 
Defined Information Requirements 
(5.2.2.6) 
Defined Security Processes 
(5.2.2.5) 
Lack of IT & FM Liaison 
Monitor & Audit Processes (5.2.2.7) Arrangement of Cybersecurity 
Duties (5.2.2.9) 
Lack of CS Responsibility in FM 
Pre-tender Competency Evaluation 
(5.2.2.8) 
 




 Risk Management Plans 
A cybersecurity risk management plan was identified as a key determinant by many researchers 
in the technology and system-security domains (section 2.5.2.2.2). Risk management plans are 
developed to evaluate and mitigate risk following the identification of their  nature and extent, 
in order to ensure the accomplishment of the organisational objectives (Joint Task Force, 2018). 
In this regard, the interview respondents illustrated the importance of identifying cybersecurity 
risk in BIM-FM, however, a majority of them were in consensus about the lack of cyber-risk 
management within their organisations (e.g., R25, section 4.3.3.2). The underlying cause of 
this shortfall was claimed to be a lack of financial and human resources to undertake the risk 
assessment (e.g., R23, section 4.3.3.2). Many respondents also pointed to a lack of risk 
oversight at board level, resulting in cybersecurity being overlooked amongst other risks. 
Empirical findings show that facilities management organisations commonly focus on the 
financial and health & safety risks, whilst cyber risks are not taken into consideration (e.g., 
R17, section 4.3.3.2). Section 2.5.2.2.2 further illustrates that risk management requires an 
established strategic approach that incorporates resources, technological facilities, and 
knowledge for the implementation of organisational risk management. Hence, for facilities 
management to successfully integrate cybersecurity within their risk-management plans, a 
strategic approach is required to support the facilitation of the training, budget and human 
resources required for cybersecurity risk management. 
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 Cybersecurity system design 
Theoretical findings in section 2.5.2.2.1 have recommended that having a cybersecurity system 
in place to protect the BIM infrastructure would benefit the BIM-FM organisations, providing 
it is effectively managed and they are designed, managed, and maintained in accordance  with 
the requirements and regulations. The thematic analysis of interviews also showed the 
significance of cybersecurity system design for the BIM-FM organisations. A majority of 
respondents claimed that the CDEs and digital tools and systems facilitating BIM projects, 
required an information security system that is designed to monitor and manage security of 
data within the digital working environments (e.g., R7, R1, section 4.3.2.2). They also 
emphasised the need for a collaborative approach between the IT and FM departments to 
develop and manage the cybersecurity systems (e.g., R23, R21, section 4.3.3.2).  
Although a number of respondents criticised the over-reliance of facilities management on IT 
solutions and disagreed with the isolated approach, other respondents claimed that 
cybersecurity is not the responsibility of facilities management (e.g., R24, R2, section 4.3.3.2). 
The latter group further demonstrated a lack of cybersecurity related knowledge and skills as 
well as a lack of awareness of risks, leading to an over-reliance on IT teams (e.g., R7, R9, 
section 4.3.4.2). Hence, it is important to have an effective cybersecurity system which is 
subject to continuous monitoring and improvement through the coordination, collaboration, 
and effective communication of technical and non-technical teams to obtain BIM-infrastructure 
maturity 
Findings from the interviews illustrated the importance of BIM authoring tools, digital-
information sharing platforms and networking systems, in the cybersecurity management of 
BIM-FM projects (e.g., R17, section 4.3.1.1). Accordingly, the BIM infrastructure maturity 
was identified in section 2.5.1.2.2, where “infrastructure” pertains to the software, hardware 
and networking systems used for facilitating access, archiving, and exchange of data within a 
BIM project.  
The empirical data collected from respondents (e.g., R19, section 4.3.4.2) shows inconsistent 
BIM infrastructure maturity amongst organisations, which resulted in disparities between their 
strategies, processes, and characteristics (e.g., size of the organisation, budget, etc). This 
confirms the findings in section 2.5.1.2, where the compatibility of technological advancements 
and strategic maturity is emphasised by Succar’s BIM maturity model (Succar, 2010, 2015). 
Hence, considerations for implementation that required BIM infrastructure should include 
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foundational strategies that can support the uptake of advanced BIM technologies. The 
successful implementation of BIM depends largely on aspects of technology and social 
interdependencies within a BIM-enabled organisation (Linderoth, 2010).  
Theoretical findings also suggest the development of a process plan for the selection, use and 
management of BIM infrastructure (section 2.5.1.2.2). Succar, (2015) proposes the 
development of an implementation plan that includes continuous evaluation and modification 
of the existing processes around the BIM infrastructure and insists on deploying structured 
measures for the management and maintenance of hardware, software, and networking 
systems. Empirical data showed that the aforementioned tasks are commonly rolled out to the 
IT and technical professionals, however, it is vital for the facilities management teams to 
incorporate their knowledge in the development of the BIM infrastructure management and 
maintenance plan (sections 4.3.2.2, 4.3.3.2). Such an approach allows for the integration of 
technical knowledge for cybersecurity with the facilities management knowledge of 
information requirements, data exchange processes and operational procedures, and hence, 
facilitates a cybersecure approach for enhancing the maturity of BIM infrastructure.  
 Defined BIM-FM Processes  
The comments of the interview respondents demonstrated that FM processes depend on the 
client requirements, project requirements and stakeholder procedures. These overdependencies 
are known to compromise compliance in favour of implementing stakeholder-specific 
preferences in defining working processes (e.g., R13, section 4.3.3.2). Theoretical findings in 
Section 2.5.1.2.3 emphasise the establishment of defined organisational processes to ensure 
transparency of working procedures. These are needed to provide an overview of the 
organisational capabilities and the areas in need of optimisation and improvement. Establishing 
well-defined and well-managed processes and procedures is identified to improve on the 
information security management capabilities within an organisation (Radl and Kaiser, 2019; 
SEI, 2010).  As Empirical findings in section 4.3.2.2 suggests (e.g., R25), developing formal 
process plans and the development of structured procedures, empower the implementation of 
strategies and the achievement of organisational goals. A cybersecure approach to BIM-FM 
would have cybersecurity at its core, hence, cybersecurity should also be incorporated within 
the processes and procedures to allow a cybersecure implementation of BIM within FM. 
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  Defined security practices 
Interviews have shown that formal documentation of processes affects the accomplishment of 
strategic goals (e.g., R25, section 4.3.2.2). The respondents further elaborated that a 
standardised approach to the development and documentation of security processes and 
procedures would improve the cybersecurity status of the stakeholders of a BIM-enabled 
project (e.g., R6, section 4.3.3.2).  Findings from the literature also emphasise the need for 
defined security management processes and procedures along with a well-designed information 
security system (section 2.5.2.2.6). Both empirical and theoretical findings highlighted the 
importance of standardisation of cybersecurity processes and the need to communicate them to 
all members of an organisation to enable a coordinated integration of cybersecurity within all 
operations. 
 Defined BIM-FM task information-requirements  
The need for a competent BIM implementation plan was initially identified in Chapter 4. This 
determinant identified the need for a number of requirements to be met for the successful 
development of a competent BIM implementation plan (section 2.5.1.2.1). As identified within 
PAS1192-2, the Employer Information Requirements (EIR) and Asset Information 
Requirements (AIR) which feed into the BIM execution plan (BEP) are fundamental principles 
of BIM level two and are essential to the development of a competent BIM implementation 
plan (Ashworth, Tucker and Druhmann, 2016). Thus, the “defined task information 
requirement” determinant is as part of the development of “a competent BIM implementation” 
plan which was primarily identified in chapter 2. However, because of the emphasis on 
criticality by the respondents, it was later decided for it to be added as a key determinant. 
Interviewees have claimed that the identification of task information requirements enabled 
easier implementation of access permits within a collaborative working environment (e.g., R14, 
section 4.3.2.2). Furthermore, participants commented further on PAS suite suggestions and 
instructions, with regard to structuring information within the BIM model. Identifying task  
information requirements results in better structuring and organisation of information and 
provides clear insights for better monitoring and control of information sharing protocol 
(e.g.R20, section 4.3.2.3). Thus, it can be concluded that the identification of information 




 Monitor and Audit Processes  
The ‘monitor and audit processes’ determinant was initially identified as quality control plans 
in Section 2.5.1.2.8. However, theoretical findings illustrated that the sole focus of the existing 
studies and models was on the evaluation and validation of BIM models through computerised 
platforms. Data collected through interviews illustrated the importance of the evaluation and 
validation of processes and performance to improve cybersecurity within a BIM-FM 
organisation (e.g., R24, R10, section 4.3.2.2). As part of the quality management processes, 
ISO 9000 specifies the importance of performance evaluation against benchmarks as well as 
incorporating performance-improvement plans into the implementation plan.  Succar et al., 
(2013) also recognised that monitoring the process enables informative decision-making on the 
course of future improvements. Therefore, the “quality control plans” in the primary research 
framework was changed to ‘monitor and audit processes’, to account for process monitoring 
and compliance audits, along with BIM quality-check plans.  
 Pre-tender BIM Competency  
Inconsistency of processes amongst the stakeholders was identified through the thematic 
analysis of interviews. Respondents have shared experiences of collaborating with lower-
maturity stakeholders in terms of the adoption and use of BIM authoring tools and CDEs, as 
well as their capabilities in managing and monitoring information sharing processes and 
procedures (e.g., R4, section 4.3.2.2). Many participants have suggested certification as a way 
of demonstrating organisational capabilities and competencies. Compliance to the best-practice 
guidelines and standards have been deemed as a way of encouraging the enhancement and 
improvement of processes to fulfil the requirements of compliance (e.g., R23, section 4.3.2.2). 
Participants have also commented that vetting procedures are important to ensure the quality 
of collaboration. Hence, integration of cybersecurity and the assessment of the cybersecurity 
maturity of stakeholders and suppliers is important for ensuring a cybersecure delivery of a 
BIM project (e.g., R13, section 4.3.3.1). Findings from the literature have also recognised the 
fragmented nature of the construction industry that has entailed inter-organisational culture 
clashes and inconsistencies in the standardisation of procedures and formal documentation 
(section 2.3.3). Discrepancies amongst stakeholders involved in a BIM-FM project can range 
from the organisational characteristics such as size, location and goals to performance, skills 
and technological capabilities (Cox et al., 2016). This may negatively impact the quality of 
service/product, Value for Money (VfM) and the overall quality of collaboration and in 
particular, information exchange processes and procedures (Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). 
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Hence, findings from the interviews and the supporting statements from the literature both 
stand by the significance of pre-tender assessment of the competencies of stakeholders.  
 Arrangement of cybersecurity duties 
Despite the uncertainties regarding cybersecurity responsibilities and duties demonstrated by 
the interviewees, the over-reliance on IT teams and technology providers to ensure and manage 
cybersecurity was discussed by the majority of respondents (e.g., R2, section 4.3.4.2). The 
available standards and guidelines within the facilities management and BIM domains 
recommend the appointment of a built-asset security manager (British Standards Insitution, 
2015). However, the cybersecurity responsibilities associated with every role within facilities 
management is overlooked. A number of respondents suggested that the strategic integration 
of cybersecurity was reliant on the performance of employees. It was also suggested that every 
user is responsible and accountable of their interactions with the digital systems and tools (e.g., 
R1, section 4.3.4.2). Thus, cybersecurity responsibility should be included within every job 
description.  
Although arrangement of BIM-related duties and responsibilities (section 2.5.1.2.5) was 
identified as contributing towards improved information management, no particular indication 
of cybersecurity-related duties was found within the existing literature. As proposed by Glantz  
(2016), organisations must assign and document the accountability of employees for the 
cybersecurity of information. Theoretical findings further elaborate on the need for a 
cybersecurity risk-aware culture both at the top decision-making management board level and 
at the implementation and execution levels (sections 2.5.2.2.8, 2.5.2.2.10). The empirical data 
also suggests that assignment of cybersecurity roles and duties to competent professionals 
within the facilities management organisations requires a competent management team to 
ensure the suitability of the duty assignment (e.g., R1, section 4.3.2.3).  
 Integration of cybersecurity in BIM-FM Performance 
Determinants related to people (employees) of organisations have been discussed amongst both 
academia (published studies, peer review papers) and professional bodies (standards and 
guidelines). As emphasised by BSI (2010), it is important to align people competencies with 
strategic and implementational goals. The empirical findings demonstrate the importance of 
employee-competencies in handling digital information. A number of participants identified 
that the cybersecurity responsibility should be included in every job description and should be 
assigned to every employee who is involved in a BIM-enabled project. It is believed that having 
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accountability for performing in a responsible and cybersecure manner requires education and 
training as well as a risk-aware culture which should be established by the senior-management 
board (sections 4.3.2.3, 4.3.3.3). Da Veiga and Eloff, (2010) further insist on the importance 
of a security-minded culture as a basis for collaboration and teamwork within organisations 
and across the industry. However, the empirical data showed a lack of knowledge and skills as 
well as a risk-aware culture at either the top or bottom management layers of some BIM-FM 
organisations.  
Findings from the literature demonstrated the significant role of the capabilities of people in 
maintaining the cybersecurity of technology-enabled organisations (section 2.4). In this regard, 
the social aspect of cybersecurity integration is discussed by the literature. For instance, 
Braumann, (2018) points to communication, training and education, culture and awareness as 
the influential factors affecting the cybersecurity of an organisation.  Hence, this section will 
further discuss the determinants that contribute to cybersecure performance within BIM-FM 
organisations (Table 8). 
Table 8-Performance Layer Themes and Sub-themes 
 
 BIM senior management team competency 
The empirical data showed that the adoption and implementation of BIM within the facilities 
management organizations requires a top-down approach. The quality and effectiveness of this 
approach is down to the competencies of both the senior-management team and operational 
teams (e.g., R11, section 4.3.3.2). Respondents argued that assigning roles and responsibilities 
to qualified teams and individuals requires competency at the top levels of management to 
develop the right criteria for the selection of human resources (e.g., R1, R14, 4.3.2.3). In this 
Performance Determinants Sub-theme: Performance Determinants Sub-theme: Inhibitors at performance 
layer 
Performance Determinants Performance Determinants Inhibitors at performance layer 
BIM senior management team 
competency (5.2.3.1) 
Cybersecurity oversight at board level 
(5.2.3.2) 
Lack of employee education and 
awareness 
BIM Knowledge and Skills 
(5.2.3.3) 
CS knowledge & kills (5.2.3.5) Lack of security-minded approach to 
BIM in FM 
 Risk aware culture (5.2.3.4) Lack of cs knowledge at BIM 
management board 
  
Lack of risk awareness across FM 
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regard, (Dakhil, 2017)) discusses the extent to which the management provides financial and 
human resources, legal support and change management, and addresses the impacts of those 
on the maturity of BIM-enabled organisations. Amongst studies that address the performance-
centric measures of BIM, a number of researchers have considered administrational and 
managerial competencies along with determinants such as education, awareness and culture 
(Architectural, 2015; Van Berlo et al., 2012). Theoretical findings in Section 2.5.1.2.6, point 
to the BIM knowledge and skills required to lead and manage BIM effectively. Henceforth, 
reducing cybersecurity vulnerabilities by minimising the challenges associated with an 
immature implementation of BIM in FM (Section 2.4.3).   
 Cybersecurity oversight at board level 
The interview responses highlighted the performance-centric competencies at the top 
managerial levels or the board of decision makers. They emphasised that knowledge and 
awareness of cybersecurity risks at board level, leads to cybersecure decision-making that 
contributes to the development of strategies that have cybersecurity at their core (e.g., R21, 
section 4.3.3.3). Many studies have previously identified the role of the board of an 
organisation in the successful streaming of strategies to all processes and procedures (Cabinet 
Office, 2012). Theoretical findings in sections 2.5.2.2.10 and 2.4.2.2.8 also acknowledge that 
the board of managers and directors are responsible for ensuring cybersecurity is integrated 
throughout the organisation and in line with the overall objectives and goals. To ensure the 
management team is capable of leading cybersecure ways of working, empirical findings have 
recommended education, training, and upskilling programmes for the management team and 
those involved in major decision-making in an organisation (e.g., R10, 4.3.4.1 and R2, 4.3.4.2). 
According to the findings, it is concluded that cybersecurity oversight refers to establishing 
management strategies and control measures, to enable the leading of cybersecurity from the 
top layer of management. Hence, facilitating a top-down approach to the integration of 
cybersecurity within BIM-FM.  
 BIM Knowledge and Skills 
Theoretical findings in section 2.5.1.2.6 showed that BIM knowledge and skills contribute to 
the fulfilment of other BIM determinants, leading to a more mature implementation of BIM in 
FM. In this regards, empirical findings also proposed that BIM education, training and 
upskilling programmes are vital to the integration of cybersecurity in BIM-FM. BIM 
knowledge and skills amongst the FM organisations was affirmed by most respondents and 
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was emphasised as a prerequisite for both cybersecurity and BIM determinants (e.g., R5, R13, 
section 4.3.4.3). For instance, the undertaking of risk management, cybersecurity-system 
design and BIM infrastructure maturity all require knowledge of  BIM tasks and working 
processes, BIM-information requirements, and the structuring of information in a BIM model. 
A comprehensive knowledge of BIM entails knowledge of BIM standards and best-practice 
guidelines and better realisation of the information-management aspects of BIM, which leads 
to better cybersecurity management of information (Arayici and Aouad, 2011). Therefore, the 
integration of cybersecurity within BIM-FM is hugely dependent on this determinant and can 
be facilitated by the collaboration of IT & FM teams. This enables the incorporation of both 
BIM knowledge from the FM professionals, and cybersecurity and technical knowledge from 
the IT/security team. Ashworth et al., (2016) emphasises that BIM-enabled organisations need 
to identify role-specific training and educational programmes to upskill employees BIM 
knowledge and skills. The fulfilment of BIM roles and responsibilities for strategy and 
implementation requires knowledge, skills, and experience by people at the top and also those 
down the line of project implementation and execution. The BIM knowledge and skills at the 
top level is incorporated with managerial knowledge and skills and hence named as the ‘BIM 
senior-management team competency’, which was identified as a determinant in section 
5.2.3.1.  
 Risk aware culture 
Interview responses demonstrated that for the facilities management industry to fully capture 
the benefits associated with the adoption of BIM, a transformational shift to the new ways of 
working is inevitable. Respondents pointed to a culture change that is required to accommodate 
cybersecure behaviour directed by an awareness of cyber risks, to the BIM-enabled projects 
within FM (e.g., R19, section 4.3.3.3). Theoretical findings have acknowledged that a risk-
aware culture entails knowledge and awareness of cybersecurity risks and their implication to 
the organisation and its assets, as well as the effective communication skills within an 
organisation (Section 2.5.2.2.9). In this regard, responses to interview questions demonstrated 
a lack of communication, symptomatic of a lack of formalised processes for communicating 
decisions or rules relating to the processes, and procedures, that must be complied with by 
employees. In particular, respondents argued that if a cybersecurity-risk assessment is 
undertaken, the results should be effectively communicated to those involved (e.g., R10, R21, 
section 4.3.3.3).  
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Both empirical and theoretical findings have acknowledged the importance of a risk-aware 
culture in the integration of cybersecurity within an organisation. A risk-aware culture which 
can be established by developing knowledge, skills, and awareness along with the 
implementation of formal communication procedures. 
 Cybersecurity knowledge and skills 
This determinant refers to the cybersecurity skills required for cybersecure performance of 
everyday job tasks. According to the interview responses, cybersecurity knowledge and skills 
are a key barrier towards cybersecure implementation of BIM. There is a consensus among the 
respondents regarding the lack of cybersecurity-related knowledge and skills in facilities 
management organisations. However, the disagreement was whether knowledge and skills in 
the cybersecurity domain is necessary for the facilities management employees (e.g., R5,13, 
section 4.3.4.3). Some of the responses demonstrated that a lack of knowledge in this regard, 
led to an isolated approach to cybersecurity and resulted in an over-reliance on IT teams (e.g., 
R22, section 4.3.3.2). Also, many respondents believed that such knowledge was not required 
for the FM employees, as it was not included in the job descriptions. Therefore, it is 
acknowledged that organisations need to be transparent about the accountability and 
responsibility of employees regarding the cybersecurity of information that they are handling 
as part of their job. A number of respondents argued that the organisations are as cybersecure 
as their weakest link. Hence, employees must be competent in interacting with BIM platforms 
and BIM authoring tools and understand the cybersecurity implications to an extent which 
allows them to perform better whilst protecting information (e.g., R19, section 4.3.3.2). 
 Framework Development 
This section presents an amalgamation of the findings from the thematic review of the 
literature, along with the empirical data collected through semi-structured interviews. The 
empirical findings are incorporated into the primary research framework developed in chapter 
2. Respectively, the primary research framework is improved and enhanced with reference to 
the empirical findings.  
This framework is developed to address the third and fourth research objectives, by presenting 
a synergy of three constructs of evidence:   
i. Literature review (section 2.3.3) 
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ii. Qualitative analysis of secondary data findings pertaining to the identification of 
BIM-FM and cybersecurity management determinants- Primary research 
framework (section 2.5) 
iii. Thematic analysis of interviews, being the primary data collection for exploring the 
primary-research framework determinants and the interconnections and existing 
arguments around the integration of cybersecurity within BIM-FM (section 4.3)  
The development of the framework was to achieve the research aim, by developing a 
framework that supports the incorporation of cybersecurity considerations within BIM-FM 
organisations.  Whilst the theoretical findings facilitated the development of the primary 
framework, the empirical results deepened and enhanced views on the determinants and their 
connections, built upon the practical views from the interview respondents. Hence, the third 
construct offers insight and evidence of the enablers and inhibitors of cybersecurity within 
BIM-FM, from which the primary research framework was enhanced and improved.  
The empirical results demonstrated the enablers and inhibitors of cybersecurity integration at 
three layers of strategy, implementation, and performance within a BIM-FM organisation. 
These determinants were identified to address the third research objective and further call on 
the third research objective by interpreting the interdependencies.   
 Strategy layer  
Evidence illustrated that the successful integration of cybersecurity within the strategy layer 
required BIM leadership, prioritisation, BIM strategy development, value identification, 
regulation and standardisation, organisational modelling of information security requirements 
and budget allocation (section 5.2.1). These determinants were in line with the determinants 
proposed by the primary framework. However, the empirical findings expanded on the scope 
of each determinant to include cybersecurity considerations. To exemplify, the primary 
framework included the purpose of the BIM implementation as a determinant which pertained 
to the goals, visions, and objectives of BIM. The empirical results demonstrated that it is 
important to take into consideration BIM leadership that encompasses the responsibility of 
setting the goals, visions, and objectives instead of limiting it to a single element of purpose. 
As findings emphasise, BIM leadership includes the identification of purpose as well as leading 
the organisation towards the achievement of goals in a cybersecure way. Additional changes 
to the primary framework included the cyber-security leadership which pertained to the 
cybersecurity oversight at board level and the modelling of organisational information security 
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requirements. The empirical data further acknowledged these elements as key determinants 
which belonged to different layers. Hence, cybersecurity oversight at board level was identified 
as a performance-centric determinant whilst the organisational modelling of information-
security requirements was sourced back to the strategic cybersecurity determinants. The 
empirical results further proposed value identification as a determinant with a similar meaning 
to the business-enablement determinant of the primary framework, which denotes the value 
provided by cybersecurity controls in the strategic management of business goals and 
objectives. As the ‘value identification’ was frequently addressed, the phrase replaced 
‘business enablement’ to ensure an easier understanding for FM professionals. Empirical 
results also demonstrated additional determinants such as ‘financial resources’ which were 
added to the framework to improve on its inclusiveness.  
 Performance layer  
The empirical results in section 5.2.2 demonstrated that the strategic determinants were 
dependent on the competencies of the BIM senior-management team and those in the top 
decision-making chairs who were responsible for developing strategies which complied with 
organisational goals and objectives. Findings also illustrated the significance of cybersecurity 
oversight, by top management capable of streaming cybersecurity down the line of 
implementation and ensuring cybersecurity is incorporated and considered in every process 
and procedure. 
 It was further illustrated that successful implementation of strategies was impossible without 
the competencies of all other employees. Other than the competency of the BIM management-
team and cybersecurity oversight at board level, other performance-centric determinants were 
also identified. Results pointed out to BIM knowledge and skills, cybersecurity knowledge and 
skills and a risk-aware culture as key determinants affecting the implementation of strategies. 
The primary framework included BIM knowledge and skills, however, a cybersecurity 
determinant labelled as ‘the competency of security team’, was initially identified, which 
pertained to the importance of cybersecurity knowledge. The empirical data demonstrated that 
for the integration of cybersecurity, all business functions must have cybersecurity knowledge 
and skills, to varying extents, depending on their roles. Henceforth, cybersecurity knowledge 
and skills were replaced with the security team competency to address the cybersecurity 
knowledge amongst all business functions, including the security team. If cybersecurity 
knowledge is sourced from the IT or security specialists, effective communication and 
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collaboration is also required within the FM and IT specialists to facilitate the incorporation of 
both BIM-FM and cybersecurity knowledge in the implementation of BIM. This will improve 
on the employee awareness of cybersecurity considerations and encourage cyber risk-aware 
decision making at the implementation layer. Hence, a ‘risk aware culture’ determinant was 
added to the framework as an additional determinant. 
The enhancement and improvement of knowledge, skills and awareness was found to be 
interdependent with the frequency and quality of training and educational programmes. Hence, 
it was concluded that the management competencies and cybersecurity oversight will feed into 
the development of a cybersecurity-minded strategy, that will result in the facilitation of 
training and education programmes which have cybersecurity at their core. The separation of 
performance determinants into two distinct levels (i.e., top-level and bottom-level)  was 
decided following the aforementioned reasoning. Hence, the primary framework was amended 
in line with the empirical findings. 
 Implementation layer  
Theoretical and empirical evidence have also identified the determinants contributing to an 
improved cybersecurity implementation within BIM-FM. These determinants include defined 
BIM-FM processes, security requirements engineering, BIM infrastructure maturity, 
cybersecurity system design, defined information requirements, risk management plans, 
monitor & audit processes, defined security processes and pre-tender competency evaluation. 
Where the pre-tender competency evaluation of stakeholders was a new addition to the primary 
framework, The primary framework also included a ‘quality-check’ determinant which was 
later changed to a ‘monitor & audit processes’ determinant to better express that the check 
refers to a process and compliance check rather than a sole focus on the quality of project 
deliverables. Furthermore, empirical results insisted on the ‘monitoring and audit processes’ 
determinant which the ‘quality check’ determinant failed to express. 
Research findings emphasised the importance of the continuous improvement of strategies and 
processes, to achieve improved performance. It was argued that the implementation of a 
security-minded BIM should be followed by auditing, monitoring and quality checks that are 
communicated to the top-management team to moderate, amend and improve strategies leading 
to an overall improvement of processes and procedures. That will further allow for the 
identification of the weaknesses and deficits which need improvement which could be achieved 




 Enhancing the scope of BIM maturity 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, a mature implementation of BIM is associated with benefits such 
as the enhancement of productivity or efficient use of organisational resources. Similarly, 
challenges associated with the implementation of BIM in FM in section 2.3.3 illustrate the 
inter-relationships between the organisational weaknesses and their effects on achieving a 
mature implementation of BIM. This includes the cybersecurity management aspect, which 
needs to be improved for enabling a mature implementation of BIM, and achieving the full 
potential of BIM in FM.  
The integration of cybersecurity with BIM determinants that are provided by the maturity 
models, will expand the scope of BIM maturity to incorporate mature cybersecurity-
management processes. To exemplify this, the existing maturity models have referred to the 
considerations of BIM leadership (section 2.6.1.3). However, no indication of cybersecurity 
considerations was found within the current resources. The integration of cybersecurity with 
BIM leadership means prioritisation of cybersecurity objectives, with respect to the BIM 
objectives initially set out by the BIM leadership (section 5.2.1.1). Therefore, BIM leadership 
should enhance its scope to encompass cybersecurity considerations, which would then 
contribute to the fulfilment of other determinants, by feeding cybersecurity into all processes 
and procedures.  
Another example is the BIM knowledge and skills (section 2.6.1.3.6), already established 
within existing maturity models. However, the scope of this determinant defined by various 
maturity models does not encompass cybersecurity considerations. When coupled with 
cybersecurity knowledge and skills (section 5.2.3.5) and backed by a risk-aware culture for 
cyber-security (section 5.2.3.4), the scope of the determinant includes the integration of 
cybersecurity. This does not mean that all employees should have an identical level of BIM 
and cybersecurity knowledge but what is necessary to perform their role safely and effectively. 
The integration of cybersecurity with BIM knowledge and skills may be achieved by the 
synchronisation of knowledge from two different employees/teams within a BIM-enabled 
facilities management (e.g., IT and FM teams), however, decisions should be made based on 
information gathered from both BIM and cybersecurity perspectives. 
The existing maturity models provide a comprehensive overview of a mature implementation 
of BIM, with a sole focus on BIM considerations. However, they do not encompass 
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cybersecurity considerations holistically. The discussion of findings showed new horizons for 
the existing BIM maturity models, to encompass cybersecurity considerations within the scope 
of BIM maturity. The integration of cybersecurity determinants with BIM determinants would 
enable organisations to seek BIM maturity that incorporates cybersecurity. Hence, 
cybersecurity management will not be segregated from BIM management within the facilities 
management organisations. The integration of cybersecurity determinants with BIM 
determinants at three layers of strategy, implementation and performance is only possible by 
looking at the inter-relationships between various BIM and cybersecurity determinants. In 
many instances, enhancing the scope of a BIM or cybersecurity determinant would enable the 
achievement of both cybersecurity and BIM-FM objectives. However, this is dependent on 
various organisational factors, including the structure, hierarchy of responsibilities, current 
BIM, and cybersecurity stance, which should be considered by each organisation. 
 BIM-FM Cybersecurity Considerations 
As demonstrated by the cybersecurity risk matrix in section 2.5.2, a breach of the cybersecurity 
triad results in the compromise of the BIM benefits in FM. Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 presented 
the various threats, that may exploit vulnerabilities in process, technology, and employee 
performance. Considering the empirical findings, current BIM-FM organisations are not 
concerned with cybersecurity considerations, and lack the capabilities required for a 
cybersecure implementation of BIM. Therefore, for improving on the cybersecurity of BIM-
FM organisations, a structured approach towards the integration of cybersecurity in strategy, 
implementation and performance layers of the organisation is required.  
The ISO19650-5 which superseded PAS1192-5 in 2020, provides an overview of the 
cybersecurity considerations within the adoption of BIM. Both documents provide a cross-
sectional approach to cybersecurity, where the variety of tasks, level of details required (level 
of information need) and cybersecurity responsibility of the employees within a specific phase 
of a BIM project are not addressed. Furthermore, guidance is provided in a generic form to 
enable cybersecurity to be applied in all organisations (e.g., regardless of size, sector, or role-
hierarchy). However, it does not account for the poor capabilities of the FM organisations to 
effectively interpret the compliance requirements and understand where improvement is 
required. As identified by the empirical findings, there is a lack of readiness in the current state 
of the BIM-FM organisations for full compliance with the existing standards. Therefore, 
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organisations should be guided towards improving their capabilities in fulfilling the 
requirements, set out in the available standards. 
Compliance with such standards and guidelines is found as a key determinant of a cybersecure 
BIM in FM (section 5.2.1.6). However, empirical findings illustrated that compliance requires 
the fulfilment of other determinants, to meet the requirements set out by the standards. For 
instance, Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 discussed cybersecurity oversight coupled with a 
competent BIM management team is required for cybersecurity to be considered at the top level 
of a BIM-FM organisation. Therefore, it can be concluded that these two determinants drive 
compliance with standards and best-practice guidelines, by facilitating the necessary 
cybersecurity systems, BIM infrastructure, processes, and resources. Therefore, this research 
proposes a longitudinal approach to a seamless integration of cybersecurity within strategies, 
implementation, and performance layers of a BIM-FM organisation.  
 
 BIMCS-FM Framework 
The primary research framework was built upon the extraction of determinants from Succar 
(Succar, 2009, 2015) and CIC BIM maturity model (Construction Industry Council, 2013), and 
the cybersecurity best practice guidelines and standards. The determinants extracted from the 
BIM maturity models were related to the challenges of BIM in FM, identified from the review 
of literature (Chapter 2). These challenges were found to act as cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
BIM-enabled facilities management, which accentuates the need for a focus on cybersecurity 
management in BIM-FM. As the BIM maturity models have limited indication to the people 
and process aspects of cybersecurity, best practice guidelines and standards in the cybersecurity 
domain were used as a source to extract the cybersecurity determinants applicable to BIM-FM 
organisations. The integration of cybersecurity and BIM determinants was the foundation of 
the primary research framework, where the structure proposed a unified management of 
cybersecurity and BIM in BIM-FM. As the primary framework (section 2.6) was based on the 
theoretical findings from the secondary data analysis, empirical data was used to enhance and 
refine the framework, through an in-depth exploration of the concepts of BIM and 
cybersecurity, and investigation of the applicability of the primary research framework 
determinants in practice. The assimilation of the empirical findings with the theoretical findings 
(i.e., primary research framework), contributed to the enhancement and refinement of the 
research framework through adding the perspective of practitioners and the recognition of the 
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interconnections between the strategic, implementation and performance layers.  
The framework that was developed as a result, proposes a structured representation of the 
determinants that lead to a cybersecure BIM-FM organisation. Whilst it does not provide the 
solution, it presents an intellectual construct that directs the facilities management 
organisations in the development of process models, based on the concepts and connections 
provided by the BIMCS-FM framework.  
Figure 14 presents the modified version of the framework which presents the additional 
determinants, streamlining and connections which have reformed the framework and 
transformed it into a cyclical framework.  
 
 
The revision of the framework is consistent with the findings from the empirical results, which 
emphasise the importance of recognising the origin of the domain of the determinant. BIM and 
cybersecurity, each have specific determinants which need to be acknowledged in separate 
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groups, while taking into consideration the bridges and links in between, which allow the 
integration of cybersecurity within BIM-FM.  
At the strategy layer, the streamlining of the performance-centric determinants and strategic 
determinants is created to express the vital need for BIM senior-management team competency 
and cybersecurity oversight on the undertaking of strategic determinants and the development 
of a security-minded BIM information management strategy. 
Research findings illustrate that a security-minded BIM information strategy leads to the buy-
in of continuous training and educational programmes that facilitate the continuous 
improvement and update of both BIM and cybersecurity knowledge and skills, for all business 
functions of a BIM-FM organisation. Furthermore, a cybersecure BIM information 
management strategy led by competent leaders and management team who have sufficient 
oversight of cybersecurity risks, induces a risk-aware culture through a strategic approach to 
the development of risk management plans and the effective communication of risks to all 
business functions. 
To take into consideration the source domain from which each determinant was derived, BIM 
and cybersecurity determinants were presented in three layers and bridged to represent the need 
for effective communication and collaboration between the organisational business functions 
(i.e., FM and IT teams). Presenting determinants in their own classes also represents the 
discussions around roles and responsibilities within the empirical results. To exemplify, the 
cybersecurity-related determinants such as cybersecurity system design, risk-management 
plans and defined security processes are commonly thought of as determinants which should 
be picked up by the security specialists, technologists, and IT teams within the FM. However, 
research findings emphasise the need for an understanding of BIM from a facilities 
management point of view, to incorporate knowledge of information requirements, BIM-FM 
roles, BIM-enabled collaboration and FM tasks and operations. Furthermore, BIM-FM 
determinants such as BIM infrastructure maturity require an understanding of the cyber risks 
and vulnerabilities of the systems, tools and networks that can be achieved by the incorporation 
of IT, and the knowledge of security specialists. Hence, effective collaboration ensures that the 
approach to the BIM infrastructure maturity determinant is not only limited to opting in and 
investing in the latest BIM infrastructure, but it also includes managing and maintaining the 
cybersecurity of BIM Infrastructure. The bridge in between the BIM and cybersecurity classes 
also represents the communication between business functions regarding the processes, 
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procedures, and risks, to ensure cybersecurity is at the core of all functions. Hence, decisions 
regarding the BIM implementational tasks including defining BIM-FM task information 
requirements, monitoring and audit processes, and pre-tender competency evaluation will 
incorporate cybersecurity.  
The successful integration of cybersecurity within a BIM implementation is only fully achieved 
when the status of implementation is audited and monitored and the feedback is reported to the 
top decision makers in the strategy-development layer to revise, refine and improve strategies, 
which leads to an improved implementation of BIM. Furthermore, compliance to cybersecurity 
rules and regulations should be monitored and the cybersecurity of processes and procedures 
should be included and considered within the audit trails. Hence, the improvements will 
encompass the cybersecurity aspect and hence, lead to the identification of the cybersecurity-
related shortfalls that can be addressed from the top.  
 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a discussion of research findings, to discover new knowledge regarding 
the determinants of a cybersecure BIM-FM. The results led to the formation of a revised 
research framework, by expanding and improving on the primary research framework 
developed in chapter 2. The BIMCS-FM framework was hence developed to act as a prompting 
mechanism for the BIM-FM organisations, to improve cybersecurity and work towards a 
unified management of cybersecurity and BIM in FM. To ensure the applicability of the 
framework in BIM-FM organisations, the next Chapter presents the validation of the 








 Chapter Six: Validation of the research framework 
  Introduction  
The previous chapter presented a discussion of primary and secondary findings, which led to 
the revision of the primary research framework. As a result, the BIMCS-FM framework was 
developed to assist facilities management organisations in the cybersecure implementation of 
BIM. This chapter aims to validate the BIMCS-FM framework using the opinion of experts. 
This was facilitated through a set of open-ended questions which were presented in the form 
of a questionnaire. The validation was conducted to validate the BIMCS-FM framework from 
two aspects. The first aspect pertained to the stakeholders’ understanding of the concepts 
proposed in the framework, whilst the second aspect was the validation of the framework and 
its embedded components. The BIMCS-FM framework is a framework which portrays 
concepts and their interconnections, to act as a prompting mechanism for the facilities 
managers to implement a cybersecure BIM.  
This chapter first presents the method of validation and describes the validation process in 
detail (section 6.2) and also presents an overview of the questionnaire design (6.3).  The results 
of the validation exercise are presented with respect to the validation objective they fulfil (6.4). 
Findings were later incorporated into the framework and final revisions were made (6.5). The 
chapter also provides a summary of the framework deliverables and its contributions (6.6) and 
is finally concluded in 6.7.  
 Validation Using Expert Review 
The validation looked into the stakeholder’s understanding of the framework and its value in 
improving the cybersecurity of BIM-FM. The validation also looked into the framework in 
terms of the concepts embedded including the layers, determinants, and interconnections of 
layers. The validation provided the views of the experts which either complimented or 
contradicted the framework and assisted with the final iterations and improvement of the 
research output.  
The validation entails looking into the following aspects:  
I. Understanding of concepts and their interconnections within the framework by 
facilities management organisations.  
II. Applicability of the three layers of strategy, implementation, and performance. 
III. Applicability of the determinants of cybersecurity integration in BIM-FM. 
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IV. Validation of the interconnections of the layers within the framework.  
V. Value of the framework for improving cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations.  
 
The collection of expert opinion using a questionnaire was supported by Okoli et al., (2004) 
and has been proven effective in studies that entail complex questions with notable levels of 
subjectivity. Therefore, the underpinning reasons for adopting a questionnaire to undertake the 
validation was: 
I. The small size of the expert group simplifies the process, as well as enabling direct 
communication with the researcher for further clarification or elucidation if 
required by the experts.  
II. The experts would require time to review the determinants description table for each 
question. Therefore, the questionnaire will provide them with the opportunity to 
respond to the questions in their own time, rather than spontaneous responses 
required in other methods such as interviews or focus groups.   
The validation was conducted in four stages which included designing the questionnaire, 
preparing the supporting documents (framework description, determinant description, and 
consent forms), expert selection, collection, and analysis of responses.  
• Stage 1: The first stage entailed preparing a set of questions to address the aim of the 
validation process. All questions were designed to address the key aspects of the 
framework validation, either wholly or partially. Considering the nature of the 
framework, the questionnaire was designed in a way to allow the experts to express 
their views in depths and details.  
• Stage 2: The second stage was to develop a clear description of the framework and the 
validation process. This description included a table of determinants with a description 
for each determinant, and an overview of the layers, concepts and connections 
presented within the framework. The description of the determinants was written using 
sections 2.5.1.2, 2.5.2.2 and 5.2.  
• Stage 3: The third stage involved selecting experts with the necessary knowledge and 
expertise in the topic under investigation. Validation using an open-ended questionnaire 
involves selecting a small group of field experts rather than a large number of 
individuals from a broader range of practitioners or the general members of the 
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population. This will allow gaining a richer insight into the views of the experts on the 
framework developed.  
This stage was conducted using the method proposed by Pawlowski et al., (2004), to 
ensure the validity of the expert selection process. It involves identifying the knowledge 
and expertise required to complete the validation task and selecting experts with the 
essential knowledge to validate the framework, from an organisational cybersecurity 
management and/or BIM-FM perspective. Henceforth, experts with experience of 
managing the cybersecurity of information as part of their role, and/or experience of 
working in managerial positions at BIM-FM organisations, were contacted for an 
informal conversation and were questioned on their willingness to participate in the 
validation study. Finally, experts were selected based on their expertise, availability 
and participation requirements and a formal invitation was sent to the chosen group of 
experts. The invitation was in the form of an email, including a brief description of the 
research and the validation process. The experts who returned their written agreement 
of participation, were sent the questionnaire and the framework description for 
validation.  
Although the existing literature was not in agreement on the specific number of experts 
required, a majority of the studies recommended a range between 3 and 20 experts, 
depending on their availability and the size of the sample used for initial data collection 
(Fernández-Gómez et al., 2020). Therefore, the validation was conducted using a total 
of seven experts, from which, five were currently working, or had been previously 
working, in senior roles within a BIM-FM organisation. The sixth expert was the head 
of digital asset security for a BIM-FM organisation. The seventh expert was a 
cybersecurity consultant who had multiple experiences of working with BIM-FM 
organisations and was also involved in developing cybersecurity guidelines for the 
AECO stakeholders, in particular, facilities managers and owners. All experts were 
knowledgeable in BIM and its application to FM.  
• Stage 4: The fourth stage was to collect the responses of the experts through email, to 
analyse and draw conclusion from their suggestions. All the questions requested 
qualitative feedback as a necessity. Responses to the questions (Appendix 3) were 
qualitatively analysed. Furthermore, all the experts were informally contacted by the 
researcher to provide feedback on the validation process. The results of which is 
discussed in the following sections.  
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 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was designed to address the aspects which were aimed to be validated using 
expert opinion. These include the stakeholders’ understanding of the BIMCS-FM framework 
and the value it brings to the cybersecurity management of BIM-FM organisations. The 
questions were designed in an open-ended format to enable the experts to provide rich 
comments, in response to each question. However, to avoid the responses diverging from the 
validation focus, all questions were structured to validate the overall structure, layers, 
determinants, and interconnections between the layers of the framework.  
The first two questions addressed the overall structure of the framework (layered structure of 
determinants), and general opinion of the experts on the terminologies used within the BIMCS-
FM. It particularly questioned whether the framework changed their understanding of the 
concepts proposed in the framework.   
The rest of the questionnaire was structured into the different layers of the BIMCS-FM 
framework, including strategy, implementation, and performance (top level and bottom level) 
layers. In each layer, the categorisation of determinants for both BIM-FM and cybersecurity 
was questioned. Furthermore, the experts were asked to comment on the validity of the 
determinants used within each layer. Finally, the interconnections between the determinants 
and layers, as proposed in the BIMCS-FM framework was validated using the comments 
received. 
 Validation  
The analysis of the comments given by the experts was carried out qualitatively. They were 
colour coded to distinguish between those that proposed additional recommendations and those 
that were in opposition to what the framework presents (See Appendix 4). For this cause, 
responses that gave agreement and positive feedback were coded in green and no further action 
was then needed for that group. Responses which were not sure about the concept under review 
but were not expressing opposing views, or responses which were proposing additional 
suggestions to compliment the presented concept, were coded in yellow. Further elaboration 
on the matter or additional explanation was required, to address comments coded in yellow. 
Finally, comments expressing opposing views and suggesting a change in the framework were 
coded orange. Comments in this category required further action, either by rearrangement or 
change to the framework, or providing a response in support of the concept. 
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The comments of experts were reviewed, and those in categories red and yellow were addressed 
in the analysis. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary and complex nature of the issue also 
necessitated the importance of providing a response to the recommendations made by the 
experts. The validation of the framework was structured into the five key aspects of validation, 
previously acknowledged as the purpose of the validation exercise:  
 Applicability of the three layers of strategy, implementation, and performance 
The first two questions of the questionnaire were designed to address this aspect of validation. 
Comments illustrated that all experts were familiar with the terminologies used for the 
determinants and believed they could easily understand the layers and elements of the 
framework. The feedback showed that:  
• All experts expressed their familiarity with the terminologies of the BIMCS-FM 
framework layers. However, one of them indicated having had no practical experience 
of the cybersecurity concepts of the framework. 
•  Another expert raised the point that some small BIM projects might not have the 
facilities to be approached based on a certain structure, like the one proposed in the 
BIMCS-FM framework.  
• Most experts believed that the concepts and layers of the framework were coherent with 
their understanding of the BIM and cybersecurity concepts, however, the framework 
had provided a more detailed view into the determinants required for the integration of 
cybersecurity in BIM-FM. However, one of them emphasised the need to gain a holistic 
understanding of the issue of cybersecurity prior to delving into the detail of how it 
could be managed.   
 Applicability of the determinants of cybersecurity integration in BIM-FM 
Findings regarding the applicability of the determinants included within each layer of the 
framework is presented below:  
1. Strategy Layer 
Question 3 was designed to address the applicability of BIM-FM and CS categories to split the 
determinants in two groups. 
• The experts believed that the determinants were applicable to the BIM-FM 
organisations. In line with this, one of them pointed that for maximising the effect of 
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the determinants, a balanced decision making is required at board level, to take into 
consideration the business goals and cybersecurity requirements.  
• One of the experts emphasised that the determinants were applicable if there is effective 
communication between the BIM experts, FM experts and IT experts to implement 
these determinants.  
 
2. Performance layer  
Questions 8 and 10 addressed the performance-related determinants affecting the cybersecure 
integration of cybersecurity within BIM-FM. Question 8 was designed to collect views on the 
proposed performance-determinants that affected the undertaking of determinants at the 
strategy layer (top-layer performance determinants). The comments of the experts illustrated 
the following: 
• All of the experts believed that the performance determinants were important for 
creating a cybersecurity-minded BIM-FM organisation. However, one of them was 
sceptical of the need for a CS oversight by the BIM management team if they are taking 
advice from the cybersecurity team. This concern was inclined towards an over-reliance 
on cybersecurity/IT specialists and disregarded the importance of balanced decision-
making which entailed knowledge and awareness of the cybersecurity context.  
• Although experts agreed on the applicability of all determinants, one of them suggested 
that the performance of those involved in operational activities had a higher influence 
on the cybersecurity stance of a BIM-FM organisation. Albeit the expert also 
emphasised that cybersecurity determinants for senior positions was an important 
enabler of improved performance.  
• Another expert also suggested the development of a generic framework to address all 
digital solutions such as BIM in FM. However, this was outside the scope of this 
research project.   
Question 10 was designed to address performance determinants at functional levels (bottom 
level performance determinants). Findings from the feedback of the experts was: 
• All the experts agreed on the performance determinants at functional levels. One of 
them suggested that a reward- aware culture might be a better than a risk-aware culture, 
meaning that employees should be aware of the benefits of creating a balanced approach 
towards cybersecurity.  
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3. Implementation Layer  
Question 11 addressed the categorisation of determinants into two groups of BIM-FM 
determinants and cybersecurity (CS) determinants. Findings from the comments of the 
experts were: 
• Experts mostly agreed on the applicability of the determinants in this layer. One insisted 
on the importance of risk assessment, which is part of the risk management determinant 
in the framework.  
• Some experts considered that these determinants required effective collaboration 
between the IT and FM teams. The framework has already represented this by the 
arrows between the two blocks of BIM-FM and CS determinants in the framework.  
• One expert also emphasised the importance of externalities which need to be taken into 
account. The framework has already addressed this by the strategy development 
determinant, however, it is worth adding this aspect to the determinant’s description 
table, to highlight the importance of considering the external factors while developing 
a cybersecurity-oriented BIM-FM strategy.  
Questions 12 and 13 were designed to address the determinants of cybersecurity integration at 
the implementation layer within BIM-FM. Findings from the comments of the experts were: 
• Experts agreed on the proposed determinants in the implementation layer and further 
emphasised the importance of a continuous assessment of the competencies of 
stakeholders rather than a one-off assessment.  
• One of the experts suggested including “technical solutions” as a determinant, whilst 
acknowledging that this was part of the “Defined BIM-FM processes” and given that 
the focus of this framework was the socio-technical aspects of managing cybersecurity, 
it will remain as part of the ‘defined BIM-FM processes’ determinant.  
• The comments also emphasised the need to communicate the risk management plans, 
which was addressed in the definition of a risk-aware culture determinant in the 
performance layer.  
• A number of experts pointed to the role of continuous auditing and monitoring to ensure 
the plans are being performed in the right way. This is also addressed by the auditing 
and monitoring of the processes proposed by the framework.  
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  Validation of the interconnections of the layers within the framework 
To validate the interconnections between the two groups of BIM-FM and CS determinants 
at the strategy layer, question 6 points out to the interchangeable effect of the strategic 
Cybersecurity and BIM-FM determinants. There is the need for effective communication 
and collaboration between the responsible teams (e.g., IT & FM teams) to implement such 
determinants in a BIM-enabled FM organisation. Findings from the comments of the 
experts were: 
• Experts all agreed on the interconnections between the two groups of determinants. 
However, one of the experts suggested having a separate functional unit to manage 
security and information security by overseeing IT and FM teams. Whilst this 
suggestion is valid and supported by this research, it is not practical for many of the 
small and medium companies who do not have sufficient human resources to form such 
unit. Hence, the BIMCS-FM presents the determinants that contribute to a 
cybersecurity minded BIM-FM, based on effective communication and collaboration 
between those responsible of implementing the determinants (IT, FM, BIM, Security 
teams). Many organisations have already adopted a separate security unit which 
manages information security by incorporating knowledge and information from FM, 
BIM, security, and IT perspectives.  
• One of the experts stated that in some organisations, there may be external parties 
carrying out the IT or FM activities and lack of an effective communication with those 
stakeholders/ service providers may also pose cybersecurity risks. However, the nature 
of the FM organisations is very different and hence, it is difficult to represent every 
situation and organisational structure within a framework. The BIMCS-FM is an 
approach to present the determinants that affect the cybersecurity of BIM-enabled 
projects within FM and the interactions and connections between the two groups of 
determinants is emphasised by the need for effective communication and collaboration 
between those in charge of implementing them. Hence, if any service is outsourced to 
an external company, there should still be effective communication and collaboration 
to enable a security-minded implementation of BIM within FM organisations 
In addition, question 7 was designed to assess the validity of the relationship between the top-
level performance determinants and strategy-layer determinants. BIMCS-FM proposes that the 
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top-level performance determinants affect the fulfilment of determinants at the strategy layer. 
The findings from the comments of the experts were: 
• They all agreed to the need for the determinants of performance at the top-level for the 
employment of the strategic determinants. However, their understanding of 
performance determinants was more inclined towards the performance of functional 
units and those involved with the operational units rather than those with higher 
authorities. However, the secondary and primary data collectively shows the 
importance of a competent management-team and cybersecurity awareness and 
oversight which would enable cybersecurity-aware decision making. This would 
incorporate cybersecurity in all processes and procedures. Hence, a top-down approach 
was suggested. 
Furthermore, BIMCS-FM suggests that the development of a cybersecurity-minded 
organisational BIM strategy leads to the need for cybersecurity embedded-training and 
educational programs. Question 9 was designed to validate the proposed links between the 
strategy layer with the deployment of a cybersecurity-minded training and educational 
program. 
• All experts strongly agreed with the vital need for education and training programs for 
a cybersecurity-oriented BIM-FM.  
In addition to the validation of bottom-level performance determinants, question 10 was 
designed to assess the proposed relationship between the bottom-level performance 
determinants on the successful implementation of determinants at the implementation layer.  
• All experts agreed on the effects of bottom-level performance determinants on the 
implementation layer.  
Moreover, to question the validity of the proposed interconnection between the BIM-FM 
determinants and CS determinants at the implementation layer, question 14 required the views 
of the experts on the link proposed by BIMCS-FM. Their feedback illustrated the following 
findings:  
• All experts agreed on the proposed link between the two groups of determinants, but 
one of them suggested that the collaboration between the two teams should be managed 
by the security team. Although this was in line with the suggestion in the  1192-5 best 
practice standard, it was not practical for many organisations (especially SMEs). At the 
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strategy layer, the inclusion of the cybersecurity-oversight determinant was 
representative of the importance of such oversight at the managerial level. This could 
be a separate unit, or part of the managerial team within the organisation. The 
cybersecurity-oversight determinant was necessary to support security-aware decision 
making for effective communication between the teams.  
• Another suggestion was that the collaboration could be between several organisational 
teams, alongside CS and FM. What BIM-FM and CS is representing can include as 
many teams as there are in an organisation. This very much related to the size and 
structure of every organisation and cannot be generalised. BIM-FM and CS are 
categories for determinants and many business teams might be responsible for 
implementing those determinants. 
Lastly, BIMCS-FM suggests that the results of the monitoring & auditing should be 
communicated at every level, to enable improved decision making at the top-level that 
ultimately feeds improvement into all processes and procedures. This connection was 
addressed by question 15 and the comments of the experts were requested to validate the links:  
• Two of the experts suggested that monitoring and auditing could be optimised using 
technical solutions to enable real-time monitoring for the detection of intrusion attempts 
or breaches. However, the BIMCS-FM framework is focused on the non-technical 
aspects of managing cybersecurity within BIM-FM organisations. The reason is, 
although technical solutions are widely used within industrial organisations, as with all 
other digital solutions, they can be breached, disabled, and compromised with the 
advancements of attacking methods. Furthermore, a large percentage of attacks are 
undetected, even with the use of varied technical solutions in the different 
organisations. Hence, BIMCS-FM is focused on continuous monitoring and auditing of 
compliance as well as the quality of products and services. This can also be carried out 
using technical solutions, but it should not solely rely on digital solutions. 
 Understanding of concepts and their interconnections within the framework by 
facilities management organisations. 
The response of experts showed their understanding of what was proposed by the BIMCS-FM, 
including the constituents and their interconnections. Their comments illustrated that most 
components of the framework are understandable by the experts. The determinant labelled as 
‘organisational modelling of cybersecurity requirements’ was the only exception. Two of the 
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experts challenged the terminology used to describe this determinant and suggested a change 
of terminology to assist FM organisations with a better understanding of the framework. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the BIMCS-FM was understood and no major changes to 
the structure or content was required. 
 Value of the framework for BIM-FM organisations 
Question 16 inquired whether the framework was of value to the BIM-enabled FM 
organisations, by assisting with the integration of cybersecurity within processes and 
procedures. All experts agreed that the framework was of value to the FM industry. Although 
one of them mentioned that its application would take time. As for the BIMCS-FM framework, 
it presented the determinants contributing to the cybersecurity-minded implementation of BIM 
in FM, so that the FM organisations could implement those determinants at the various levels 
of strategy, implementation, and performance. As all comments were coded in green, no further 
action was required by the researcher.  
 Revision to Framework  
The validation questionnaire provided valuable insight and feedback from experts within the 
BIM-FM and cybersecurity fields. The responses received fulfilled all aspects of validation 
which were initially targeted. Their comments also enabled the improvement of the framework 
through minor justifications. The amendments to the framework following the validation 
exercise were as follows: 
I. Taking “external factors” into account.  
One of the experts drew attention to the external factors affecting BIM-FM organisations and 
how compliance to regulations and standards can bring an adaptive approach towards external 
influences. The BIMCS-FM framework represents the determinants of BIM Leadership along 
with standardisation and compliance to regulations, which enables the development of a 
competent BIM strategy that considers both external and internal factors affecting the 
organisation as a whole. This comment was taken on board by emphasising the external factors 
within the definition of the ‘strategy development’ determinant. Hence, the definition of this 
determinant for the use of the BIMCS-FM framework was changed to: ‘Establishing a strategy 
that has the extra-organisational factors and intra-organisational business-needs incorporated 
within and is transferable into the BIM implementation processes & procedures’. This would 
prompt the facilities management organisations to consider the effects of externalities and 
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employ a proactive approach towards them by the following of best practice guidelines and 
standards.  
II. Rephrasing and simplifying ‘organisational modelling of information security 
requirements’ to enable FM organisations to better understand the concepts and 
terminologies within the framework.  
Two of the experts also raised concerns regarding the organisational modelling of security-
requirements terminology. One expert stated that the terminology was not clear to FM and 
should be explained. Another questioned the terminology with respect to its definition and the 
fact that it doesn’t suggest the need for computational modelling which it implies for the reader. 
This determinant was commonly accepted by the cybersecurity specialists among the experts; 
however, it might require a simplification in terms of its label. Hence, the determinant was 
changed to ‘identification of the organisation’s information security requirements’ to better 
relate to the definition that is provided for this determinant: ‘Interpretation of organisational 
information security requirements as part of the organisational information requirements (OIR) 
document, with respect to organisational goals, value identification, risk tolerance and 
determining the applicability of cybersecurity controls based on the best-practice guidelines 
and standards’.  
Hence, the BIMCS-FM framework was adjusted in definition and terminology to accommodate 
the views of the experts and improve on its value for the facilities management organisations. 
The adjustments were coloured in red in the framework (Figure 15) and table of definitions 




Figure 15- Validated BIMCS-FM Framework 
 
Table 9- Validated BIMCS-FM Determinants' Description 












BIM Leadership  BIM Leadership is to translate the purpose of BIM implementation (BIM vision, 




Establishing a strategy that has the extra-organisational factors and intra-organisational 
business needs incorporated within and is transferable into the BIM implementational 
processes & procedures 
Regulations & 
Standardisation  
BIM strategy is developed upon the best-practice guidelines & standards and 
incorporated into implementational and performance improvement processes and 
procedures. 
CS Prioritisation  Strategic prioritisation of cybersecurity initiatives, planning and investment based on 
organisational needs, to ensure cybersecurity is embedded into the BIM-FM strategy. 
CS Value 
Identification 
Identification of the value of information and assets and the potential losses in case of a 
cyber-attack. Value can be monetary or non-monetary (reputation, trust, etc) 





Interpretation of organisational information security requirements as part of the 
organisational information requirements (OIR) doc, with respect to organisational goals, 
value identification, risk tolerance and determining the applicability of cybersecurity 





















Cybersecure BIM Implementation in FM 
BIM Enabled Facility Management 
BIM Enabled Facility Management 
BIM Enabled Facility Management 
Cybersecurity Embedded Training & Education  
Continuous Improvements Continuous Improvements 



















Adoption of fit for purpose BIM infrastructure managed and maintained by continuous 
updates and assessments to ensure technological excellence. 
Defined BIM-FM 
Processes 
BIM-FM working processes including data sharing, interaction between stakeholders 
and communication are formally documented and regulated based on best-practice 




Development of the Employers Information Requirement document (EIR) to reflect on 
the OIR specifications and set out the BIM Execution Plan (BEP) projection. 
Stakeholder’s 
Capability Evaluation 
Evaluation of supply-chain capabilities in fulfilling the requirements of EIR, addressing 
their information management competencies and IT and human resource capabilities. 
Monitor & Audit  Continuous monitoring of processes and auditing of performance to ensure adherence 
with strategic rules and regulations, leading to continuous improvement of processes and 
deliverables quality during the whole life cycle of a project. 
Cybersecurity Risk 
Management 
To identify, analyse, evaluate, and treat a cybersecurity risks to the digital information of 
a BIM-enabled FM organisation.  
Reliable Cybersecurity 
System Design 
Designing reliable systems to protect digital data, based on the information security 
requirements and risk management capabilities.    
Defined Security 
Processes  
Defining and formalising processes and procedures to manage and maintain 





















The extent to which the BIM management team support the adoption and 
implementation of BIM, by standardisation of processes and procedures and providing 
sufficient resources and facilities.  
BIM Knowledge & 
Skills  
Continuous training and education to ensure up to date BIM knowledge and skills for all 
employees.  
Cybersecurity 
Oversight at Board 
Level 
Managing and motivating cyber security at the strategy level through leveraging, 
influencing, and ensuring full support from senior-management teams as well as 
effective collaboration of IT & business management teams for the integration of cyber-
security initiatives.  
Cybersecurity 
Knowledge & Skills  
Continuous training and education to supply employees with the latest capabilities 
required for full compliance with organisational cybersecurity regulations, processes, 
and procedures.  
Risk-Aware Culture  Establishing a culture where all employees value, promote and practice cybersecurity 
procedures to protect the security of digital information with respect to the security 
requirements set out as part of the risk management process. 
 
 Framework Beneficiaries  
The BIMCS-FM framework is an intellectual construct that presents the determinants of a 
cybersecure implementation of BIM in facilities management organisations. The connections 
of the determinants guide the facilities management organisations to adopt a cybersecurity-
oriented approach to the implementation of BIM. The transformation of the primary framework 
through outlining the amendments support the following deliverables:  
I. The framework advocates an apprehension of the need for an organisational shift 
that fosters a mature implementation of BIM information management that has 
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cybersecurity at its core. 
II. Defines baseline determinants of cybersecurity integration within BIM-enabled FM 
to address the shortfalls and limitations that challenge the integration.  
III. Accentuates the role of people and process in managing and maintaining a 
cybersecure BIM-FM.   
IV. Establishes a framework for bridging cybersecurity and BIM determinants, in 
support of a cybersecure BIM in various layers of strategy, implementation and 
performance in FM.  
With respect to the above deliverables, this framework assists the senior management teams in 
BIM-FM organisations, to embed cybersecurity in their strategies, processes, and employee 
ways of working. Due to the varying structure of the BIM-FM organisations, the senior 
management team may consist of various roles that are labelled differently within each 
organisation. Hence, this research focuses on those involved in the top managerial decision 
making, who have an overview of the strategic, implementational and performance aspects of 
BIM in FM. Therefore, this framework encourages the incorporation of cybersecurity 
considerations within all business functions of a BIM enabled facilities management 
organisation.  
The application of this framework requires fundamental transformations within a BIM-enabled 
organisation, to be able to build up the knowledge, skill set, awareness and culture that is 
required for a cybersecurity-minded implementation of BIM. Furthermore, the implementation 
of the concepts proposed in various levels of strategy, implementation, and performance, 
should be approached through the development of process models that would be fit for purpose 
within various BIM-enabled FM organisations of different sizes, structures, and different 
sectors (e.g., education, industry, health, etc.). Investigation into the ways in which a single 
determinant can be approached within a BIM-FM organisation is required to identify the 
process that is required for implementation of a determinant such as “BIM infrastructure 
maturity” or “risk aware culture”. Hence, the BIMCS-FM framework assists with providing an 
insight into the concepts that should be considered for a cybersecurity-oriented implementation 
of BIM within FM. It can also be considered as a key source of information for the development 




The comments and feedback of experts demonstrated a general consensus on the value that the 
BIMCS-FM framework brings to FM organisations, by proposing a structured approach to 
improving cybersecurity in various levels of strategy, implementation, and performance. The 
inclusion of determinants and their interconnections within each level emphasise the key 
contributing factors to cybersecurity management and enables FM to tackle the issue with a 
better understanding of the required competencies and capabilities. Hence, the BIMCS-FM 
framework fulfils the aim of the research, by acting as a prompting mechanism which will lead 
to a more cybersecure management of BIM-enabled facilities management organisations. 
The validation exercise enabled the researcher to validate the model and improve on the minor 
issues with the terminologies and phrasings. The views of the experts were relatively 
homogeneous and did not indicate any major divergence of thought and opinion. The minor 
terminology issues which were brought up by a couple of experts were incorporated in the 
framework and amended accordingly. A final version of the research framework was developed 















 Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
 Introduction 
In achieving the aim of the research, previous chapters showed the formation, validation and 
development of the final research framework using the theoretical and empirical findings. The 
secondary data collection revealed a number of determinants contributing to a cybersecure 
BIM-enabled facilities management, which were used to construct a primary research 
framework (chapter 2). The empirical findings (chapter 4) from the thematic analysis of 
interviews with industry professionals were later synchronised with the theoretical findings, 
leading to the formation of the BIMCS-FM framework (Chapter 5), based on the primary 
framework construct. The BIMCS-FM framework was validated and finalised (chapter 6) in 
response to the research question, of how cybersecurity can be improved in the implementation 
of BIM in FM.  
This chapter presents the research findings to demonstrate evidence of the fulfilment of the 
research question, aim and objectives. It demonstrates the way in which the findings respond 
to the research question, by discussing the contributions, potential implications, and limitations 
of each phase of the research. Section 7.2 illustrates the way the findings address the research 
objectives and their contribution to the achievement of the research aim. Sections 7.3 outlines 
the theoretical and practical contributions, followed by the limitations and future studies in 
sections 7.4 and 7.5 respectively.  
 Results attribution to research objectives  
Four research objectives were proposed to reach the main aim of the research (chapter 1). 
Through the review of the literature in BIM (Sections 2.2), the first research objective was 
achieved, which highlighted the issue of cybersecurity in various phases of the BIM lifecycle 
(Section 2.2.6). To take further steps towards the achievement of the research aim, the second 
research objective was fulfilled by investigating the risk factors affecting cybersecurity in BIM-
enabled facilities management, by reviewing the literature in BIM-enabled facilities 
management and cybersecurity in the digital built-environment (Section 2.3, 2.4). Objective 
three was partially fulfilled through the development of the primary research framework, 
including the BIM and cybersecurity determinants that contribute towards the improved 
cybersecurity of a BIM-FM organisation (Section 2.6). The primary research framework was 
further revised and expanded based on the empirical data, collected using interviews. The 
revised framework fulfilled the third research objective by identifying determinants of a 
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cybersecure BIM-FM (chapter 5,6). Finally, the fourth research objective was fulfilled by 
validating and finalising the BIMCS-FM framework (chapter 6), to act as a prompting 
mechanism assists BIM-enabled facilities management organisations in improving their 
cybersecurity status. The sub-sections below provide a synthesis of findings, pertaining to the 
accomplishment of each research objective and its contribution to the achievement of the 
research aim.  
 Research Objective I –To critically explore the cybersecurity risks in various phases 
of a BIM lifecycle. 
The first research objective was achieved by a review of the literature for BIM and 
cybersecurity, with a particular focus on the various phases of a BIM lifecycle. Findings 
illustrated that during the in-use phase of the project, facilities managers were responsible for 
managing and maintaining both the digital and physical aspects of the facilities, in 
collaboration with various stakeholders. Hence, large volumes of as-built and as-maintained 
information were shared with a large group of stakeholders, with differing processes and 
procedures for the managing and handling of digital information. Thus, robust information-
management processes in this phase of a BIM project are required to accomplish the full 
potential of BIM in FM. This directed the research to focus on the cybersecurity management 
in BIM-FM organisations.  
 Research Objective II- To identify the risk factors affecting cybersecurity in BIM-FM 
organisations.    
To identify the challenges of managing cybersecurity in BIM-FM organisations, section 2.3 
explored the application of BIM in various task areas of FM. Findings illustrated the 
significance of the availability of accurate and up to date information, of the facility to achieve 
the benefits of BIM in FM. Findings also unveiled the challenges associated with the 
application of BIM in FM. These challenges related to the strategy, implementation, and 
performance layers of an organisation and had the people, processes, and technology at their 
core. Section 2.3.3 showed how the challenges in the implementation of BIM in FM resulted 
in an increased cybersecurity vulnerability. Therefore, it was concluded that overcoming BIM 
implementation challenges can minimise the cybersecurity vulnerabilities.  
To further explore these vulnerabilities, section 2.4 considered the cybersecurity threats, risks, 
and their impacts on BIM-FM organisations. Based on the cybersecurity triad, a risk matrix 
was developed to represent how an infringement of data confidentiality, availability and 
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integrity may compromise the BIM benefits in various task areas of a facilities management 
organisation (section 2.4.3). The findings illustrate that cybersecurity threats may target people, 
process or technology-related vulnerabilities within the strategy, implementation, and 
performance layers of an organisation. However, current measures were seldom focused on the 
technical cybersecurity measures, whilst also neglecting to consider measures that minimise 
the people-related and process-related vulnerabilities.  
Results conclude that effective cybersecurity management with particular focus on people and 
processes is required, to overcome the BIM challenges that lead to a higher cybersecurity 
vulnerability in BIM-FM organisations. Therefore, a mature implementation of BIM that 
includes cybersecurity considerations is required in BIM-FM organisations.  
 Research objective III- To determine the requirements of a cybersecure 
implementation of BIM in FM. 
In fulfilling the third research objective, this study sought to investigate what the existing 
resources propose for overcoming cybersecurity vulnerabilities raised by the challenges 
identified in BIM-FM (section 2.3.3).  In doing so, BIM maturity models were explored to 
identify people-related and process-related determinants, contributing to a cybersecure BIM in 
FM. Succar’s BIM maturity model (Succar, 2010) and CIC BIM maturity model (Construction 
Industry Council, 2013) were selected for their focus on the managerial and social aspects of 
BIM as well as their applicability to FM (section 2.5.1). Thus, BIM determinants applicable to 
FM organisations were extracted from the two models. The review of BIM maturity models 
was indicative of a lack of focus on the people and process aspects of cybersecurity and a sole 
focus on maintaining infrastructure security and ensuring technology excellence. Therefore, 
the investigations were directed to resources in organisational cybersecurity management to 
extract the people-related and process related determinants of a cybersecure organisation. The 
cybersecurity determinants were identified from the review of secondary data including best-
practice guidelines, standards, and peer-reviewed journals. A primary research framework was 
developed to represent the integration of cybersecurity determinants with BIM-FM 
determinants (section 2.6), to overcome the strategic, implementational and performance 
challenges.  
The primary framework was further expanded and revised based on the empirical findings from 
interviews with industry professionals. As a result, the third research objective was met by the 
176 
 
assimilation of theoretical and empirical findings, which also contributed to the fulfillment of 
the final objective (i.e., development of a framework).  
 Research objective IV. To develop and validate a framework that supports an improved 
integration of cybersecurity considerations in BIM-FM organisations.  
Empirical findings from the interviews demonstrated the interconnections between the BIM-
FM and cybersecurity determinants. Hence, the BIMCS-FM framework was developed, 
portraying the determinants contributing to a cybersecure BIM in FM together with their 
interconnections (section 5.3). The determinants included BIM-FM and cybersecurity 
determinants to enable the integration of cybersecurity in the strategy-setting, implementation, 
and performance of BIM-enabled FM organisations. The interconnections between the BIM-
FM and cybersecurity determinants demonstrated the need for effective communication and 
collaboration between those responsible for the deployment of each determinant. The need for 
the collaboration was to overcome the isolated approach to cybersecurity management and 
enable informed decision making for both cybersecurity and BIM-FM tasks.  
To finalise the development of the BIMCS-FM framework and achieve the fourth research 
objective, a validation exercise was conducted using a review by experts of the BIMCS-FM 
framework (chapter 6). The validation was carried out using an open-ended questionnaire, from 
which minor modifications were applied to the framework. The experts suggested minor 
alterations in the terminology to avoid confusion and misunderstanding amongst the FM 
organisations. The findings from the validation also emphasised the need to consider the 
external factors affecting the cybersecurity of a BIMFM organisation. Therefore, this aspect 
was highlighted in the definition of the ‘strategy development’ determinant and hence, the 
definition was finalised as ‘establishing a strategy that has the extra-organisational factors and 
intra-organisational business needs incorporated within and is transferable into the BIM 
implementation processes & procedures.  It was further concluded that the BIMCS-FM 
framework (section 6.4.5) was a valuable prompting mechanism for facilities management 
organisations to improve the cybersecurity in their organisations. 
 Contributions  
The contributions of this research are structured as contributions to theory and practice. The 
theoretical contributions entail the assimilation of knowledge from the two key domains of 
BIM-FM and cybersecurity, to bridge the existing knowledge gap within the literature. 
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Furthermore, contributions to the industry involves assisting the facilities management 
organisations to achieve a cybersecure implementation of BIM.  
 Theoretical Contributions   
• Eliciting process-related and people-related considerations for cybersecurity within 
the BIM-FM: 
Following a critical review of cybersecurity and the implementation of BIM in FM, it was 
highlighted that BIM and cybersecurity were often coupled technologically with a limited 
emphasis on people-related and process-related complexities. As demonstrated by the findings 
from the review of the literature, these complexities increase the vulnerability of FM to 
cybersecurity attacks. Therefore, a risk matrix (section 2.4.3) mapping cybersecurity breaches 
within BIM-enabled FM was developed to support portraying the necessity of acknowledging 
people and process related vulnerabilities. The risk matrix showed how a cyber-attack 
compromises the benefits of BIM in FM. Considering that the accomplishment of potential 
BIM benefits in FM is supported by maturity models, this can inform future determinants 
within BIM maturity models. This is because existing maturity models within BIM 
acknowledge cybersecurity as part of the BIM infrastructure maturity, which propose an 
isolated technology-dependent approach to the management of cybersecurity. Therefore, by 
the integration of cybersecurity in strategic, implementational and performance determinants, 
this study sought to emphasise the people-related and process-related cybersecurity 
considerations and inform the future BIM maturity models to support the cybersecure adoption 
and implementation of BIM.  
 Contributions to Practice 
• Developing a BIMCS-FM framework that acts as a prompting mechanism for 
cybersecurity considerations within BIM-enabled FM: 
The BIMCS-FM framework was developed to unite the two domains of BIM-FM and 
cybersecurity from a people and process perspective (Figure 15). The determinants presented 
within this framework create a contemporary body of knowledge for academics and researchers 
in the fields of cybersecurity management, BIM, and FM to explore the implementation of each 
determinant in BIM-enabled  organisations with varying characteristics (e.g., size, industry 
sector, etc.). The literature highlighted that is often the responsibility of the IT teams to manage 
expectations regarding cybersecurity. This tended to happen in isolation from the FM teams 
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and hence incurring a lack of cybersecurity oversight in the decisions made by the FM teams. 
Similarly, the management of cybersecurity was carried out with little consideration for the 
BIM-FM operational needs, which create challenges in managing access to the information 
required by various stakeholders. Therefore, the development of the BIMCS-FM framework 
acts as a prompting mechanism for the BIM-FM organisation, to integrate cybersecurity 
considerations within the strategic, implementational and performance related aspects of their 
organisation.  
Furthermore, the BIMCS-FM framework highlights the role of people and processes, 
recognising the part played by robust processes, to facilitate, manage and maintain the digital 
technologies supporting BIM. Hence, it assists senior managers and decision makers in BIM-
FM organisations to transform their approach to cybersecurity management from reactive to 



















 Limitations  
Throughout this research project, attention was given to build in a high level of quality into the  
processes of data collection, data analysis and reporting of the findings. However, a PhD 
journey entails limitations brought about by time and resources which inherently affects the 
research. The scope of the research targets three main concepts of BIM, cybersecurity, and FM, 
where gathering in-depth knowledge and expertise in all three domains is a challenge that needs 
to be overcome by the researcher alone. Researcher’s background and level of knowledge and 
expertise in each domain significantly affects the project’s approach and the resources required. 
The exploratory review of literature conducted at the beginning of this research was to gain 
understanding of the three domains and the way they influence one another.  
The preliminary review of literature also illustrated another limitation with respect to the 
availability of resources that address the aim of the research focusing on the people and process 
aspects of cybersecurity in BIM enabled FM. This issue was tackled through using secondary 
data from the two domains of BIM and cybersecurity, followed by a qualitative analysis of 
secondary data based on the findings from the literature review in BIM enabled facilities 
management. Although the available resources in BIM and cybersecurity did not specifically 
address the issue of cybersecurity in BIM enabled facilities management organisations, they 
were used develop a knowledge block that addresses cybersecurity in BIM-FM. This 
knowledge block was primarily presented as the primary research framework and was later 
enhanced and modified using empirical findings resulted from thematic analysis of 25 semi-
structured interviews with industry professionals.  
As with most interpretive and qualitative research, debates around the researcher-bias and/or 
respondent-bias will also come into play. The adoption of BIM within FM organisations is still 
at its initial stages, therefore, the implementation of BIM is mostly project-based and ad-hoc, 
depending on the financial resources of the client and the level of understanding of the benefits 
of BIM. In these situations, the main focus is on the modelling aspects of BIM (which are 
usually desirable from the point-of-view of the client), rather than the more necessary and 
fundamental changes needed in the way that information is managed and maintained. 
Therefore, those selected to take part in this study were from organisations which were at 
different levels of BIM adoption. This meant that their interview responses were dependent on 
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their experience, knowledge, and the way they applied BIM in their day-to-day work. This can 
be referred to as respondent-bias which needed to be taken into account in a qualitative study.  
Another potential limitation of this study was the researcher-bias, which is a common threat to 
interpretive studies within qualitative research. This study has paid careful attention to avoid 
this, by constantly comparing the findings from the empirical data analysis with the findings 
from the secondary data analysis and existing literature. A validation exercise was also carried 
out to assess the validity of the findings and to ensure the researcher-bias did not affect the 
results.  
 Future Studies  
• Future studies will seek to investigate the concept of cybersecurity risks in various types 
of BIM-FM organisations, across all phases of a BIM project. Assimilation of findings 
in section 2.2.6 illustrated that a cybersecurity breach negatively effects all phases of a 
BIM project. Therefore, further exploration is required to capture the extent of impact 
in various scenarios, including various stakeholders, various types of projects, BIM 
maturity, and many more influential factors affecting the risk impact across the lifecycle 
of a BIM project.  
• Based on the review of literature, the BIM-FM specific risk matrix in section 2.4.3 maps 
potential cybersecurity risk impact on the BIM benefits for various areas of FM. This 
was carried out by combining of the findings from the review of literature in the two 
distinct domains of BIM-FM and cybersecurity, which sets out the foundations for 
further research into the probabilities and severity of risk, using empirical data to 
validate or expand on the developed risk matrix.  
• The BIMCS-FM framework developed as the main output of this research, presents a 
number of determinants that contribute to an improved cybersecurity in BIM-enabled 
FM organisations. Future research could explore the means for implementing each 
determinant depending on the characteristics of organisations, (such as size, sector, 
clients, etc.) by developing process models that can be applied in various organisations. 
This will also enable the evaluation of this framework using empirical data, following 
a full investment in the determinants proposed.  
• Future research can also explore the application of the BIMCS-FM framework in all 
BIM-enabled organisations across other phases of a BIM project. Although the BIM-
FM determinants were selected for facilities management organisations, the framework 
has the potential to be adjusted for the use of other BIM stakeholders. This requires 
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future explorations into the applicability of the framework in other phases of a BIM 
project, the suitability of the determinants for other phases and how it would be adjusted 
to meet the requirements of all stakeholders.  
 
 Final Thoughts  
The advancement of digital technologies such as the Building Information Modelling in the 
built environment has led to an increased cybersecurity risk to the facilities management 
organisations and the facilities they manage and maintain. It has been evident that organisations 
are keener on the digitisation aspects of BIM adoption, rather than focusing on the digitalisation 
of their modus operandi. A matter which yields lower BIM maturity in terms of the people and 
process aspects of BIM implementation, and inherently leads to a lower immunity to 
cybersecurity breach. Thus, BIM enabled FM organisations should take a proactive approach 
towards a mature adoption and implementation of BIM that has cybersecurity considerations 
at its core. This requires a competent approach to the strategic, procedural and performance 
requirements of the adoption and implementation of a cybersecure BIM in FM, that is 
reinforced by upskilling and knowledge management of the employees both in senior 
management positions and the operational teams. This is also in line with the latest publication 
on driving transformational change in the digital built environment, where it emphasises the 
need for an organisational change to accomplish the benefits associated with the adoption of 
technologies in the built environment (Shelbourn and Underwood, 2021). 
“A multidisciplinary approach to competency-based management across sectors, disciplines, 
professions, etc., matters more than targeting productivity improvement through rapidly 
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Abstract 
Purpose – BIM creates a golden thread of information of the facility, which proves useful to 
those with malicious intents of breaching the security of the facility. A cyber-attack incurs 
adverse implications for the facility and its managing organisation. Hence, this paper aims to 
unravel the impact of a cybersecurity breach, by developing a BIM-FM cybersecurity-risk-
matrix to portray what a cybersecurity-attack means for various working areas of FM.  
Design/methodology/approach – This study commenced with exploring cybersecurity within 
various stages of a BIM project. This showcased a heightened risk of cybersecurity at the post-
occupancy phase. Hence, thematic analysis of two main domains of BIM-FM and cybersecurity 
in the built environment led to the development of a matrix that illustrated the impact of a 
cybersecurity attack on a BIM-FM organisation. 
Findings- Findings show that the existing approaches to the management of cybersecurity in 
BIM-FM are technology dependent, resulting in an over-reliance on technology and a lack of 
cybersecurity awareness of aspects related to people and process. This study sheds light on the 
criticality of cyber-risk at the post-occupancy phase, highlighting the FM areas which will be 
compromised as a result of a cyber-attack.  
Originality/value – This study seeks to shift focus to the people and process aspects of 
cybersecurity in BIM-FM. Through discussing the interconnections between the physical and 
digital assets of a built facility, this study develops a cyber-risk matrix which acts as a 
foundation for empirical investigations of the matter in future research. 
Keywords- BIM, FM, Cybersecurity, Risks, Threats, Cyber-awareness 
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Appendix 1. Interview Participation Form  
Research Participation Agreement 
Dear Participant, 
I am a Doctoral Researcher at the school of Computing, Engineering and Built Environment at 
the Birmingham City University. I am investigating cybersecurity management in BIM-
enabled Facilities Management. My specific interest is in the challenges brought by the 
interaction of people with digital technology offered by Building Information Modelling, and 
the ways in which the information will be exchanged and stored using various methods. The 
aim is to investigate the requirements improving the cybersecurity of BIM, for achieving its 
benefits within the facility management sector.  
I would be most grateful if you would volunteer to assist in a study that I am conducting by 
granting an interview. No more than one hour would be required either face-to-face or via a 
call, depending on your availability and preference. This interview is for me to gain a better 
understanding of the issues affecting good cybersecurity culture within the FM sector with a 
focus on BIM-enabled projects and the knowledge and skills required to improve the security 
of digital data within FM. I will seek your consent before the interview starts as I intend to 
audio record the interview. Full anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed for all 
participants that take part in this research and any work to be published as a result of this 
research will be done so in agreement with all parties. 
This research project is designed and conducted by Nikdokht Ghadiminia, a PhD candidate at 
Birmingham City University.   
Participation - Your participation in this interview is voluntary and you may withdraw your 
participation at any time. You understand that fully anonymised extracts from the interview 
may be quoted in the published PhD thesis.  
 
Benefits - You will receive no direct benefits from participating in this research study. 
However, your responses will provide useful findings in the development of a practical 
framework used for improving the cybersecurity of the digital data (i.e., BIM data).  
  
Risks - There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this study other than those 
encountered in day-to-day life. 
 
Confidentiality - All your responses will remain anonymous without revealing personal details. 
All interview data are treated with utmost confidentiality in any publications or presentations 
and will remain anonymized.  
 
Consent of Participation 
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I  -----------------------------(Name/Surname) here-by confirm that I am willing to participate in 
an interview on the information management strategies practiced by Facility Management 
stakeholders. 
Your signature will also confirm the following: 
• You have read the above information 
• You understand that this interview will be audio recorded for researchers use only. 
• You understand that all personal data will be kept strictly confidential.  
• You voluntarily agree to participate 
• You are 18 years of age or older 
 






Researcher: Nikdokht Ghadiminia, BEng, MSc, PGCert, 07711272134 
nikdokht.ghadiminia@mail.bcu.ac.uk  
 
Director of Studies: Dr Mohammad Mayouf, PhD, MSc, PGCert, BSc, CAPM, FHEA, 
ACIOB 
Participant Signature:  ---------------------- 
                                       
Date: ------------------- 






Appendix 2. Validation Questionnaire Consent Form 
Participation Agreement  
Title of Research: An organizational approach to improving the cybersecurity of 
BIM-enabled facilities management. 
Researcher: Nikdokht Ghadiminia, PhD Candidate, Birmingham City University 
Aim of study: The aim of this research is to develop a framework that supports the 
integration of cyber security within the BIM-enabled facilities management 
organisations. This study explores the enablers and inhibitors of maintaining a 
cybersecure BIM-enabled facilities management by accentuating the role of people 
and processes. 
Participant selection 
You are selected as an expert with either facilities management or organisational 
cybersecurity management expertise to contribute to the validation of the framework 
proposed by this research. The validation task involves answering a questionnaire on 
the concepts within the framework. Your participation is voluntary, and you can 
withdraw at any point without justification. You will be asked to sign a consent form 
upon your participation.  
Confidentiality: All responses and information collected from the questionnaire will be 
kept secure and no personally identifiable information will be kept or reported. All 
information will be managed in accordance with the Data Protection Act. The data 
collection process complies with the Birmingham city university’s research code of 
conduct.  
Withdrawal: You can withdraw your participation at any point. Also, you may inform 
the researcher if you do not wish any of your answers to be used in the research.  
Description of the validation activity: As an expert with knowledge of facilities 
management and/or cybersecurity management, you are asked to respond to open 
ended questions regarding the proposed research framework. All participants will be 
given a research brief, which includes the research framework, a description of the 
framework and a table of description for the elements within the framework. You are 
asked to read the research brief prior to responding to the questionnaire. The questions 
are aimed at improving and optimising the proposed framework using your valuable 
insight.  You are not obliged to answer to every question; however, every comment 
will add value to the research and is much appreciated.  
Benefits: Participation in this research does not entail any financial gain for the 
participants. However, the facilities management industry will benefit from your 
valuable contribution to the development of a framework which can potentially guide 





No serious concerns are anticipated as a result of participation in study. However, you 
can always communicate your concerns to me or my director of studies if further 
details were required. Please find the contact details below: 
• Researcher: Nikdokht Ghadiminia, Doctor of Philosophy Research Candidate, 
Birmingham City University, email: Nikdokht.Ghadiminia@mail.bcu.ac.uk, 
contact phone number: 07711272134 
• Director of Studies: Dr Mohammad Mayouf, Birmingham City University, 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































        










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































          




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
